Publications:
Settlements under Unequal Access to Justice (with Madina Kurmangaliyeva), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 193, pp. 237–268 (2022).
Optimal Information Disclosure in Contests with Stochastic Prize Valuations (with Mariya Teteryatnikova), Economic Theory 75, pp. 743–780 (2023).
Optimal Information Disclosure in Contests with Communication, Theory and Decision (2025).
Optimal Information Disclosure in Competing Contests with Budget Constrained Players, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 241, 107392 (2026).
Working Papers:
Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents (PDF) – 2nd round R&R in Economic Theory
Many real life competitions feature multi-dimensional prizes. We develop a model where two players with asymmetric preferences engage in a contest game. The key novelty is the introduction of multi-dimensional rewards. We characterize the optimal prize allocation that maximizes aggregate effort. When heterogeneity in preferences is strong and the designer cannot assign identity-dependent prizes, the loser must get a positive reward, which is in stark contrast to the existing literature. Such allocation eliminates the advantage of the stronger competitor and incentivizes the opponent to exert more effort (the equilibrium effect). Applying the model to the data from professional tennis competitions where prizes consist of money and the ATP ranking points, we provide empirical evidence that highlights the importance of multi-dimensional incentives in contests.
Flexible or Uniform? Optimal Pricing Strategies of Chains (with Ekaterina Kazakova and Alexander Tarasov) (PDF) – submitted
We develop a model of spatial competition with two heterogeneous in their market access chains, choosing between third-degree price discrimination in their local markets (flexible pricing) and a unified chain-level price (uniform pricing). The markets are interconnected with each other via consumers who commute between them and can make purchases in locations where they do not reside. With the uniform pricing strategy, a chain can potentially grow its market share by making its price in one market informative about prices in all other chain’s locations. We show that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium, in which the two pricing strategies co-exist: the larger chain uses uniform pricing, while the smaller chain employs flexible pricing. We also find that the chains never choose the pricing strategies that maximize the total consumer surplus.
Support Link Formation in Contests (with Mariya Teteryatnikova, James Tremewan, and Alexander Usvitskiy) (PDF)
We use theory and an experiment to investigate how support relationships develop endogenously in view of a future contest, and how those relationships affect contestant investment. We introduce a two-stage game, in which two competing players form support links with a third, indirectly involved player before proceeding to the contest stage. We characterize conditions under which players form support links, and study how links influence contest outcomes. An experiment provides partial support for the theory, however we find patterns of over-investment that cannot be explained by standard behavioural phenomena such as “joy of winning” and reciprocity.
Work in Progress:
Strategic Attacks in Networks (with Mariya Teteryatnikova)
When Justice is Hurried and When is it Buried? Wealth Inequality and the Duration of Cases in Court (with Madina Kurmangaliyeva)
Dormant Projects:
Adverse Selection in Job Promotion Contests with Multi-dimensional Skills (with Anna Ponomarenko)