Protecting Democracy Online: Government Regulation of Misinformation on Social Media 

Government regulation of social media platforms targeting misinformation spread by foreign powers is crucial due to the effects of misinformation via social media. The dangers of political misinformation disseminated on social media became most apparent during recent US presidential elections and the Coronavirus pandemic. Since social media corporations are forced to self-regulate, moderation of content relies on the integrity of the companies which creates a conflict of interest: profits versus protection. Content should be regulated by the government to limit falsehoods perpetuated by global entities with the intent of interfering with US affairs. Although social media users may have the right to view news that affirms their political beliefs, that does not mean democracy must be sacrificed. While there may be pushback from companies, the benefits of regulation outweigh the potential risks for the sake of upholding US democracy. In order for democracy to endure in this complex digital age, accountability of misinformation can no longer be placed on social media companies, but rather on the US government. Americans have a right to know who is behind the information they view online. 

This proposal, inspired by utopian ideals, is for enhanced government oversight and regulation of social media platforms with a focus on eliminating misinformation spread by foreign governments. It is not meant to infringe upon the right of freedom of speech for Americans, but rather support free speech without outside influence from long-term enemies of the US. The utopian philosophical principles that inform this proposal are social and political stability as well as the establishment of best conditions for all citizens. Additionally, since the spread of misinformation affects social hierarchies as a result of false stereotypes and scapegoating of certain socioeconomic and cultural groups, this plan would also encourage harmony between diverse groups of Americans.

The spread of misinformation on social media by foreign actors with the intent of swaying voter decisions has become heightened in recent years. Known US adversaries have tried to manipulate Americans with falsehoods perpetuated online with malicious intent, and are becoming less covert and more brazen in their tactics. Not only does it create distrust of accurate news and mislead voters, but these false narratives also pit fellow citizens against each other, creating an “us versus them” dynamic. 

According to an NPR article, foreign influence through social platforms peaked during the 2024 presidential election, when outside powers made bold attempts to influence voters. Political misinformation circulated online directly correlates to lower voter turnout, ultimately determining election outcomes. In 2024, foreign actors spread information about fictitious bomb threats at polling places as an attempt to scare voters. These threats are just one example of the more extreme lengths foreign powers are willing to go to for any chance to impact election outcomes. Americans deserve to vote without the bombardment of false information from foreign governments. 

Russian, Chinese, and Iranian interference is well documented and tracked by US cybersecurity teams. However, when foreign powers flood social media platforms with misinformation, their content is protected on these sites away from US cybersecurity teams. In a National Intelligence Council Report from 2020 detailing election interference, it states that Russia’s “online influence actors sought to affect US public perceptions of the candidates, as well as advance Moscow's longstanding goals of undermining confidence in US election processes and increasing sociopolitical divisions among the American people” (page 3). While no interference occurred directly with polling device technology, voter opinion was manipulated via online proxies and misinformation. In order to fully protect US voters from political manipulation online and to create unity between the American people, there must be government regulation of social media to reduce misinformation. Currently, the American government is limited in this way, leaving loopholes on social media for planted political misinformation to flourish. In 2024, Iran also peddled an "influence campaign” with intentions to “[exacerbate] divisions in the US, creating confusion, and undermining the legitimacy of US elections and institutions” (page 5). The intent of these global actors is clear and threatening to democratic affairs. The campaigns orchestrated by foreign governments also generate doubt in American voting systems, opposing political parties and their candidates, and create distrust among voters. 

