UAVCAN Intrusion Dataset (Enhanced & Watchdog-Mimicking Attacks)
Dataset Summary
Protocol: UAVCAN v0 (DroneCAN)
Target System: Commercial Quadcopter UAV (Pixhawk 4 FC + 4 UAVCAN ESCs)
Attacker Node: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B with CAN Shield (Physical Bus Attachment)
Primary Environment: Autonomous flight and real-time motor control operations
1. Dataset Overview
UAVCAN Protocol: UAVCAN v0 (now maintained as DroneCAN) is an application-layer protocol running over CAN bus, designed for reliable, realtime distributed communication in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), robotics, and aerospace systems.
Dataset Purpose: Built to address key structural limitations in existing UAVCAN datasets—such as single-attack isolation and non-aligned
Transfer IDs (TIDs)—by providing highly complex, compound intrusions and protocol-aware threat scenarios.
Data Collection Method: Collected from a physical UAV operating under normal flight conditions while executing real-time attack injections targeted at high-impact motor control parameters.
2. Testbed Environment & Hardware
Target Vehicle: Commercial UAV platform driven by a Pixhawk 4 flight controller connected to four UAVCAN-compatible Electronic Speed Controllers (ESCs).
Malicious Node Setup: A Raspberry Pi 4 Model B equipped with a CAN shield attached directly to the UAVCAN bus interface as a terminal node.
Control Software: Real-time attack packets generated using the python-can library over SSH connection.
3. Dataset Statistics
Both 'Attack' and 'Normal' labels are defined at the frame level.
4. Key Features & Attack Scenarios
Core Attack Characteristics
Watchdog-Mimicking Attacks: Attack messages mimic the legitimate cyclic Transfer ID (TID) sequence (031) in the UAVCAN tail byte, making simple sequence-based detection ineffective.
Compound & Concurrent Attacks: Includes complex intrusion scenarios where multiple attack vectors are executed simultaneously or sequentially.
Flight-Critical Targets: Intentionally targets motor control IDs to directly challenge the flight stability and functional safety of the UAV.
Attack Types Included
1. Flooding: High-frequency message injection disrupting bus availability.
2. Fuzzing: Arbitrary and randomized payload injections targeting motor control channels.
3. Replay: Retransmission of valid historical flight traffic.
4. Compound Injections: Multi-threaded combinations including Flooding, Fuzzing, and Replay executed simultaneously.
5. Reference & Citation
If you use this dataset in your research, please cite the following paper:
@INPROCEEDINGS{LUMI_Song, author={Song, Yuchan and Kim, Huy Kang}, booktitle={2026 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (I
V)},
title={LUMI: Lightweight UAVCAN Message Window-Based Intrusion Detection System},
year={2026},
volume={},
number={},
pages={2102-2109},
keywords={Modeling;Timing;Controller area networks;Signal detection;Windows;Printing;Autonomous aerial vehicles;Entropy;Security;Protocols;intrusion detection system (IDS);rule-based IDS;lightweight security;unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV);CAN protocol;UAVCAN protocol}, doi={10.1109/IV66570.2026.11623974}}
6. DATASET DOWNLOAD
Download Link: Download
7. CONTACT
Yuchan Song (thddbcks618@korea.ac.kr) or Huy Kang Kim (cenda@korea.ac.kr)