xl674@georgetown.edu
I am a PhD student at the Department of Economics at Georgetown University. My general interest includes Matching, Search and Dynamic Games.
Work in Progress:
The Structure of Bayesian Stable Matchings with Transfers (Draft Available upon Request)
Abstract: Classical matching theory gives stable outcomes a sharp structure: identical unmatched sets (Lone Wolf) and a lattice of stable payoffs. Hu (2026) shows that under incomplete information without transfers, lone wolf survives whenever stable outcomes share a common information structure. We show that this is not generally true under incomplete information with transfers. Moreover, we gave sufficient and necessary condition in which the lone wolf theorem stands generically.
Deliberation by Ballot: Communication and Consensus in Elections by Repeated Ballots
Abstract: Some of the oldest consensus institutions — conclaves, juries, conventions — do not separate deliberation from voting: members communicate by voting, casting repeated ballots until a supermajority forms. We model committees where each ballot is semi-binding communication about private information and private biases.
Implementing Stable Matching under Private Information [Proposal Slides]
Abstract: This paper aims to implement Bayesian stable matching (Liu, 2020) as a Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in a Decentralized bargaining process following Elliott and Nava (2019).