Dr. Donald Ainslie Henderson (born 1928)

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Donald Henderson


Henderson with his Presidential Medal of Freedom in July 2002


Born

Donald Ainslie Henderson

September 7, 1928

Lakewood, Ohio

Died

August 19, 2016 (aged 87)

Baltimore, Maryland

Nationality

American

Alma mater

University of Rochester

Known for

Eradicating smallpox

Awards

Ernst Jung Prize (1976)

Public Welfare Medal (1978)

National Medal of Science (1986)

Japan Prize (1988)

Albert B. Sabin Gold Medal (1994)

Calderone Prize (1999)

Presidential Medal of Freedom (2002)

Scientific career


Fields

Epidemiology

Institutions

World Health Organization

Johns Hopkins University

University of Pittsburgh

UPMC Center for Health Security

Donald Ainslie Henderson (September 7, 1928 – August 19, 2016) was an American medical doctor, educator, and epidemiologist who directed a 10-year international effort (1967–1977) that eradicated smallpox throughout the world and launched international childhood vaccination programs.[1] From 1977 to 1990, he was Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health.[2] Later, he played a leading role in instigating national programs for public health preparedness and response following biological attacks and national disasters.[3] At the time of his death, he was Professor and Dean Emeritus of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and Professor of Medicine and Public Health at the University of Pittsburgh, as well as Distinguished Scholar at the UPMC Center for Health Security.[4][5][6]

Early life and education[edit]

Henderson was born in Lakewood, Ohio, on September 7, 1928, of Scots-Canadian immigrant parents.[7] His father, David Henderson, was an engineer; his mother, Eleanor McMillan, was a nurse. His interest in medicine was inspired by a Canadian uncle, William McMillan, who was a general practitioner and senior member of the Canadian House of Commons.[8]

Henderson (first man on left) as part of the CDC's smallpox eradication team in 1966.

Henderson graduated from Oberlin College in 1950 and received his MD from the University of Rochester School of Medicine in 1954. He was a resident physician in medicine at the Mary Imogene Bassett Hospital in Cooperstown, New York, and, later, a Public Health Service Officer in the Epidemic Intelligence Service of the Communicable Disease Center (now the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention—CDC). He earned an MPH degree in 1960 from the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health (now the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health).[8]

Research and career[edit]

Eradication of smallpox[edit]

Henderson served as Chief of the CDC virus diseaser surveillance programs from 1960 to 1965, working closely with epidemiologist [Dr. Alexander Duncan Langmuir (born 1910)]. During this period, he and his unit developed a proposal for a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) program to eliminate smallpox and control measles during a 5-year period in 18 contiguous countries in western and central Africa.[9] This project was funded by USAID, with field operations beginning in 1967.[8]

The USAID initiative provided an important impetus to a World Health Organization (WHO) program to eradicate smallpox throughout the world within a 10-year period. In 1966, Henderson moved to Geneva to become director of the campaign. At that time, smallpox was occurring widely throughout Brazil and in 30 countries in Africa and South Asia. More than 10 million cases and 2 million deaths were occurring annually. Vaccination brought some control, but the key strategy was "surveillance-containment". This technique entailed rapid reporting of cases from all health units and prompt vaccination of household members and close contacts of confirmed cases. WHO staff and advisors from some 73 countries worked closely with national staff. The last case occurred in Somalia on October 26, 1977, only 10 years after the program began.[8] Three years later, the World Health Assembly recommended that smallpox vaccination could cease. Smallpox is the first human disease ever to be eradicated.[10] This success gave impetus to WHO's global Expanded Program on Immunization, which targeted other vaccine-preventable diseases, including poliomyelitis, measles, tetanus, diphtheria, and whooping cough.[11] Now targeted for eradication are poliomyelitis and Guinea Worm disease; after 25 years, this objective is close to being achieved.[6][12]

Later work[edit]

From 1977 through August 1990, Henderson was Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health. After being awarded the 1986 National Medal of Science by Ronald Reagan for his work leading the World Health Organization (WHO) smallpox eradication campaign, Henderson launched a public struggle to reverse the Reagan administration's decision to default on WHO payments.[13] In 1991, he was appointed associate director for life sciences, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President (1991–93) and, later, deputy assistant secretary and senior science advisor in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).[8] In 1998, he became the founding director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, now the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.[4]

Following the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center, HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson asked Henderson to assume responsibility for the Office of Public Health Preparedness (later the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response).[14][15][16] For this purpose, $3 billion was appropriated by Congress.[8]

In 2006, Henderson published an academic paper critical of social distancing as a pandemic measure, saying it would "result in significant disruption of the social functioning of communities and result in possibly serious economic problems".[17][18]

At the time of his death, he served as the Editor Emeritus of the academic journal Health Security (formerly Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science).[19]

Honors and awards[edit]

