The Impact of Colonialism on British Military Doctrine at the Start of the First World War

Navigating Two Spheres of War

“My solution to the problem is that we must give a signal before war breaks out or it may be too late, and the best way of doing so is to send a force from India… at once.” [1] This was the dilemma posed by the Indian Military Secretary, Viceroy and Secretary of State at the outbreak of war in July 1914. While the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was sent to the Western Front (WF), the Central Powers sought to expand their territorial reach into the Asian and Pacific regions. The BEF could not fight in both spheres simultaneously, forcing British military strategists and colonial officials to navigate how best to deploy soldiers from the Empire to protect vital imperial assets. This eased pressure on British soldiers on the WF, but deployment decisions were also driven by deep scepticism over the efficiency of Indian soldiers.

The primary purpose of colonial soldiers at the start of WWI was to protect imperial assets. There was no initial planning for their involvement on the Western Front. Early British discussions show that WWI was equally an imperial defence war for Britain, rather than solely an obligation to protect Belgium. When Indian soldiers were eventually deployed in Europe, the colour bar and martial race theories explain why they went ‘over the top’ first; military officials viewed the sepoys’ ‘uncivility’ and ‘bestiality’ as suited best to hand-to-hand conflict. Military doctrine used Indian soldiers with disregard to avoid sacrificing the ‘superior’ and limited British soldiers.

Aims of the Project

The relationship between military and colonial history regarding Britain and WWI has often been one of friction. Traditional military historiography, notably the works of Gary Sheffield and David French, focuses exclusively on the BEF and the Triple Entente’s Western Front engagement. Conversely, colonial historiography, including works by Ian Cardozo and Gajendra Singh, grants agency to colonial soldiers by explaining their significance. This separation is artificial, as three million colonial soldiers fought for the British and were strategically deployed based on their colonial contexts and previous military experiences. The better a colony’s relationship with Britain, their resources, and military strength, the more likely they were to be initially deployed. Therefore, colonialism played a significant, yet historically under-regarded, role in military planning leading up to and during the start of WWI.

Over the summer of 2025, I completed a SURE scheme research project to bring the military and colonial history methodologies together. The aim was to see how colonial thinking influenced British military doctrine to explain not how but why colonial soldiers were utilised in specific ways at the start of WWI.

British Military Planning from 1900

Arguably, albeit subconsciously and constrained by alliance obligations, victory for Britain in WWI was equally about defending its empire. Due to British maritime strength and a small army, the BEF lacked the capacity to fight on the Western Front and simultaneously defend imperial interests. The Western Front became a priority for the BEF due to political obligations with the Triple Entente, so the Empire had to be defended by alternative means. [2] In practical terms, however, little had been achieved in terms of colonial and dominion participation in War Office strategic planning by 1914.

The Empire had significant interests in Egypt and Mesopotamia, demonstrated by the Indian Army’s small demonstrations in Tanga during November 1914. [3] The limited capacity of the BEF meant military strategists had no choice but to deploy colonial soldiers in non-Western spheres of war to defend imperial assets.

Analysing dispatches between British military and colonial officials for India in 1914, notably the Viceroy and Secretary of State, showcases these developments. Discussions anticipating war in Mesopotamia and imperial defence of Persia were prominent. Colonial officials feared that a Turk-Arab alliance could leave India vulnerable to a German invasion. [4] As the ‘Jewel in the Crown’ of the British Empire, India’s protection was paramount.

The dispatches made it apparent that the ‘nativeness’ of Indians meant they could be dispatched to Persia without suspicion of occupation. Colonialists referred to the ‘tribes’ of the Tigris Valley as the ‘educated classes’, implying they would be less likely to resent the operation. [5] Obedience and lack of independent thought were deemed desirable traits for sepoys to minimise diplomatic tensions and to ensure swift occupation. Decisions regarding the skill levels of Indian soldiers and probabilities of sparking conflict were often taken between the Viceroy and Secretary of State for India. [6] This suggests military strategists favoured Indian troops in Mesopotamia to avoid non-military international tensions caused by British soldiers. However, they were conscious of the Indian army’s perceived lack of military advancement. By handing responsibility to Indian troops, colonial defence was clearly the primary role initially envisaged for them, explaining why they were not initially considered for the Western Front, stereotypes from the military elites of Indian primitiveness deemed them suited only to savage, non-European fighting.

Imperial defence was crucial for British military thinking even if reforms and changes to their military strategy were focused on the BEF.. Britain lacked the capacity to fight on the Western Front and defend its empire using only British troops, making colonial soldiers the logical solution. However, significant colonial and racial undertones underpinned Indian deployment. Internal discussions viewed Indian troops fighting in Mesopotamia as a more natural environment for colonial soldiers due to their nativity to the area. This also minimised the risk of violating the colour bar principle, the belief that non-white soldiers should be restricted to fighting other non-whites, due to the perceived superiority of white soldiers. Thus, Indian soldiers were not initially sent to the Western Front due to officials deeming their traits only suitable to colonial fighting.

