Research Projects

Working Papers

How Sanctions Reshape Trade and Contract Bargaining: Evidence From Export Restrictions on Russia

(solo-authored, Presented at APSA 2025, MPSA 2026, GIPES 2026, VIPES 2026, Peace Science 2026)

What makes sanctions more or less costly? This paper examines two channels through which sanctions impose costs on the target state: trade disruption and contract bargaining. I argue that sanctions disrupt trade most when the target depends more on sanctioning countries and alternative supply is concentrated among fewer non-sanctioning countries. Concentration of alternative supply also weakens the bargaining position of importers in the target state and pressures them to accept less favorable contractual terms. Using 34 million transaction-level records from Russian customs, this paper analyzes how U.S. and EU export restrictions following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine shifted Russia's imports and shipping contracts. Consistent with the argument, sanctions disrupted Russia's imports most in products with greater dependence on U.S. and EU suppliers and more concentrated alternative supply. Shipping contracts also shifted further toward exporter-favorable terms in products with fewer alternative supplier countries, placing more shipping costs and risks on Russian importers. These findings show how trade structure shapes the economic costs of sanctions through its effects on trade and contract bargaining.

Targeted Sanctions and Maritime Shipping

(with Christina Davis. Presented at APSA 2025, MPSA 2026, IPES 2026)

Targeted sanctions on vessels are a prominent instrument of economic statecraft aimed at disrupting maritime commerce and coercing target states. But do these sanctions work, and if not, why do they fail? Using satellite-based vessel tracking data from 2013 to 2022, we examine structural and relational constraints on targeted sanctions. The structural constraint stems from the dispersed nature of maritime shipping, which limits monitoring and enforcement. These limits create opportunities for targeted vessels to adapt and continue operating despite sanctions. Consistent with our argument, we find that sanctions reduce sanctioned vessels’ port calls only in the short term. Sanctioned vessels also increase evasive shipping activity by disabling tracking systems to conceal their operations. The relational constraint arises because targeted states can use diplomatic engagement to preserve port access for their sanctioned vessels. Using political event data, we find that third-party states receive more port calls from sanctioned vessels following positive engagement with targeted states, including diplomatic visits and bilateral agreements. These findings show how the decentralized structure of global shipping and limited cooperation by third-party states constrain the effect of targeted sanctions.

Persuasion and Backlash from International Law in Global Swing States 

(under review, with Stephen Chaudoin, Presented at MPSA 2024, APSA 2025, PEIO 2026)

When one country or international organization makes accusations about violations of in- ternational law, the intended audience is often third-party states who might support punishing the offender. When do these accusations persuade publics in those countries and when do they trigger backlash? We show that reactions to accusations about international law violations are consistent with a theoretical model that allows for both types of responses – persuasion and backlash – depending on the audience member’s prior beliefs and trust in the information source. We provide evidence from large survey experiments in four global swing states: India, South Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia. Swing states are where persuasion or backlash matter most, since allegations about international law could conceivably tilt their support toward the accuser or the accused. In our survey experiments, when the International Criminal Court makes accusations that Russia violated international law, this persuades certain subsets of the population to support sanctions and assistance for Ukraine. When the United States makes an identical accusation, this fails to persuade, and often backfires, because of the United States’ lack of credibility as an accuser. We further show how accusations affect perceptions of the accuser, not just the accused. We show a dynamic feedback loop, where information sent today can increase or decrease views of the credibility of the information source. This can then magnify or mute the effect of future accusations. Accusations by the ICC improve respondents’ views of the Court’s credibility. Accusations by the United States further undermine its credibility.

Competitive Cooperation? Rivalry and Public Support of International Organizations (with Hyunso Oh)

Could public support for international organizations (IOs) survive amid geopolitical rivalry? Contrary to popular expectation that a rival's participation could lead to backlash against IOs, we argue that rivalry can strengthen the domestic backing of costly support for IOs. We test this claim using paired survey experiments in the two biggest players in the multilateral stage--United States and China--focusing on the cases of United Nations and the Paris Agreement. In line with our theory of competitive cooperation, we find that both U.S. and Chinese citizens are more likely to support increased funding to the IOs when informed about a rival country's boost in funding. For Americans, the support operates through competitive perceptions of national influence within IOs, whereas the mechanism is less salient among the Chinese respondents. Against received wisdom, we find evidence that Americans with high levels of national chauvinism and support for the Republican Party are also, if not more, likely to lend support for increased IO funding. We further show that such increased support is not accompanied by a broader call for unilateralism or other exclusionary arrangements. Our findings reveal the geopolitical logic that underpins public support for even costly contributions to IOs.

Work in Progress

Demystifying Kim's Kingdom: Public, Elites, and Propaganda in North Korea Newspapers (with Nayun Kim)

This project investigates North Korea's elite-level authoritarian information control with a comparison to public-level information control through large textual datasets including official newspapers and party propaganda. This dataset is the first attempt to systematically analyze North Korea's domestic politics from the 1940s to the present. 

Targeted sanctions and the behavior of drug trafficking organizations (with Julio S. Solís Arce)

This paper analyzes how US sanctions affect the behavior of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Mexico. DTOs strategically choose to use violence to hold influence in their operating regions. When facing economic sanctions, we expect DTOs to exert violence to citizens to cope with unexpected negative income shocks.

Optimizing Export Controls on Chips (with Yunho Jin)

We explore the challenge of designing optimal export controls for AI training hardware, particularly GPUs, to balance U.S. national security and economic competitiveness. GPUs are pivotal for AI development, with implications for both industrial innovation and military capabilities. Our framework focuses on restricting access to advanced GPUs by geopolitical rivals, such as China, while minimizing the economic impact on U.S. firms. We propose frameworks to evaluate export controls, incorporating key GPU performance metrics—compute capability, memory bandwidth, and interconnect bandwidth—and their role in AI development. A performance modeling tool will assess the time, energy, and carbon footprint required for AI training, providing insights into the optimal boundaries for export controls. By addressing the tension between industry advocacy for narrowly tailored policies and government priorities for national security, we aim to offer actionable recommendations to policymakers. This work bridges technical and policy considerations to create a balanced approach to export controls.

Publication

Lim, T. (2023). Fragmented Labor Regime: FDI, Labor Regulation, and Workers’ Protests in China. Journal of East Asian Studies

Lim, T., & Kim, S. E. (2022). Buying influence? Rotating leadership in ASEAN and allocation of Chinese foreign aid. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific.