Contents
Many doubters of the Description of the World’s (DW) authenticity base their argument on the untrustworthiness or even lack of evidence to support Marco Polo’s claims on Asia, China specifically, within the book. The most vocal of such doubters, Frances Wood, argues in her book that it was unlikely that Marco Polo had been in China due to his lack of acknowledgement within Chinese and Persian sources,[1] his negligence in mentioning unique Chinese cultural aspects such as tea, chopsticks, Chinese writing and foot binding,[2] as well as the questionable statistics and descriptions used in the DW which provides the reader with a blurry understanding of China and its culture. When viewing these arguments, one has to put into context Marco Polo’s role in the events of his book. Why did he go to China? What did he do there? From understanding the relationship between Europe and the Mongols during Marco Polo’s day, we can attempt to make sense of his actions and answer whether Marco Polo went to China.
The rise of the Mongol empire in the early 13th century, as they swept through the steppe, Central Asia, and Russia and Hungary between 1237-1242, ignited the interest of Europeans in East Asia. The Catholic church was mired in the Crusades against the Muslim world when the unheard-of Mongols arrived in the fray, and wondered whether the Mongols could be a strong ally against the Muslims or whether they were going to be a greater threat for themselves. As a result, papal envoys such as John of Plano Carpini,[3] ambassadors of kings such as Andrew of Longjumeau,[4] and missionaries such as William of Rubruck[5] undertook missions to enter areas under Mongol influence and see whether they could forge an alliance with the Mongol leaders, maybe convert them to Christianity even, so that they could together reclaim the Holy Lands from Muslim rule. In the case of failure, these envoys also recorded information on the institutions, cultures and practices of the Mongols, specifically battle-related, so that the European forces could perhaps devise strategies to defeat them.[6]
The successful conquest of the Mongols saw them acquire a large amount of territory, where they were able to set up trade networks for goods such as spices, luxury textiles, precious stones and more.[7] These exotic goods could possibly be sold for high prices in foreign areas, which provided opportunities for merchants and traders to prosper under Mongol rule, whereas the Mongols would then themselves profit off the business revenues.[8] The Mongol patronization of trade also largely facilitated the flourishing of trade with the construction of roads and canals, creating and supporting trade cities such as Tabriz, improving the yam travel system[9] and more.[10] The opening-up of Asia and the Middle East under a single government provided a great opportunity for European merchants to travel across the continent in the hope of gaining more profit for their goods.[11]
The Mongol’s “universal mandate” originally claimed rule over all territory in the world. They viewed Europe simply as territory they could subjugate easily, and this can be seen from their answers to envoys and ambassadors from Europe before the 1260s,[12] where they would always order subjugation. As time passed and the Mongols weakened,[13] however, they started to realize that they could not complete such grand conquests by themselves and would have to seek the support of allies in order to continue expanding. One such ally could be found in the Catholic Europeans, which had a shared feud against the Mamluks of Egypt, a major power that prevented the Ilkhanate from further expansion.
This shift in attitude towards the Europeans can be observed from Denise Aigle’s research on letters from Ilkhanate rulers Hulegu and Abaqa to Europe and the Christian church.[14] Unlike former letters before them, they do not mention the universal mandate or call for submission, instead treating the Europeans as equals and proposing to “establish a treaty of perpetual peace with the Holy Roman Church” in order to turn their focus on the Mamluks.
The Yuan split the peoples under their rule into four class: Mongolians, Semurens (people coming from Central Asia the Middle East and Europe), Hans (peoples of Northern China) and Manzi (peoples of Southern China).[15] The Yuan favored semurens over the other two groups as they were the first ethnic groups to join the cause of Yeke Mongol Ulus, they were more likely to stay loyal to the Mongols, and to prevent an over-reliance on Chinese that could easily lead to sinicization. [16] The top two classes were much more likely to occupy high roles in the court system such as advisors to the khan, daraguchis,[17] or act as envoys to their home country. They could also act in their original jobs: jobs that provided great monetary and knowledge-based benefits to the Mongols, such as trading, the preaching of religion, researchers of knowledge, and others. Preventing these influential jobs from falling into Chinese hands were important for the Yuan to keep the stability of their empire.
