Articles

  1. “The Hidden Debate: The Formation of Nuclear Doctrines in the Middle East,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, (June 1982), 205-227.

  2. “Methodological Magic,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 3, No. 4, (October 1988), 134-155.

  3. With John Hannah, “Intervention Threats in Short Arab-Israeli Wars: An Analysis of Soviet Crisis Behavior,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4, (December 1988), 46-76.

  4. “Don’t Let Them Estimate: Why the IDF Should Not Be Responsible for Political Intelligence,” Maarachot, No. 328, January-February 1993, 38-45 (Hebrew).

  5. With John Ferris, “Getting Marlowe to Hold His Tongue: The Conservative Party, the Intelligence Services and the Zinoviev Letter,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 8, No. 4, (October 1993), 100-137.

  6. “Israel’s Intelligence Failure of 1973: New Evidence, A New Interpretation, and Theoretical Implications,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, (Spring 1995), 584-609.

  7. “Israel Caught Unaware: Egypt’s Sinai Surprise of 1960,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1995), 203-219.

  8. “The Wealth of Information and the Poverty of Comprehension: Israel’s Intelligence Failure of 1973 Revisited,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, (October 1995), 229-240.

  9. “Rotem: The Forgotten Crisis on the Road to the 1967 War,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 31, (1996), 547-566.

  10. “State-Intelligence Relations in Israel: 1948-1996,” Journal of Conflict Studies Vol.17, No.2 Fall 1997), 133-156.

  11. “Variations on a Theme: The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli Strategic Thinking,” Security Studies, Vol.7, No.3 (Spring 1998), 149-184.

  12. “A Bull in a China Shop: Netanyahu and Israel’s Intelligence Community,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol.11, No.2 (Summer 1998), pp.154-174.

  13. “Israel’s Northern Eyes and Shield: The Strategic Value of the Golan Heights Revisited,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.21, No.3 (September 1998), pp.46-66.

  14. With Zachary Sheaffer, “Barings and Yom Kippur: Surprise Despite Warning in Business Administration and Strategic Studies,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol.11, No.3 (Fall 1998), pp.331-349.

  15. “The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Causes,” Maarachot, No.361, November 1998, pp.14-28 (Hebrew).

  16. “Fifty Years of Israeli Deterrence Policy: Lessons from the Past, Thoughts for the Future,” Maarachot, No. 366-367, October 1999’ pp.12-30 (Hebrew).

  17. “Israel’s 1973 Intelligence Failure,” Israel Affairs, Vol.6, No.1, (Autumn 1999), pp.11-35.

  18. “Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel’s National Security Conception,” Israel Affairs, Vol.6, No. 2&3, (Spring 2000), pp.81-103.

  19. “Israel’s National Security Towards the 21st Century: Introduction,” The Journal of Strategic Studies (A Special issue on: Israel’s National Security Towards the 21st Century), Vol.24, No.2, (June 2001), pp.1-12.

  20. “Intelligence Failure and the Need for Cognitive Closure: The Case of Yom Kippur,” in: Richard K. Betts and Thomas Mahnken (eds), The Paradox of Intelligence: Essays in Memory of Michael I. Handel (Frank Cass, 2003), 166-89.

  21. With Arie W. Kruglanski, “Intelligence Failure and the Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise,” Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No.1, (March 2003), pp.75-99.

  22. Unconcluded Conclusions,” in: Anat Kurz (ed.) Thirty Years Later: Challenges to Israel Since the Yom Kippur War (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2004), 23-30 (Hebrew).

  23. Roundtable: The Settlements,” Yale Israel Journal, No.7, Summer 2005, 23-33.1211.

  24. “Intelligence and Politics,” Leaders and Intelligence (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, The Broadcasted University, 2004), 55-67 (Hebrew).

  25. “The Sources of the Problematic Relationship Between Intelligence Producers and Consumers,” Leaders and Intelligence (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, The Broadcasted University, 2004), 42-54 (Hebrew).

  26. “The War of Yom Kippur as a ‘War of Choice’,” The War of Yom Kippur and Its Lessons Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, The Broadcasted University, 2004), 114-122 (Hebrew).

  27. “The Interaction Between Intelligence Officers and Policymakers Prior to the 1973 War,” The War of Yom Kippur and Its Lessons Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, The Broadcasted University, 2004), 28-36 (Hebrew).

  28. “The Paradox of Israeli Power,” Survival, Vol.46, No.4, (Winter 2004-05), pp. 137-56.

  29. “The Crisis in Israel’s National Security Conception,” Maarachot, No. 401, June 2005, 10-19 (Hebrew).

  30. “The Historiography of the Yom Kippur War: Major Aspects in a Thirty-Year Perspective,” Journal of Israeli History, Vol.24, No.2, (September 2005), pp.251-66.

  31. With Dima Adamsky, “’The Russians are not Coming’: Israel’s Intelligence Failure and the Soviet Military Intervention in the ‘War of Attrition’ in 1970.” Intelligence and National Security, March 2006, Vol.21, No.1, 1-25.

  32. “A Chance not taken: Sadat’s Peace Initiative of February 1973 and Its Rejection by Israel.” The Journal of Contemporary History, July 2006, Vol. 41, No. 3, 545-56.

  33. “Israel’s Military Intelligence Performance in the Second Lebanon War.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, (December 2007) Vol.20, No.4, 583-601.

  34. “Leaders Under Stress: Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War,” in: Yosi Goldstein and Adli Dular (Eds.), Leadership at Times of War (Rehovot: Weitzman Institute, 2007), 139-46 (Hebrew).

  35. “Golda Meir, Anwar Sadat, and the Coming of the Yom Kippur War,” (Hebrew) Alpayim (969) 31, Summer 2007.

  36. “Lessons not Learnt:Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era,” Israel Affairs, (January 2008) Vol. 14, No.1, 70-83.

  37. With Rose Mcdermott, ” Personal Functioning Under Stress: The Role of Accountability and Social Support in Israeli leaders in the Yom Kippur War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, February 2008, Vol. 52, No.1, 144-170.

  38. “The Professional Ethics of Intelligence Estimate,” in: Michael Andregg (ed.) Intelligence Ethics: the Definitive Works of 2007.

  39. “Surprise as Disrupting Strategic Plans: The First Thirty Hours of the Yom Kippur War,” in: Moshe Shemesh and Zeev Drory (eds.) National Trauma: The War of Yom Kippur after Thirty Years and another War (Beer Shaba: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2008 , 137-49 (Hebrew).

  40. With Rose Mcdermott, “Change the Analyst and not the System: A Different Approach to Intelligence Reforms,” Foreign Policy Analysis, April 2008, Vol. 4, No.2, 26-44.

  41. “The Intelligence Chief who Went Fishing in the Cold: How the Identity of Israel’s Most Valuable Source in Egypt was Leaked by Maj. Gen. (res.) Eli Zeira,” Intelligence and National Security, April 2008, Vol.23, No.2, 226-248.

  42. “Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws: The Causes of Israel’s Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War,” The Journal of Military History, April 2008, 72, 11-41.

  43. With Jack S. Levy, “Conscious Action and the Study of Intelligence Failure,”Political Science Quarterly, Summer 2009, Volume 124, No.3, 461-88.

  44. The Hubris of initial victory: The IDF and the Second Lebanon War,” in: Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani (eds.) Israel and Hizbollah: An asymmetric conflict in historical and comparative perspective (London: Routledge, 2009), 147-62.

  45. “The 1973 Yom Kippur War,” in: Mitchell G. Bard and David Nachmias (eds), Israel Studies: An Anthology (AICE Publication, 2009).

  46. “Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel,” Armed Forces and Society, April 2010 36: 505-525.

  47. “The Intelligence Community During the Yom Kippur War (1973)” in: Amos Gilboa and Ephraim Lapid (eds.), Israel’s Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence (Jerusalem: Gefen, 2011), 76-87.

  48. With Rose Mcdermott. “The Intelligence Analysis Crisis.” In: Loch Johnson (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence. (New York: Oxford UP, 2010), 359-374.

  49. With Kobi Palkov, “A Failure in June and Success in October: Soviet Intelligence and Operation Barbarossa,” Maarachot, No.438, August 2011, 46-55 (Hebrew).

  50. “The Intelligence Professional Ethics,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligenc, January 2011 24: 22-43.

  51. “Deterrence Policy in a Changing Strategic Environment” in: Bernd W. Kubbig and Sven-Eric Fikenscher (eds.), ArmsControl and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East, (Routledge, 2012), 89-105.

  52. “Confronting the Intelligence Fiasco of the Yom Kippur War.” Bustan: The Middle East Book Review. 3.2 (Fall 2012), pp. 131-149.

  53. “Why Israel Should Trade Its Nukes?” Foreign Affairs(online), October 25, 2012.

  54. “The Misuse of Israel’s National Security Policy: A New Explanation for the Intelligence Failure in the 1973 War,” Maarachot, No.448 (April 2013), pp. 46-53 (Hebrew).

  55. ”Politicization of Intelligence: A Comparative Study.” The International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 26, 2 (February 2013), 347-369.

  56. “The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1967-1973.” Oxford Bibliographies Online. 28 May, 2013

  57. “Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of the Khomeini Revolution.” The Journal of Strategic Studies. Vol. 36, 5 (October 2013), 718-742.

  58. “The “Special Means of Collection”: The Missing Link in the Surprise of the Yom Kippur War.” Middle East Journal. Vol. 67, 4 (Automn 2013), 531-546.

  59. Israel’s Intelligence Community”, in: Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, and Claudia Hillebrand (eds.), Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies (Rouledge, 2013), 209-217.

  60. “The Historiography of the Yom Kippur War: A Forty Years’ Perspective.” Iyunim Bitkumat Yisrael, 23 (2013), 1-33 (Hebrew).

  61. ”The Special Means of Collection and the Yom Kippur Intelligence Failure: A New Look”, In Zohar Avraham, The Yom Kippur War – 40 Years After (The Institute for the Research of Israel’s Wars, 2013), 123-142 (Hebrew).

  62. With Amr Yussef, “The Hidden Factors that Turned the Tide: Strategic Decision-Making and Operational Intelligence in the 1973 War.” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.37, 4 (2014), 584-608.

  63. “A Question of Loyalty: Ashraf Marwan and Israel’s Intelligence Fiasco in the Yom Kippur War.” Intelligence and National Security,Vol. 30, 5 (2014),667-685.

  64. “The Best Times of Eli Zeira,” Hedim B, Israel’s Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center, January 2016, 28-37.

  65. “I do not Know the Truth, Only my Memoirs,” Hedim B, Israel’s Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center, January 2016, 56-66.

  66. With Rose McDermott, “Pearl Harbor and Midway: The Decisive Influence of Two Men on the Outcomes.”Intelligence and National Security published online March 2, 2016.