Misinformation spread online with the intent of swaying voter decisions is widespread and often specifically targeted to certain voter groups. Foreign powers use two main tactics: flooding social media platforms with large amounts of fictitious content, and narrowly targeting certain demographic groups. A study tracking the Russian influence campaign in the lead up to the 2016 presidential election and associated voter attitudes reports that “at least 32 million US Twitter users were potentially exposed to posts from Russia-sponsored accounts in the eight months leading up to the 2016 election. Facebook has estimated, by comparison, that 126 million users had the potential to view Russian state-sponsored content on its platform” in just over a two-year period. According to an article on circulating election falsehoods on social media during 2020, just one Facebook post containing misinformation “collected 39,000 likes and comments on the social network and reached 18 million people”; this macroscale method of disseminating content is well-known among foreign misinformation campaigners and is an attempt to reach as many American social media users as possible in one fell swoop. The other technique used by global adversaries is to target specific voting groups. For example, researchers found that 10% of respondents account for nearly 98% of exposures to social media posts from Russian influence accounts in 2016; however, just one planted seed of misinformation can spread exponentially online making initial removal of misinformation content extremely crucial. In a New York Times article covering Russian, Iranian, and Chinese interference in 2024, researchers note that when misinformation becomes “custom-built for a specific audience by preying on their interests or opinions” it becomes much more effective in manipulating Americans. Since 2016, foreign powers are delivering fictitious political content with even more precision, leaving an inevitable mark on voters. 

The spread of misinformation on social media by foreign actors with the intent of swaying voter decisions has become heightened in recent years. Known US adversaries have tried to manipulate Americans with falsehoods perpetuated online with malicious intent, and are becoming less covert and more brazen in their tactics. Not only does it create distrust of accurate news and mislead voters, but these false narratives also pit fellow citizens against each other, creating an “us versus them” dynamic. 

According to an NPR article, foreign influence through social platforms peaked during the 2024 presidential election, when outside powers made bold attempts to influence voters. Political misinformation circulated online directly correlates to lower voter turnout, ultimately determining election outcomes. In 2024, foreign actors spread information about fictitious bomb threats at polling places as an attempt to scare voters. These threats are just one example of the more extreme lengths foreign powers are willing to go to for any chance to impact election outcomes. Americans deserve to vote without the bombardment of false information from foreign governments. 

Russian, Chinese, and Iranian interference is well documented and tracked by US cybersecurity teams. However, when foreign powers flood social media platforms with misinformation, their content is protected on these sites away from US cybersecurity teams. In a National Intelligence Council Report from 2020 detailing election interference, it states that Russia’s “online influence actors sought to affect US public perceptions of the candidates, as well as advance Moscow's longstanding goals of undermining confidence in US election processes and increasing sociopolitical divisions among the American people” (page 3). While no interference occurred directly with polling device technology, voter opinion was manipulated via online proxies and misinformation. In order to fully protect US voters from political manipulation online and to create unity between the American people, there must be government regulation of social media to reduce misinformation. Currently, the American government is limited in this way, leaving loopholes on social media for planted political misinformation to flourish. In 2024, Iran also peddled an "influence campaign” with intentions to “[exacerbate] divisions in the US, creating confusion, and undermining the legitimacy of US elections and institutions” (page 5). The intent of these global actors is clear and threatening to democratic affairs. The campaigns orchestrated by foreign governments also generate doubt in American voting systems, opposing political parties and their candidates, and create distrust among voters. 

Misinformation spread online with the intent of swaying voter decisions is widespread and often specifically targeted to certain voter groups. Foreign powers use two main tactics: flooding social media platforms with large amounts of fictitious content, and narrowly targeting certain demographic groups. A study tracking the Russian influence campaign in the lead up to the 2016 presidential election and associated voter attitudes reports that “at least 32 million US Twitter users were potentially exposed to posts from Russia-sponsored accounts in the eight months leading up to the 2016 election. Facebook has estimated, by comparison, that 126 million users had the potential to view Russian state-sponsored content on its platform” in just over a two-year period. According to an article on circulating election falsehoods on social media during 2020, just one Facebook post containing misinformation “collected 39,000 likes and comments on the social network and reached 18 million people”; this macroscale method of disseminating content is well-known among foreign misinformation campaigners and is an attempt to reach as many American social media users as possible in one fell swoop. The other technique used by global adversaries is to target specific voting groups. For example, researchers found that 10% of respondents account for nearly 98% of exposures to social media posts from Russian influence accounts in 2016; however, just one planted seed of misinformation can spread exponentially online making initial removal of misinformation content extremely crucial. In a New York Times article covering Russian, Iranian, and Chinese interference in 2024, researchers note that when misinformation becomes “custom-built for a specific audience by preying on their interests or opinions” it becomes much more effective in manipulating Americans. Since 2016, foreign powers are delivering fictitious political content with even more precision, leaving an inevitable mark on voters. 

