Research

University of Haifa

Summary of my Research Activities and Future Plans

My work in International Relations focuses on explaining patterns of international conflict and cooperation and the sources of war and peace. I account for continuity and change in global and regional security by synthesizing levels of analysis (in particular the international system and domestic politics). My theoretical approach is to bridge the sharp and counterproductive divisions in the field of International Relations. The field of International Relations is distinctive not only because it addresses competition in the real world of international politics, but also because of the intense conflict in the academic world among its competing explanatory perspectives (the so-called "war of the isms"). My work synthesizes different levels of analysis, which allows me to integrate some of these competing perspectives. The goal is to explain phenomena that were previously explained by a host of distinctive and unconnected theories in a single coherent overarching framework. This approach is evident in my books and articles and in my current research project.

In my first book (When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics, The University of Michigan Press, 1995; 2nd ed. 2002), I developed a theory of great power conflict and cooperation by synthesizing the effects of systemic and domestic factors. The second/paperback edition of the book (published in May 2002) had a new preface and a new afterword. The preface examines the contributions of the book's theory to the recent major debates in the field and also for explaining some of the major post-Cold War developments. The afterword focuses more specifically on the contributions the theory can make for our understanding of the post-Sept. 11 developments in international politics.

In another book I have developed a new theory of regional war and peace. The key product is my recent book: States, Nations and Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press-Cambridge Studies in International Relations-2007; 500 pages).

The book asks the following key questions: Why are some regions prone to war while others remain at peace? What conditions cause regions to move from peace to war and vice versa? The book offers a novel theoretical explanation for the differences in levels of and transitions between war and peace. I distinguish between "hot" and "cold" outcomes, depending on intensity of the war or the peace, and then uses three key concepts (state, nation, and the international system) to argue that it is the specific balance between states and nations in different regions that determines the hot or warm outcomes: the lower the balance, the higher the war proneness of the region, while the higher the balance, the warmer the peace. The international systemic factors, for their part, affect only the cold outcomes of cold war and cold peace.

The theory of regional war and peace developed in this book is examined through case studies of the post-1945 Middle East, the Balkans and South America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and post-1945 Western Europe. It uses comparative data from all regions and concludes by proposing ideas on how to promote peace in war-torn regions.

The State-to-Nation balance has two distinctive dimensions:

I. The extent of state strength (or the success of state-building): This variable refers to the institutions and resources available to states for governing the polity. Weak states lack effective institutions and resources to implement their policies and to fulfill key functions. State strength or capacity can be measured by the ability of the state to mobilize manpower for military service and to extract financial resources from their societies.

II. The degree of congruence (or extent of success of nation-building)-- the extent of congruence between the territorial states and the national aspirations and identities of the people in these states, namely the extent to which the current political boundaries in a certain state reflect the national affiliations of the main groups in that state and their aspirations to establish states and/or to revise existing boundaries. High congruence means that there is a compatibility between the state (as an entity administering certain territory) and the national sentiments of its citizens (that is, their aspiration to live as a national community in their own state). There are two primary senses in which a state's geopolitical and national boundaries may be incongruent in relation to the ethno-national criterion of one state per one nation:

a. A single geopolitical entity may contain numerous ethno-national groups. This is the internal dimension of incongruence, which has major implications for the possibility of civil wars, especially in weak states.

b. A single ethno-national group may reside in more than one geopolitical entity. This is the external dimension of incongruence, which has major implications for revisionist policies, especially if the majority ethnic group in the state lives in substantial numbers also in neighboring and other regional states, either as a majority or a minority.

The project explains variations in state war-propensity. I introduce a new typology of state war-proneness based on four major types of states: revisionist, failed, frontier, and status-quo. The major novel contribution of this essay is the argument that the combined effect of variations in the extent of success in state-building (strong or weak states) and nation-building (nationally congruent or incongruent) shapes the level and the type of state violence by producing different categories of states with regard to their war-propensity. Strong states but nationally incongruent generate revisionist states, which initiate aggressive wars. The combination of state strength and national congruence leads to a status-quo state. Weakness and incongruence bring about civil wars and foreign intervention in "failed" states. Weakness but congruence produce the "frontier state" with boundary and territorial wars, but also with a reasonable likelihood of evolution of status-quo orientation over time. I focus here on key examples of these types of states, especially from two regions: Iraq and Lebanon in a highly war-prone region - the post-World War II Middle East; and Argentina and Brazil in a more peaceful one, at least in the 20th century-South America, although these states experienced quite a number of wars in the 19th century.

A related project is entitled: "Taming the Revisionist State: The Effects of Military Defeats on the War-Proneness of Germany vs. Iraq." The study will ask the following questions: Can external intervention, especially coercive military intervention by the great powers, have stabilizing or de-stabilizing effects on the aggressive behavior of revisionist states? What does IR theory lead us to expect-- and what does the historical record show -- with regard to the effects of military defeats on the war-propensity of revisionist states? In other words, why do some militarily defeated states become war-like, while others peaceful?

I compare Germany and Iraq in two milestones - post-World War I and post-World War II Germany, with post-1991 and post-2003 Iraq. The effects, however, vary greatly between the cases and within them. While the post-WWI peace settlements failed, post-WWII Germany and Europe became a role model for peacemaking. Post-1991 Iraq was partially contained by the great powers, while post-2003 Iraq is facing an ongoing and problematic attempt at stabilization of a failed state. This comparative assessment provides us with policy implications for relevant issues, while also contributing to the growing literature regarding post- conflict peace building.