Seventeen universities conferred honorary degrees on Henderson.[36]

Selected publications[edit]

Personal life[edit]

Henderson married Nana Irene Bragg in 1951.[7][22] The couple had a daughter and two sons.[22][36] He died at Gilchrist Hospice, Towson, Maryland, at the age of 87, after fracturing his hip.[7][36][37]

References[edit]

EVIDENCE TIMELINE

1979 (March) - Interview of Dr. Alex Langmuir

Youtube channel Global Health Chronicles   /   Live on youtube : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NICfQM9d0CM 

See Dr. Donald Ainslie Henderson (born 1928) /  Dr. Alexander Duncan Langmuir (born 1910)   /  

Leaders in American Medicine: Dr. Alexander D. Langmuir Interviewed by [Dr. Donald Ainslie Henderson (born 1928)]. A National Medical Audiovisual Center Production in cooperation with Alpha Omega Alpha. Atlanta, Georgia

Saved copy of video : [HV00HD][GDrive]  /  Download image :   [HV00HE][GDrive]  

Watch on Housatonic.Live 3 below : 

(Mar 1979) Alex Langmuir (epidemic intelligence service / “cutter Incident”) Donald Henderson int.Â Â đŸŸ„Live3  /  BitChute  /  Odysee  /  Rumble 

Video notes : 

2001 (Oct 29) - Los Angeles Times : "Vaccinations Problematic"

BY THOMAS H. MAUGH II   /   OCT. 29, 2001 12 AM PT   /  Saved text into PDF :  [HN028F][GDrive] 

Mentioned :   Dr. Darrell Ray Galloway (born 1946)  /   Dr. Thomas Patrick Monath (born 1940)   /  Meryl Jae Nass, MD (born 1951)   /   Dr. Donald Ainslie Henderson (born 1928)  /   VaxGen, Incorporated   /

Full newspaper page : [HN028G][GDrive]  /   Newspaper clip above : [HN028H][GDrive]

As anthrax exposures continue and the specter of smallpox has loomed on the horizon, many officials have begun discussing widespread vaccination against the two diseases in an effort to reduce public concern about terrorist threats.

But the vaccines now in use present a number of problems--ranging from lack of manufacturing capacity to side effects--that render large-scale vaccination programs problematic.

Medical researchers have been working on efforts to produce safer vaccines. But until now, drug companies have put relatively little money into what has been considered a low-margin, low-priority part of the business.

For both anthrax and smallpox, the side effects of the vaccines are serious enough that widespread vaccination could cause more damage than the diseases themselves unless the vaccines are used only after a major outbreak has begun.

Anthrax vaccination of soldiers has produced reports of severe side effects, such as bleeding and thyroid malfunction, and has been linked to six deaths.

Just what degree of risk there is from the vaccine, however, is unclear. Many medical authorities say it is safe, but some doctors have suggested it could be one of the causes of the mysterious Gulf War syndrome, which some troops sent to the Persian Gulf in the early 1990s have said they suffer from

Fear of the vaccine is perhaps greater than fear of anthrax. As many as 400 members of the U.S. military have been court-martialed or have resigned rather than submit to the vaccination because of the perceived risks. Some physicians share their misgivings.

“You won’t see me getting in line for the vaccine,” says [Meryl Jae Nass, MD (born 1951)], a longtime critic.

The vaccine is produced by only one manufacturer, BioPort Corp. of Lansing, Mich., and the technology is nearly 40 years old. Although the company is currently producing the vaccine, the Food and Drug Administration will not allow it to be shipped because of various deficiencies in quality control and manufacturing at the plant.

The vaccine is unusual in that it is not targeted at the bacterium itself, as are most vaccines, but at the toxin produced by the bacteria as they grow. That toxin produces the cellular damage that can lead to death from an anthrax infection.

The toxin has three major components: protective antigen, lethal factor and edema factor. When the toxin is released in the body, individual molecules of the protective antigen clump together on the surface of target cells to form a doughnut-shaped pore. This pore is then used by the other two components to enter the cell, where they are lethal.

The vaccine is designed to stimulate antibodies to the protective antigen, preventing it from attaching to cells. In theory, if the action of the toxin is blocked, then the immune system can eradicate the bacteria or they can be killed with antibiotics.

“We buy the individual some time to fight off the infection,” said microbiologist [Dr. Darrell Ray Galloway (born 1946)] of Ohio State University.

BioPort grows a strain of Bacillus anthracis that secretes only protective antigen. The bacterial culture is filtered--in a process much like making coffee in a filter pot--to collect the antigen along with any other materials that are secreted by the bacterium. The material that drips through the filter becomes the vaccine. It contains no bacteria, either dead or alive.

But the antigen does not stimulate a strong immune response. To get good immunity, six doses of the vaccine must be given at two-week intervals.

