Abstract: This paper studies how sequential auction timing affects small business participation in procurement markets. Using Oklahoma highway procurement data where morning and afternoon auctions occur within the same day, I find that morning wins generate measurable cost reductions through realized synergies, yet capacity constraints lead winners, especially small firms, to enter fewer subsequent contracts. Small firms gain larger cost savings from coordination but face higher barriers to reentry, reflecting tighter bonding and capacity limits. I adopt a structural framework to recover cost distributions, synergy functions, and entry costs. Counterfactual simulations demonstrate bundled formats achieve both lowest procurement costs and expanded small firm representation, suggesting targeted project pairing can enhance fiscal efficiency and equitable access.
Abstrct: This paper studies the efficiency of FCC spectrum Auction 110, which sold 5G licenses across 406 markets using an ascending clock format. Using a revealed preference approach, I estimate bidder valuations, standalone values, and geographic complementarities, and evaluate whether spectrum caps promote small bidder participation. The analysis shows welfare losses of about $3.6 billion under current rules, with strong effects of complementarities and bidder strategies. These findings highlight how auction design shapes competition, efficiency, and opportunities for smaller firms.
Abstrct: Nearly three years after ChatGPT’s launch, the generative AI landscape remains in rapid flux. Using high-frequency traffic data from Semrush, we track adoption patterns for the 60 most-visited GenAI tools through mid-2025. We find five key trends. First, rapid innovation with new entrants like DeepSeek and Grok. Second, ChatGPT’s continued dominance, accounting for 77% of traffic in April 2025. Third, explosive growth since mid-2024 driven by rising users and engagement. Fourth, widening global divides as adoption in low-income countries lags far behind. Fifth, localization advantages for non-U.S. tools such as Le Chat and Chinese platforms. These patterns highlight both the dynamism of the market and the risks of deepening inequality, underscoring the need for inclusive digital policies.
Abstract: Chen and Rey (2019, Rand Journal of Economics) show that multiproduct firms in competitive markets often adopt competitive cross-subsidization: losses on weak products are offset by profits on strong ones. This paper examines whether that strategy remains robust when a firm discontinues its weak product lines instead of subsidizing them. We show that an equilibrium exists where one firm exits and the rival uses monopoly profits from that market to cross-subsidize other products. This equilibrium Pareto dominates the standard cross-subsidization outcome, indicating that while the strategy persists, it arises through monopoly power rather than direct competition.