India

The Indian Army was trained and equipped for warfare on the Indian frontier. It was sent to the Western Front only as a last resort after the BEF and Territorial Army (TA) were decimated at the First Battle of Ypres in October 1914. Other dominion states were mobilised but no meaningful number of troops would arrive until late 1914. Britain reluctantly had to deploy Indians into the Western Front. By the end of 1914, 30 percent of ‘British’ forces in France were Indian. [7] This highlights the magnitude and speed of Indian contribution, leading to British overreliance in subsequent years.

Colonial and racial prejudices were embedded in their deployment, complexified by different stereotypes about India’s ethnic and religious diversity. The British viewed the Gurkhas as primitive and instinctive with an ability to fight doggedly, explaining why they were mainly deployed in hand-to-hand combat. Military doctrine also considered Indian suitability to exotic climates, with strategists connecting the ‘bizarre’ nature of Indians to thriving in ‘warmer, less civilised environments.’ [8] Recruiters were warned that Jats were ‘marred by grosser traits’ and their ‘dogged courage exhibits themselves in crimes of violence’. [9] By contrasting white Western soldiers' sophistication with the more ‘barbaric’ and ‘uncivilised’ Indian troops, military officials placed Indians in ‘ungentlemanly’ theatres of war, replicating their perceived mannerisms and natural environment. This justified anticipating more casualties and sacrificing Indian soldiers more sparingly than British soldiers.

This stereotype reaffirms why Indian soldiers were initially deployed in Mesopotamia. As part of military doctrine, colonial officials made distinctions based on religious beliefs to rate combat readiness. Sikhs were deemed hardy, brave but of slow intelligence and devotedly attached to officers. [10] Hindu soldiers were deemed difficult to control and feed in the field, making them less desirable. [11] These distinctions were known as martial race theory, with colonial prejudices such as tribalness, savagery and others contributing to an artificial racist hierarchy of different Indian soldiers. Martial race theory, originated in 1857 by British army officials in India after the rebellion, was the classification and implementation of hierarchies within different ethnic and religious groups in India, to determine their military suitability. These were used to reaffirm colonial control through ‘divide and rule’ techniques. In these British logics, Sikhs were most preferable, whereas Hindus and those from Punjab were less desirable.

Maps and battle reports from the Battle of Tanga in November 1914 help explain the tactical deployment in imperial defence campaigns. [12] Here, the Indian soldiers were fighting in East Africa. The Princely States of India were deemed with a bit more respect than the Indian Expeditionary Force (IEF). The IEF was put in more hazardous situations before British soldiers disembarked. There were condescending undertones, describing the Indians as the ‘lesser of the two’ in comparison to British regiments. [13] It was suggestive that the Indians lacked discipline, reinforcing the colour bar and martial theories. The Indians were at the forefront of the battle; the British at the opposite end, with less direct combat, reinforcing segregation even within a cooperative mission. 

Conclusion

Overall, Indian soldiers were deemed less reliable than white soldiers, requiring supervision due to lingering concerns from the 1857 Indian Rebellion. The colour bar theory was definitely prominent in 1914, hence the initial focus on imperial defence in the Mediterranean. Non-white soldiers were discouraged from fighting white soldiers due to the perceived superiority of the latter. When fighting in tandem with European forces, Indians were segregated and put first in the firing line, deemed better in ‘savage’ conflict, implying they were treated as a sacrifice.

Participating in the SURE scheme has shown that more research can be done to see how colonial soldiers were deployed throughout the duration of WWI, and how this aligned or changed as British doctrine and strategy evolved. Future research could explore if military turning points like Gallipoli led to significant changes. However, this methodology can also be applied to other conflicts, with colonial soldiers being part of the British system from the Napoleonic Wars through to the Second World War. It is a significant gap within British historiography, and yet such an important and insightful lens to analyse the British and colonial experience of warfare from c.1790 through to 1945 in bringing military and colonial historiography together.

Megan Beevers is a third-year undergraduate History student in the School of History, Philosophy and Digital Humanities. This research was undertaken as part of the Sheffield Undergraduate Research Experience (SURE) scheme. This project also analysed why Australasian and Canadian soldiers were utilised by the British military strategists. Thank you to Dr. Sebastian Gehrig and Dr. Sarah Frank for their supervision during the project. Thank you to The UK National Archives for granting access to the First World War maps, telegrams and dispatches, which have been invaluable to the project.

References

[1] The UK National Archives (TNA), WO 106/52, Persia and Mesopotamia, 1914

[2] John Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c.1900-1916 (London, 2017), p. 6

[3] Ian Beckett, The British Army and the First World War (Cambridge, 2017), p. 173

[4] TNA, WO 106/52, Persia and Mesopotamia

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ian Cardozo, The Indian Army in World War I, 1914-1918 (New York, 2024), p. 81

[8] Gajendra Singh, The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars: Between Self and Sepoy (London, 2014), p. 24

[9] Ibid., p. 33

[10] Ibid., p. 30

[11] Ibid.

[12] The UK National Archives (TNA), WO 158/439: Indian Expeditionary Force: Despatch by Maj General A.E. Aitken, with maps, 1914

[13] Ibid.

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