According to the DW,[18] Marco Polo’s father Niccolo and uncle Maffeo left Venice in 1260[19] first arrived in the territory of the Golden Horde with the aim of gaining a larger profit for the merchandise they brought with them, and continued east as war between Berke and Hulegu prevented them from returning to Venice via the original route.[20] There, they encountered and were entrusted by Khubilai Khan as envoys to the pope in Rome.[21] Back in Italy, they decided to bring Niccolo’s teenage son Marco, whose mother had died during their absence, on their return to China in 1271.
As an European, Marco Polo would have entered the system as a semuren, the second-highest class for the Mongols. As his father and uncle before him, he would have likely trained to be a merchant in his youth, thus lacking the skill set to serve as a daraguchi or advisor to the Khan. He would, however, be familiar with the procedures of trading, and could serve in the Yuan government as a official for trade.[22] A second path he could take within the Yuan government would be to act as wotuo merchant which answered and provided directly to the royal family.[23] Last but not least, through his multilingual talents,[24] he could have acted as an envoy to foreign lands should there be such a necessity.
Firstly, we know that Marco Polo arrived in China as a merchant, following in his father’s footsteps. He could possibly have taken up positions in the Yuan dynasty hierarchy as a semuren, but it would likely be lower-ranked as he did not possess the skill set needed for high-ranking advisors to the khan or ruling a province independently. This could be a plausible reason for him not being mentioned in dynastic sources such as Yuanshi and Yongledadian.
Due to his profession, during his stay in China Marco Polo was likely to pay more attention to the knowledge that he knew would help him gain profit in his profession, such as the specifics of the salt trade and paper notes.[25] This would reasonably explain why the description of these details are as specific as they are in the DW, and can act as a breakthrough point for contemporary historians to validate the reliability of the DW.
On the other hand, Marco Polo would not pay as much attention and describe in such details things that did not interest him or affected with his profit, such as the living habits of Chinese people that did not interest him.[26] We also have to take into account that he was a semuren, and under the Mongol’s racial policies would not have had much in-depth contact with the lower-classed Han and Manzi, hence making it understandable for him to neglect descriptions on their culture.[27]
Furthermore, unlike past Europeans who had wrote on the Mongol Empire, Marco Polo was not on a diplomatic mission. He would not be recording everything he had seen in order to report to a benefactor in the future; he simply wanted to share what he saw in the Far East with other Europeans. The DW co-authored by Marco Polo and Rustichello of Pisa was largely based off Marco’s memory of events around 10-20 years after they had happened,[28] and it would not be surprising if his memory failed to remember specific details of places and events, turning to giving generic descriptions.
Through understanding the mutually beneficial military, political and economical relationships between Europe and Asia in the mid to late-1200s, we can learn that Marco Polo’s decision to travel to Asia may have been a logical one, as well as observing what he could possibly have done in China. From this knowledge, we can attempt to explain the reasoning behind the lack of evidence or detail in the DW to prove that Marco Polo was in China.
Every historical resource has its own limitation, something missing that relies on other sources to fill in. Every historian has his own bias and viewpoint that he/she brings into his research, which requires others to question and doubt in order for humanity to gain a good view on a historical event. These resources may be called unreliable, but the flaws cannot fully overshadow the strengths. Similarly, Marco Polo’s DW, at its worst, should be called an unreliable source, but it cannot be used to prove that he was not in China.
[1]Wood, Frances, 132.
[2] ibid, 67-73.
[3] Morgan, David, Kindle Location 1837.
[4] ibid, Kindle Location 1854.
[5] ibid, Kindle Location 407-408.
[6] Richard, Jean, 47.
[7] Jackson, Peter (b), 212.
[8] Tang, Li, 108.
[9] The yam system was likely developed by the Khitan Liao dynasty in China. It consisted of many post stations, where travelers and envoys could go through and change horses quickly with the proper authorization. (paizas) (Morgan, David, Kindle Location 1148 - 1156)
[10] Jackson, Peter (b), 215 - 217.
[11] Even after the breakup of the Mongol Empire into a number of constituent states, such an opportunity was not significantly reduced (Jackson, Peter (a), 83.)
[12] Richard, Jean, 51.
[13] The Mongols were mainly weakened by internal political strife arising from political benefits and their first major military setback in the battle of Ayn Jalut in 1260. (Aigle, Denise, 155.)
