Does dissatisfaction with centrist parties affect the electoral success of extremist parties in Germany?

Germany's far-right party the AfD has growing support, so why is this occurring even though they are considered extreme?

Introduction

Democracies falter for a number of reasons; therefore, it is necessary to identify them. Weaknesses of democracies are clear in instances in which extreme parties elect leaders into power. This could range from the rise of Abascal from the Vox party in Spain to Trump’s time as president in the US, when he would spark discussion over invalid voting, as discussed in other research. In Europe, a particularly prominent issue is the rise of parties criticizing entire political systems, which often entails dislike for the parties currently in power. Examples of such extreme parties are the Vox party and the Alternative for Germany (AfD).

The following research focuses on the reasoning behind the rising electoral success of the AfD in Germany. Although there are already speculations about the reasoning behind their rise, such as the heavy use of social media and playing the victim, they are not limiting. For instance, there is a possibility that different levels of satisfaction with centrist parties can impact the likelihood of an individual to vote for the AfD.

Related Studies

As expected, this relationship has been considered by other researchers. For instance, in the Oxford Handbook of Populism, the chapter titled addresses the topic. The importance of dissatisfaction with “Populist Parties and the Structure of Political Competition” centrist parties is discussed by claiming that extremist parties become appealing when they promise new ideas different from existing parties and promise more democratic expression. Additionally, it is suggested that this is especially tempting for those who are against mainstream elites.

Furthermore, the research article, “Centrist anti-establishment parties and their protest voters: more than a superficial romance?”, focuses on the rise of centrist parties that are anti-establishment. This brings up the idea that in a sense centrist and extremist parties may have something in common; however, the main reason this relates to the study of the electoral success of extremist parties is that it infers that there are reasons other than dissatisfaction that impact success. In the case of the research article, ideology was one of the main aspects of the study. For this reason, alternate hypotheses will also be addressed in the research presented here.

Hypothesis

To determine the impact of centrist dissatisfaction on the rise of centrist parties in Germany, the relationship between whether an individual voted for the AfD or not was compared with their feelings toward centrist parties. Hypothetically, if an individual has less satisfaction with centrist parties, then they are more likely to support extremist parties through voting.

Research Design

To begin with, data to analyze was chosen from national German survey data on the 2019 election. The questions resulted in responses that revealed what individuals would rank centrist parties such as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The rankings were on a scale of one to ten when the parties were viewed individually, however, the variable that mostly be used is one ranking like for centrist parties as a whole, which falls on a scale of one to twenty. Satisfaction for parties is the independent variable. The dependent variable was taken from a different question that seeks who a person voted for. This allows for the dependent variable to become a binary split between who did or did not vote for the AfD. Since there are many factors that influence these opinions, the results will be controlled through age, gender, education, and marital status.Overall, the combination of these responses allows for it to be analyzed whether satisfaction for centrist parties has an influence on whether an individual voted for the AfD.

To better understand this data. Below is the graph showing how many people voted for the AfD or other parties. Of those who participated in the survey, only 8% voted for them. Moreover, the average satisfaction of participants of centrist parties overall is shown as 12.8. If those who voted for the AfD typically fall below this average, then the hypothesis that those who are more dissatisfied with centrist parties are more likely to vote for extremist counterparts would be true.

Results

In order to interpret the data, it was put onto scatterplots with linear regression lines. There are only data points at zero and one on the y-axis because it is a binary variable revealing whether the respondent voted for the AfD or not (afd_vote). Zero means that an individual did not vote for the AfD and one means they have voted for the AfD. On the other hand, the x-axis represents the satisfaction for centrist parties (centrist_like). The linear regression line produced from this scatterplot has a slope of -0.0205 and the alternate hypotheses are applied.

The first graph presents the overall centrist satisfaction in relation to voting for the AfD; however, the second two graphs are included to show that even when centrist parties are separate, the relationship is still nearly the same.

The null hypothesis for the presented data is that there is no relationship between satisfaction with centrist parties and whether an individual votes for the AfD. Because the slope of the line of regression has a p-value of >.001, which is lower than 0.05, it is plausible to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, the slope of -0.205 is likely to not be due to random sampling errors in the data. In other words, there is a statistically significant relationship between centrist party satisfaction and voting for the AfD. For every one unit the satisfaction increases, the likelihood of voting for the AfD decreases by 0.205.

Finally, the results of the alternative hypotheses can be addressed. First, there was not a statistically significant difference in voting for the AfD based on age; the slope was a very small value of -6.17E-05. Contrarily, there was a statistically significant relationship (p-value was <.001) between gender and voting for the AfD. There is a negative slope, which means when switching from men to women, there is a smaller chance for women to vote for the AfD. Similarly, as education and centrist satisfaction increase, voters are less likely to choose the AfD because there is a negative correlation. On a different note, although it is slightly less statistically significant with a p-value of 0.025, people who are married are more likely to vote for the AfD, which is suggested by the positive correlation coefficient.

Conclusion

Overall, it is strongly suggested that in Germany, people who are more satisfied with centrist parties are less likely to vote for the AfD. Therefore, the hypothesis that individuals with less satisfaction for centrist parties are more likely to vote for the AfD is suggested to be true. Considering the very low p-value and the fact that the responses are in a large number from national survey data, it is very likely that the findings of this data are an accurate representation of Germany as a whole. Thus, the results can be generalized to understand that the more dissatisfied people are with centrist parties, the more likely they are to vote for extreme parties in Germany.

Since this data only covers Germany, it does not provide a full understanding of the impact of satisfaction on the rise of extremist parties. Nevertheless, further research could be conducted to compare results in varying countries to see if this holds true outside of Germany as well. Since there was a clear relationship found in Germany and the rise of extremist parties in democracies are growing, it is important to conduct more research on this topic. Once it is understood that a lack of satisfaction with centrist parties leads to the rise of extremist parties, especially in Europe, there will be higher urgency for solutions to be found to increase satisfaction.

Works Cited

“AFD Watershed, 5 Reasons for the Far Right Rising in Germany.” Süddeutsche.de, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 May 2018, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/projekte/artikel/politik/afd-5-reasons-for-the-far-right-rising-in-germany-e403522/.

Barrio, Astrid, et al. “Vox Spain: The Organisational Challenges of a New Radical Right Party: Article.” Politics and Governance, 24 Nov. 2021, https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/4396/4396.

Engler, Sarah. “Centrist Anti-Establishment Parties and Their Protest Voters: More Than a Superficial Romance?” European political science review 12.3 (2020): 307–325. Web.

“Examining President Trump's Unusual Style of Party Leadership: Institute for Policy Research - Northwestern University.” Examining President Trump's Unusual Style of Party Leadership: Institute for Policy Research - Northwestern University, https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/news/2020/galvin-president-trumps-leadership-style.html.

“German National Survey Data.” CSES, 6 Aug. 2019, https://cses.org/.

Kaltwasser, R., Taggart, P. A., Espejo, P. O., & Ostiguy, P. (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press.

“Political Parties in Germany.” Handbook Germany, https://handbookgermany.de/en/political-parties.