Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: Free Press, 1963)

Primary published sources utilized:

MTA House Hearings

FBN Annual Reports, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1935, 1936

Periodical articles, but no precise citations.

Archival sources utilized:

none

A sociologist, Becker examined deviant behavior in this book. He presented multiple theoretical models of deviance but focused on the “moral entrepreneur” thesis. This theory posited the presence of an actor “whose initiative and enterprise overcame public apathy and indifference and culminated in the passage of Federal legislation (p. 135). Becker then presented two exemplar cases, marijuana users and dance musicians. He discussed the MTA for total of 12 pages in this 224-page book.

Becker’s principal interpretations, and commentary on their accuracy are noted below:

- Marijuana was little known in the U.S. before the 1920s and few worried about it because usage was confined primarily to Hispanics in southwestern border states. (p. 135)

Subsequent work, especially Rathge’s dissertation, disproves this by demonstrating that concern about marijuana existed much earlier, and that local and state jurisdictions took measures to regulate access before the late 1920s.

- “In 1937, the United States Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act, designed to stamp out use of the drug.” (p. 135)

This is incorrect in the sense that the law distinguished clearly between which parts of the plant were considered to be “marijuana” under the law and which were not. The U.S. government did wish to curb as much as possible smoking marijuana for pleasure. Nevertheless, the government did not intend the law to impinge on industrial uses of hemp and even medical uses of cannabis. Subsequent Treasury Department regulations based on the law, and enforcement thereof, enabled continued cannabis cultivation, including the massive increase in acreage that occurred during World War II. Information about how the MTA was enforced and U.S. government support for cannabis cultivation through War Hemp Program was publicly available long before Becker wrote this work.

- Based on “what little I have been told, by people familiar with the period about the use of marijuana in the late ‘twenties and early ‘thirties leads me to believe that there was relatively lax enforcement of the existing local laws.” (p. 137) Government officials “probably dismissed it as not warranting major attempts at enforcement” as evidenced by “the price of marijuana is said to have been very much lower prior to the passage of Federal legislation.” (p. 138)

Becker readily admitted in this passage that he relied on hearsay and surmise. His only documentary source was the 1931 FBN annual report, which actually downplayed the likelihood of any significant increase in marijuana use. Moreover, Becker failed to account for the fact that this 1931 report was produced early in Harry Anslinger’s tenure as FBN Commissioner, at precisely the time the FBN repeatedly stated publicly that it did not want to take on any marijuana-related enforcement responsibilities. Anslinger demonstrated throughout his time as the country’s principal drug enforcement official a penchant for highlighting or disparaging the threat posed by any particular drug according to his immediate purposes. If he wanted a higher appropriation or enhanced legal authority, he presented substance abuse figures significantly greater than during the few previous years; when he feared budget cuts or criticism that the FBN was failing in its duties, he presented lower usage figures to claim that the Bureau had successfully suppressed illicit consumption. Moreover, subsequent work, especially Rathge’s dissertation, demonstrates that considerable concern about marijuana existed at the local and state level by the late 1920s and early 1930s, and that sub-national jurisdictions took measures to regulate access even before the late 1920s.

- “While it is, of course, difficult to know what the motives of Bureau officials were, we need assume no more than that they perceived an area of wrongdoing and that properly belonged in their jurisdiction and moved to put it there.” (p. 138)

Becker stated baldly in this passage that he didn’t know what caused federal officials to act. (Becker cannot be faulted--FBN records were not available at the time he wrote this book.) Yet he nevertheless inserted his preconceived “moral entrepreneur” thesis that ostensibly provided a plausible motivation. To support his interpretation, he cited the same 1931 FBN report, but clearly did not grasp that federal support for the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act was intended to obviate the need for the U.S. Congress to pass a national law. Anslinger and other federal officials repeatedly stated as much in speeches, newspaper accounts, addresses to state legislators, and other publicly available records that Becker did not consult.

- Becker noted correctly that in 1936 the FBN began to hint publicly about the need for federal legislation, but he provided no explanation for this volte face, apparently because he did not understand the government had reversed its position. (p. 139)

- Becker then jumped in and out of chronological order between the 1933 and 1936 reports to present the FBN as continuously supporting the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (which is correct), but not accounting for what factors motivated the government's suddenly increased public advocacy for a federal cannabis control law beginning in 1935-1936. (p. 140)

- Becker supported his interpretation by using the Readers’ Guide to Periodical Literature (a key pre-internet source) to identify popular press articles about the menace posed by marijuana, demonstrating that the FBN provided material for many of those stories. (p. 141) However, he indicated only four articles appeared in the national press between July 1935 and June 1937, the key period during which the Treasury department drafted the MTA and the congressional hearings took place. This hardly represents some sort of overwhelming media campaign; during the 1930s the Readers’ Guide listed over 50,000 citations annually. Becker cited a high of 17 articles published in the subsequent two years, again a miniscule proportion of the total, and not particularly relevant since the law went into effect in October 1937. In sum, 21 articles over a four-year span (a period during which the Readers’ Guide cited over 200,000 articles) falls far short of a persuasive argument that a groundswell of popular interest supported passage of the MTA or its implementation thereafter. If Becker’s claim is that the FBN acted as a moral entrepreneur in influencing an apathetic public, the Bureau did a poor job indeed.

-Becker then briefly summarized, with some significant quotage, the congressional MTA hearings. (pp. 142-145) He noted correctly, citing Anslinger’s testimony, that the law did not designate the industrially-useful parts of the plant as “marihuana” and that the law was not intended to impinge on legitimate commercial usages. He unconvincingly cited a complaint from a small contingent of birdseed manufacturers as “serious opposition”—the record makes clear that FBN officials huddled with industry representatives and quickly arrived at a mutually-satisfactory solution.

- Becker concluded his account of the MTA by claiming that the FBN’s actions and passage of the federal law created a new category of outsiders. Becker lodged, at best, a debatable claim; his evidence could easily be read to indicate that marijuana smokers—to the limited extent that mainstream society had direct experience with cannabis users—were already an outcast group. Although it may well be the case that the FBN acted as a kind of bureaucratic and even moral entrepreneur, the evidence Becker cited does not provide a convincing explanation as to what motivations informed the timing of the law, its specific provisions, nor its implementation.