A partly related study focuses on "Democracy, the State-to-Nation Balance, War and Peace." This study asks the following question: Does democratization make states and regions more pacific or more war-prone? More specifically, the study attempts to account for two types of variations: one is theoretical, the other-empirical. The theoretical variation is between the democratic peace theory vs. the argument that democratization leads to war. The empirical variation is between regions which democratized and became more peaceful (e. g. South America in the l980s; Central Europe in the l990s) and regions and states which democratized and became more violent (e. g. the Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union in the l990s).

The empirical examination focuses on the changes which both Germany and Iraq have gone through since World War I until today. I look at the effects of the changes in their state-to-nation balance and level of democratization on changes over time in their tendencies toward war and peace.

In another study I collaborate with my former student - Dov Levin. The study will attempt to identify the causes of intraregional great power expansion. We develop an original account and evaluate its explanatory power in comparison to the existing theories. The empirical investigation focuses on the case of the U.S territorial expansion in the Southwest at the expense of Mexico in the second quarter of the 19th century (this joint paper is just published ).

A major current research project proposes an innovative neo-classical realist model for explaining shifts and variations in US grand strategy. This project is under an advanced book contract by the University of Chicago Press. The model is based on a novel distinction between four ideal-type approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the US policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions, namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat, that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. This is a novel explanation of changes in grand strategy. While great power parity is conducive to realist approaches, a situation of hegemony allows the liberal perspectives to emerge. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these two systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in four cases of major shifts in US grand strategy following World War II: the peak of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the shift to Détente in the mid-to-late l960s, the post-Cold War era in the l990s, and the post-9/11 period. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.

A new study, which has just started, examines the competing expectations about the likely character of the post-Cold War Order. With the end of the Cold War, analysts advanced competing expectations about the likely character of the post-Cold War Order. Many expected a far-reaching transformation in the fundamental character of world politics (notably, a decline in the centrality of the state in world politics). Some of these predictions were quite optimistic (esp. Liberals and Constructivists)- believing the changes will lead to more peace and cooperation; some were pessimists-predicting the emergence of new types of conflicts, while others (the realists) remained skeptic regarding the possible transformation (for better or worse) in the fundamental character of international politics, even if taking into account specific changes in the global distribution of capabilities as leading to some important changes in the dynamics of the international system-whether in the direction of a benign hegemon or balance of power politics.

While none of these perspectives predicted accurately the nature of the international system, there is a differential application of the predictions of the competing approaches to different regions. Some regions seem to fit the optimistic expectations (Europe, South America), others fit the pessimists' predictions (South Asia, Africa, Middle East), while still others might accord with realist expectations (East Asia and the post-Soviet). Some other regions went through a transition from fitting the pessimist line to resemble more closely the optimist approach (the Balkans).

How could we explain the variations in the level of peace, order, institutionalization and cooperation in the various regions? I'll argue that the combined effect of two factors-state strength and national congruence-- is the most important, although an additional factor can mitigate or aggravate their effects-great power intervention. The two key factors are state strength-the effectiveness of the functioning of state institutions; and national congruence-the extent of congruence between geo-political boundaries and national aspirations and identities in the region. Regions in which the states are strong and nationally coherent will tend to meet the optimists' predictions. Regions in which at least some of the states are failed states - both weak and incongruent -- will follow the pessimist predictions; while regions with strong states but incongruent will tend to produce a revisionist model. Finally, the instability prevalent in regions populated by failed states can sometimes be mitigated by the intervention of a benign hegemon, but in highly fragmented regions such interventions might face a lot of problems and have some de-stabilizing effects.

In six other research projects I have dealt with subjects such as the following:

I developed the key concept of "security" by addressing the major post-Cold War debate on the need to redefine the concept. The debate is between those who favor an expansion of the concept and traditionalists who oppose any major revision of it

2. My work developed a theoretical model which integrates the effects of democracy and relative power on the diplomatic behavior of great powers.

3. I developed an analytical framework for addressing the sources of great power regional involvement and its effects on regional conflicts. I proposed causal linkages between balances of great power capabilities and interests, types of great power involvement and noninvolvement in regional conflicts and patterns of regional conflicts.

4. I proposed a theoretical framework for accounting for variations in hegemonic military intervention, especially the post-Cold War US military engagement

5. My study deduced and tested propositions from the logic of competing schools-of-thought regarding the military behavior of states.

6. I examined the effects of alternative international scenarios on the future of the Middle East. This examination is done within the context of exploring global influences on regional security.

Another research project will examine systemic effects on US management of war and peace in the Middle East. I propose that there are great variations in US management of war and peace in the Middle East in the last decades. The project will focus on (1) a conceptual and empirical description of these variations in conflict management and (2) an explanation of such variations based on the logic of the combined effects of the systemic and regional balances of threat.

More specifically, I study in-depth US strategies in four Middle East wars and the diplomacy in their aftermath: the l973 war, the 1991 Gulf war, the 2003 Iraq war and the Second Lebanon war. I'll examine (1) whether any one of the management strategies was dominant in US conduct in each of these four wars? (2) what is the best explanation for the dominance of each of these approaches in each of the war cases?