Critics fear that the other bacterial components collected along with the antigen may cause side effects, so research has focused on eliminating them.

“The interest is in more highly defined vaccines so one knows precisely what one is being immunized with,” Galloway said.

The Army has been working with the National Institutes of Health to use genetic engineering techniques to produce a pure antigen. Although both the military and the NIH have consistently refused to talk about their work, other experts say that human tests will begin early next year. That vaccine will also require multiple doses.

In his research, [Dr. Darrell Ray Galloway (born 1946)] also is targeting the toxin. But instead of using the antigen protein itself, he is injecting mice with the gene that causes the body to produce the protein. Researchers have been producing such DNA vaccines against a variety of diseases, and they are generally thought to produce a more powerful immune response and fewer side effects than standard protein vaccines.

He also uses the gene for the lethal factor in his vaccine. “We get a greater response with both than with one alone,” he said. Preliminary results in mice reported earlier this year indicate that the DNA vaccine can blunt anthrax infections, but Galloway must conduct many more tests, including vaccination of primates, before use of the vaccine in humans can be considered.

The most optimistic estimate would be 18 to 24 months before clinical trials could begin, he said.

The smallpox vaccine produces a different set of problems. Like the anthrax vaccine, it employs old technology--dating back to experiments by Edward Jenner, the pioneer of vaccines, in 1796.

Smallpox is produced by a virus called variola, but researchers do not use it to produce the vaccine. Instead, they use a related virus called vaccinia, which produces a disease called cowpox.

The normally mild infection produced in humans by the live vaccinia provides very good protection against smallpox--so good that the disease has been eradicated from nature. Today, variola is known to exist only in one laboratory each in the United States and Russia, although U.S. officials suspect that Iraq and perhaps other nations may also possess some virus stocks.

“The risk of its being used as a weapon is not very high, but it’s there,” said [Dr. Donald Ainslie Henderson (born 1928)] of Johns Hopkins University, who ran the global smallpox eradication campaign. “And if you got an outbreak, it would be a terrible global catastrophe.”

Existing stocks of the smallpox vaccine were grown in calf cells, collected and freeze-dried more than 30 years ago.

The vaccines are believed to still be effective, but they are contaminated with proteins and other materials from the cow cells that may produce adverse reactions in some individuals.

New Rules From the FDA

The FDA no longer allows vaccines to be grown in animal cells. The new contracts for vaccine production recently signed with several companies require that vaccinia be grown in human cells. That process is straightforward and should not introduce difficulties, and manufacturers assume that the new vaccine will be as effective as the old one.

“There are no technical hurdles here,” said Lance Gordon, chief executive of vaccine manufacturer [VaxGen, Incorporated]. “Everything that has to be done to make a state-of-the-art smallpox vaccine is technology already in use.”

But critics caution that a smallpox vaccine grown in human cells has never been tested and that assumptions don’t always hold up.

Vaccinia, moreover, can itself produce problems ranging from open sores all over the body to death.

The death rate is estimated to be as high as 2 in a million cases, meaning that if the entire U.S. population were vaccinated, about 600 people would die of the vaccine.

Inadvertent contamination of the eye--caused perhaps by touching the vaccination site and then the eye--can produce severe problems, including blindness.

Vaccinia itself is infectious. That’s a valuable trait in a vaccination program because it provides protection to people who weren’t directly vaccinated.

But in a modern society with large numbers of people whose immune systems have been damaged, by HIV infections or as a result of drugs taken for organ transplants, that contagion could be a major problem that likely would lead to additional deaths.

All told, vaccinating all Americans against smallpox could cause 3,000 severe adverse reactions and a much larger number of lesser problems, according to [Dr. Thomas Patrick Monath (born 1940)], an executive at British vaccine manufacturer Acambis.

If a terrorist group actually launched a smallpox attack, however, “we don’t have any choice as a society” other than to use the vaccinia vaccine, said [Dr. Darrell Ray Galloway (born 1946)].

The U.S. population now is almost entirely unvaccinated--the effect of the vaccine largely wears off after about 20 years, so most people who received the vaccine as children are no longer immune. An unprotected outbreak of smallpox potentially could kill millions of people, experts say.

A small number of researchers have been exploring the possibility of using a different type of vaccine, a killed-virus vaccine, which would eliminate the danger to immunosuppressed individuals.

But development of such a vaccine, like that for anthrax, has been hindered by lack of a market, and any product is still at least a couple of years from human tests.

For that reason, officials have pushed for a major expansion of the current smallpox vaccine supply. Right now, the country has about 15 million doses, not nearly enough to contain a major outbreak.

The World Health Organization once had 200 million doses in storage in Switzerland, but the international body ran out of money to keep them, and they were destroyed after President Reagan reduced U.S. payments to the United Nations. ‘