Papers
Recent Work
“Social Epistemic Dependence,” Philosophical Topics, forthcoming.
“Virtue Epistemology and Social Epistemic Dependence,” Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, forthcoming.
“Does anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony imply interest relativism about knowledge attributions?,” Veritas, forthcoming.
“Epistemology,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021.
“The Transmission of Knowledge and Garbage,” Synthese 197 (2020): pp. 2867–2878.
“Safety in Sosa,” Synthese 197 (2020): pp. 5147-5157. (with correction, Synthese 197 (2020): pp. 5159-5159.)
“Intellectual Humility and Contemporary Epistemology: A critique of epistemic individualism, evidentialism and internalism,” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility, Mark Alfano, Michael Lynch, and Alessandra Tanesini, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2020).
“Knowledge-producing Abilities,” in Christopher Kelp and John Greco, eds. Virtue-theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
”Hinge Epistemology and the Prospects for a Unified Epistemology,” Synthese 198 (Supplement Issue 15) (2021): pp. 3593-3607.
“Virtue Epistemology,” with John Turri and Mark Alfano, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2021 Edition.
“The Role of Trust in Testimonial Knowledge,” in Katherine Dormandy, ed. Trust in Epistemology (New York: Routledge, 2019).
“Knowledge, Virtue and Achievement,” in The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, Heather Battaly, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2019).
”Satisfying Understanding,” in Stephen Grimm, Christoph Baumberger and Sabine Ammon, eds. Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science (New York: Routledge, 2017).
”Common Knowledge,” The International Journal for the Study of Scepticism 6 (2016): 309-325.
SOme Papers in Religious Epistemology
“The Possibility of Spiritual Perception: Objections and Replies,” in Frederick D. Aquino and Paul Gavrilyuk, eds. Perceiving Things Divine: Towards a Constructive Account of Spiritual Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).
“Social Religious Epistemology,” chapter 9 from The Transmission of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
“Transmitting Faith (and Garbage),“ European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2018): 85-104.
”Knowledge of God,” W. Abraham and F. Aquino, eds. The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
“Religious Knowledge in the Context of Conflicting Testimony,“ Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83 (2009): 61-76.
”Friendly Theism,” in James Kraft, ed. Religious Tolerance through Epistemic Humility (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008).
More Papers
“Testimonial Knowledge and the Flow of Information,” in David Henderson and John Greco, eds. Epistemic Evaluation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
“Post-Gettier Epistemology,” (Epistemologia Pós-Gettier),Veritas 3 (2015): pp. 421-437.
”Episteme: Knowledge and Understanding,” in Kevin Timpe and Craig A. Boyd, eds. Virtues and Their Vices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)
”A (Different) Virtue Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2012): pp. 1-26.
”Reflective Knowledge and the Pyrrhonian Problematic,” in John Turri, ed. Virtuous Thoughts: Essays on the Philosophy of Ernest Sosa (Dordredcht: Springer Publishing, 2013).
Chapter One of Achieving Knowledge: ”Knowledge as Success from Ability” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
”External World Skepticism,” Philosophy Compass 2 (2007): pp. 625-649.
”The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): pp. 57-69.
”Justification is Not Internal,” in Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa, eds. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).
”Motivations for Sosa’s Epistemology,” in John Greco, ed. Sosa and his Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
”Knowledge as Credit for True Belief,” in Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski, eds. Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
”How to Reid Moore,” Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002): pp. 544-563.
”Virtues in Epistemology,” in Paul K. Moser, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Chapter One of ”Putting Skeptics in Their Place” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
”Agent Reliabilism,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): pp. 273-296.
”Modern Ontology and the Problems of Epistemology,” American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1995): pp. 241-251.
”Reid’s Critique of Berkeley and Hume,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): pp. 279-296.