[14] ibid, 153-154.
[15] 蒙思明, 25.
[16] Jackson, Peter (a), 94
[17] Governors of provinces. They were commonly occupied by Mongols, by on some rare occasions semuren would be employed for such endeavors. (Tang, Li, 94-95.)
[18] Kinoshita, Sharon, chp. 2 - 10
[19] Both Yule and Jackson notes that although manuscripts claim the time to be 1250, its seems more likely through historical evidence to be 1260. (Yule, Henry, 3, Jackson, Peter (a), 89.)
[20] Pelliot notes that the route between Constantinople and Berne’s domain was not blocked by war between Hulegu and Berke, but instead of complications between Berke and Byzantine emperor Michael Palaeologus. (Pelliot, Paul, 94-95)
[21] Morgan notes that this was a common practice of the Mongols (Morgan, David, Kindle Location 1888-1890)
[22] Pelliot suggests that if Marco Polo was to have an official role within the Mongol administration, it could plausibly be in the Yangzhou local salt administration. This would explain Marco’s detailed description on making salt and how the Mongols profited off it throughout the DW. (Pelliot, Paul, 834, Kinoshita, Sharon, chps. 117, 132, 140, 143, 153)
[23] Wotuo, originating from the Turkish word ortog, translates directly to “companion” or “partner”. De Rachewiltz explains that such merchants were granted special status in Mongol territories to purchase goods and make investments for the Khan and the royal family. (De Rachewiltz, Igor, 79)
[24] Yule argues that Marco Polo knew four languages: Bashpah-Mongol, Arabic, Uighur and Tibetan (Yule, Henry, 28-30)
[25] For specifics on paper money, (Kinoshita, Sharon, chp. 96)
[26] Many of Marco Polo’s descriptions on Cathay and Mangi provinces are rather generic, with: 1) the citizens are idolators 2) they use paper money 3) they belong to the Great Khan. For an example, see (Kinoshita, Sharon, chp. 142)
[27] Finnigan, Jonathan. 11:37 - 12:06
[28] The DW was composed by Marco Polo and Rustichello of Pisa in a prison in Genoa in 1298, whereas Marco Polo left for Asia in 1271 and arrived at the Yuan Court in 1275 (Kinoshita, Sharon, xiv)
Aigle, Denise (2005). The Letters of Eljigidei, Hülegü, and Abaqa: Mongol Overtures or Christian Ventriloquism? Inner Asia, 7(2), 143-162. Retrieved December 23, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23615692
De Rachewiltz, Igor (1997). Marco Polo went to China. Zentralasiatische Studien, 27, 34-92.
Finnigan, Jonathan (2004). Marco Polo: The China Mystery Revealed, Episode 2. Alexander Street.
Jackson, Peter (1998). Marco Polo and His 'Travels'. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 61(1), 82-101. Retrieved December 23, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3107293 (referred to as (a) in footnotes)
Jackson, Peter (2017). Pax Mongolia And A Transcontinental Traffic. In The Mongols and the Islamic World: From Conquest to Conversion (pp. 210-241). New Haven, London: Yale University Press. Retrieved December 23, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1n2tvq0.16 (referred to as (b) in footnotes)
Morgan, David (2007). The Mongols. Second ed. Blackwell.
Pelliot, Paul (1959). Notes On Marco Polo Vol 1. Imprimerie Nationale .
Pelliot, Paul (1959). Notes On Marco Polo Vol 2. Imprimerie Nationale .
Polo, Marco (2016). The Description of the World. Translated by Sharon Kinoshita. Hackett Publishing Company.
RICHARD, J. (1969). The Mongols And The Franks. Journal of Asian History, 3(1), 45-57. Retrieved December 23, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41929939
Tang, Li (2011). East Syrian Christianity in China under the Mongol Empire: A History Reconstructed. In East Syriac Christianity in Mongol-Yuan China (12th-14th centuries) (pp. 87-150). Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Retrieved December 23, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvc16hhv.8
Wood, Frances (1996). Did Marco Polo go to China. Westview Press.
Yule, Henry (1903). Book of ser Marco Polo Vol 1. John Murray.
蒙思明(1980):《元代社会阶级制度》。中华书局。