There may be several counterpoints to this proposal, most prominently the question of free speech and a possible overreach of the government. These are both very relevant concerns; however, with the right management, checks and balances, and ultimate goal of protection of American voters and democracy, both of these issues would be avoided. To prevent this proposal from morphing into a removal of free speech, it is important to remember that foreign conflict in a modern world takes place online; it is in the best interest of the US to protect democracy on all fronts, including the new front of social media. Foreign powers “do not, and should not, have a First Amendment right to participate in American elections”. A plan centered around these ideals, if handled properly and with the safety of our nation at its core, has the capacity to reinstate trust in US election processes, reconnect fellow citizens and decrease polarization and group divides. This proposal can encourage and promote meaningful discourse–online and face-to-face–instead of spreading extremist misinformation planted with the intent of inciting fear and swaying political outcomes.  

In Defending Democracies, it describes the current method of self-policing as potentially more dangerous than a clear plan for removal of misinformation: “a lack of transparency undermines attempts to show that restrictions on foreign speech are neutral and not driven by geopolitical considerations or influence”. When self-policing is in place, content regulation is driven by a whole host of biases beyond drive for increased profits and larger user bases. An organized team dedicated to removing content that poses true threats to US voters, political discourse, and election results can eliminate the biases of social media companies that self-policing caters to. 

This proposal overall has the power to eliminate harmful misinformation and safeguard American political affairs from outside disruption. The utopian principles featured in this proposal and its effects include social and political stability; reduced political and social polarization from false narratives spread online by foreign powers through fear-mongering and scapegoating would decrease polarization. Protecting the American people from dangerous misinformation would create harmony in the political sphere and beyond. It would also encourage free speech and empathetic dialogue between different political groups, creating equality. Not only would foreign actors be stopped from disseminating falsehoods, but justice and democracy would prevail as a result of protection of US electoral affairs. There would be less division based on social class, gender, and racial stereotypes perpetuated by misinformation on social media. 

Social media platforms refuse to remove certain content that contains misinformation; this tactic is very similar to the principle in The Circle by Dave Eggers that can be described as “fear of deletion”. In the eyes of social media and technology companies, more content is always better, even if it is detrimental to voters and creates division among Americans. The platforms are caught up in their own accumulation of power and profit to such an extent that it is difficult for content to be removed from their expansive algorithms. Therefore, government regulation is crucial for the survival of democracy. Unlike Brave New World and 1984, government oversight does not have to be oppressive to the point of elimination of freedom of speech. Guardrails should be in place to prevent total government control of social platforms and complete elimination of free expression. The key focus of this proposal is to preserve democracy, not to eradicate it. Ultimately, this plan should be acted in accordance with the historical preservation of American democracy, free speech, protection of US electoral affairs, and participation of the people. 

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Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections. National Intelligence Council, 2021.https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-PREX28-PURL-gpo153032/pdf/GOVPUB-PREX28-PURL-gpo153032.pdf 

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Hagen , Lisa. Dec. 2020. Trump’s Conspiracy Theories Raise Concerns About Turnout In Georgia Senate Runoffs, NPR. 

Alba, Davey. “Now Circulating on Social Media: 4 Election Falsehoods (Published 2020).” New York Times, 14 Oct. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/10/14/technology/four-election-related-falsehoods.html 

Frenkle, Sheera, et al. “How Russia, China and Iran Are Interfering in the Presidential Election - The New York Times.” New York Times, 29 Oct. 2024, www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/technology/election-interference-russia-china-iran.html 

Jingnan, Huo. “Foreign Influence Efforts Reached a Fever Pitch during the 2024 Elections.” NPR, NPR, 12 Nov. 2024, www.npr.org/2024/11/09/nx-s1-5181965/2024-election-foreign-influence-russia-china-iran