About me

Job market paper

1. "A model of employer and employee moral hazard in optimal disability insurance", 2025, working paper (to be uploaded soon).

Abstract: In this paper, I analyze the optimal, welfare-maximizing levels of disability insurance policy parameters in an economy that includes both employee and employer moral hazard. The three key policy parameters that I consider are i) the disability benefit level, ii) the strictness of the disability screening process, and iii) the level of experience rating in the disability insurance premiums paid by employers. Experience rating links the insurance premiums paid by firms to their (former) employees’ DI costs. I derive welfare-maximizing conditions for the three policy parameters by extending the Diamond Sheshinski (1995) model, adapted by Haller et al. (2024), with an employer side to be able to analyze the behavioral effects of employer incentives, in this case, experience rating, in disability insurance. The conditions can be empirically estimated through the sufficient-statistics approach. 

Publication

2. "Do Stronger Employer Responsibilities Enhance Workplace Accommodation for Sick-Listed Workers? Evidence from a Dutch Reform" (with Viola Angelini, Max Groneck and Raun van Ooijen). Health Economics (Forthcoming).

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of stronger employer responsibilities for facilitating work resumption of sick or disabled workers on employers' workplace accommodation efforts during sick leave. We exploit a reform in the Netherlands that altered experience rating – i.e., shifting the costs of sick leave and disability insurance to the firm – both for permanent and non-permanent employees. Using unique Dutch survey data on workplace accommodation of long-term sick-listed workers, we show that experience rating has no significant impact on accommodation efforts. Moreover, we provide evidence that the reform led to more firms opting for self-arranging both the sick leave benefits and the reintegration process of sick non-permanent workers, instead of using the public insurance scheme.

Working papers

3. "Reduced screening older workers for disability benefits: Short-run behavioral effects" (with Max Groneck, Pierre Koning, Raun van Ooijen, and Marcel Spijkerman). 2025, working paper. 

Abstract: We examine the impact of a 2022 policy change in the Netherlands where long-term sick-listed workers aged 60+ can bypass screening and receive full temporary Disability Insurance (DI). Using administrative data and a difference-in-differences design around the eligibility cutoff, we find that DI applications rose modestly (+1.2 pp) while awards increased markedly (+6.5 pp) driven by higher acceptance and a shift from partial-, and permanent to full temporary DI. Effects are larger for women, service-sector workers, and the lowest income quintile. One year after potential receipt, employment fell by 2.1 pp and earnings responses imply a 31 percent crowd-out ratio. The results suggest that moral hazard is more evident in labor supply responses than in DI application behavior.