Lucas Yonker - Philosophy
What does it mean to be truly committed? In both the philosophy of action and ethical theory, commitment is invoked to explain why agents not only form intentions but also hold to them in the face of competing considerations and changing circumstances. Two influential traditions dominate the conversation. The first, following Michael Bratman, identifies commitment with the stability of future-directed intention: once an agent settles on a plan, that intention resists easy reconsideration and structures further practical reasoning. The second, developed by Christine Korsgaard and refined by Facundo Alonso, grounds commitment in the agent's reflective endorsement of reasons as normatively binding: to be committed is to stand behind a course of action on the grounds that one has sufficient reason to do so. This project argues that each of these accounts, even taken together, leaves something essential out.
Drawing on Harry Frankfurt's work on caring, I argue that commitment is best understood as the convergence of four interrelated elements: (a) an intention to act, (b) endorsement of certain reasons as normative grounds for that intention, (c) caring about the action itself, and (d) caring about the commitment itself. Caring, on this account, is not merely a feeling or preference but a will-bound, identity-shaping attitude. It is the motivational foundation that gives commitment its characteristic resilience, meaning its capacity to resist temptation, withstand contrary reasons, and shape the agent's identity over time. Without caring, normative reasons remain abstract and intentions remain fragile; with it, commitments become counterfactually robust and genuinely one's own.
What are the limits of accounts that identify commitment with the stability of intention (Bratman) or with the reflective endorsement of reasons (Korsgaard, Alonso)?
What role does caring, in Frankfurt's sense, play in sustaining commitment across time and changing circumstances?
How do normative endorsement and caring relate? Are they the same attitude, reducible one to the other, or distinct but mutually supportive?
What makes a commitment counterfactually robust, and why does this robustness matter for agency, identity, and accountability?
My argument builds on what Bratman and Alonso get right and identifies what they leave out. Intention gives commitment its structure; normative endorsement gives it rational authority. But neither, alone or combined, explains why genuine commitments survive pressure that mere intentions and endorsements do not.
The missing ingredient is caring, and it operates at two levels:
Caring about the object of the commitment: the action, person, goal, or project itself, which gives the commitment personal significance.
Caring about the commitment itself: valuing the very state of being bound to this course of action, which gives the commitment its resilience.
Together these generate what Frankfurt calls volitional necessity: the agent finds it psychologically impossible to simply abandon the commitment. Far from being a loss of autonomy, volitional necessity is an expression of it, aligning the will with what the agent most deeply values.
Endorsement and caring remain distinct attitudes. Endorsement is a reflective judgment about what reasons bind; caring is the affective and volitional investment that gives those reasons their personal grip. Genuine commitment arises when the two converge, producing commitments that are counterfactually robust: resilient against contrary reasons, shaping of identity, and genuinely the agent's own.
I am deeply grateful to Dr. Facundo Alonso for his guidance, careful reading, and insightful feedback at every stage of this project. His mentorship helped sharpen both the argument and my appreciation for the broader philosophical stakes of the question. I would also like to thank the Miami University Undergraduate Summer Scholars Program and the faculty and staff who made this opportunity possible.Â
Alonso, Facundo M. "A Hybrid View of Commitment." In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 9, edited by David W. Shoemaker. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025.
Bratman, Michael E. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.
Frankfurt, Harry G. The Reasons of Love. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Critical Thinking
This project required sustained analysis of competing philosophical accounts of commitment and the construction of an original argument that holds up under pressure. Engaging Bratman, Korsgaard, Alonso, and Frankfurt meant identifying what each account gets right, pinpointing where each falls short, and building a positive view that resolves the gap rather than splitting the difference.
Communication
Philosophy is an exercise in writing clearly about things that resist clear writing. Translating dense primary sources into precise, readable prose, and then condensing the argument into a ten-minute talk for a mixed audience, demanded two distinct communicative disciplines.
Professionalism
Sustained independent research depends on the less visible habits of the discipline: tracking citations carefully, meeting self-imposed deadlines, and revising drafts in response to feedback. Presenting the finished work at a public forum extends that standard beyond what a course submission typically demands, and treats the project as something worth polishing to a professional level.