My research focuses on the nature of rationality and its connection to other normative statuses. I argue, contra orthodoxy, that some rational beliefs (and actions) are blameworthy, that rationality and rightness come apart, but that rationality and epistemic justification go together, and that (pace some prominent epistemologists) rationality really is a requirement for knowledge. I defend an account of the structure of normativity on which rationality and rightness are both equally central and irreducibly distinct norms, which are both determined by distinct kinds of reasons. Since I favor reasons-based theories of rationality and rightness, I spend a lot of time thinking about reasons and how they work.
Papers
In Defense of Defeat (Synthese, 2026)
Abstract: The idea that knowledge and justification can be defeated is a staple of contemporary epistemology. Recently, however, several prominent knowledge-firsters have rejected this idea. According to them, agents retain knowledge and justification in the face of (putatively) defeating evidence, at least in paradigm cases of (putative) defeat. But it isn’t plausible that the agents’ beliefs remain rational in such cases. To accommodate this, these knowledge-firsters posit unreasonable knowledge: cases where knowledge and rationality come apart. In this paper, I argue that the accounts of rationality endorsed by prominent knowledge-firsters – when coupled with indefeasibilism about knowledge – fail to accommodate clear intuitions about rationality in certain novel defeat cases. Thus, knowledge-first indefeasibilists lack a satisfactory account of rationality. This, I suggest, provides us with reason to accept what seemed intuitive all along: that in putative cases of defeat, justification and knowledge really are defeated. This in turn undercuts much of the motivation for positing unreasonable knowledge.
Published Version: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-026-05780-x
Rationality Does Not Always Exculpate (Accepted conditional on minor revisions at Philosophical Studies)
Abstract: Many philosophers assume that rationality always exculpates: that if a belief or action is rational, then it follows that it is not blameworthy. Recently, this idea has featured prominently in an increasingly popular style of argument for ultra-externalist views in epistemology. These arguments rest on cases in which, intuitively, an agent’s beliefs or actions are blameworthy, despite being rational by internalist (and moderate externalist) lights. If rationality always exculpates, then only ultra-externalist theories are left standing. In this paper, I show that these arguments rest on a mistake. By looking closely at certain cases in ethics, it becomes clear that – whatever the true theory of rationality – it is not true that rationality always exculpates. I then sketch an account of when, and why, rational behavior is blameworthy. My account in hand, I show how internalists can capture our intuitions about blameworthiness in the relevant cases. I argue that my view handles the cases even better than the ultra-externalist theories they were taken to motivate. The arguments thus fail, and in turn, the primary motivation for ultra-externalist views in epistemology evaporates.
Please email me if you'd like to see a draft.
A paper on the rationality and rightness of belief, and their connection to epistemic justification (in progress)
A paper offering a novel theory of the proper basing relation (in progress)