Zsolt Boda

European Journal of Political Culture

ISSN 2784 - 0271 ISSN – L 2784 – 0271

Volume 1, Issue No.1 (March2021, pp.36-45)

Published: 30 March 2021

The Culture of Democracy Under Threat?

Populism, Polarization, and Illiberal Tendencies in Today’s Democracies

Zsolt Boda

ELKH Centre for Social Sciences

Hungary

boda.zsolt@tk.hu

Abstract

From the very beginning researching political culture has not been a value-free endeavour: in their seminal study Almond and Verba proposed three ideal types of political cultures of which the one they called participant corresponded the best to the practice and institutions of liberal democracy (Almond and Verba 1963). That is, in this perspective studying political culture is not just about the description of values, attitudes and knowledge about politics, but also about addressing the question: what kind of political culture does support democracy? It is not to deny that features of political culture can be identified and analysed without this normative aspect. But it is also important to stress that the normative approach has been present throughout the history of political culture studies, including seminal works like Inglehart (1977), Putnam (1993) and Dalton (2004). This paper argues that current trends of democratic backsliding make the normative endeavour especially timely. Recently the quality of democracy has been declining even in well-established democracies and several countries, including EU-members Hungary and Poland, have experienced serious illiberal regressions. Moreover, the paper stresses the challenges stemming from the spread of populism and its consequences, like political polarization and the erosion of democratic norms. However, I also argue that populism is more than simply a threat to liberal democracy: it is also a warning sign of some deep, structural problems of today’s socio-political systems and, as such, will presumably not go away until those problems, like growing inequalities in income and influence, persist. From this perspective the paradox of populism lies in that it is a reaction to the disintegration of the polity while it is also contributing to its further fragmentation, which, I believe, is one of the greatest challenges of today’s politics.

Democratic Backsliding and Populism

Both data (EIU, 2017) and scholarly analysis (Lührman and Lindberg, 2019) confirm that on average the quality of democracy has been declining around the globe in the past decade. While some countries, like Turkey, Russia, or Hungary exemplify what may be labelled as serious ‘democratic backsliding’ or ‘illiberal regression’ (Bermeo, 2016), even established democracies, like the US, are not spared from the deterioration of democratic quality (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). This is an alarming phenomenon. While the scholarly literature used to regard democratization as a one-way development, it is now recognized that the quality of liberal democracy can deteriorate, that is, democratic backsliding and illiberal regression may happen.

It is very difficult to define precisely the meaning of democratic backsliding as liberal democracy is a complex institutional arrangement and many of its elements may erode in many different ways under the pressure of diverse actors (Bermeo, 2016). However, typical examples of democratic backsliding include

· the manipulation of elections strategically by the power holders:

“…hampering media access, using governmental funds for incumbent campaigns, keeping opposition candidates off the ballot, hampering voter registration, packing electoral commissions, changing electoral rules to favor incumbents, and harassing opponents”

(Bermeo, 2016: 13)

· executive aggrandizement, when through a series of institutional changes, the executive weakens the checks and balances on executive power (ibid.).

Democratic backsliding is also called ‘illiberal turn’. The concept of illiberal democracy was popularized by Fareed Zakaria (Zakaria, 1997) when he warned that although the number of democratically elected regimes in the world was increasing, many of them did not live up to the criteria of liberal democracies after the elections. Illiberal practices include bypassing the parliament and constitutional rules, ruling by presidential decrees, suspending civil liberties, threatening the opposition, and bullying journalists (Zakaria, 1997). While elections and referenda are strategically used as means of providing popular legitimacy to the regime, the “free and fair” character of the ballots is increasingly under pressure. However, as Zakaria also stressed, there are many forms and many intensities of illiberalism: some of its strong manifestations can hardly be seen democracies and better be called hybrid regimes (Karl, 1995), while in other cases illiberal practices constitute only milder and sporadic pursuits to weaken checks and balances on the executive power.

From the perspective of political culture studies, it is important that, as Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue, “democratic norm erosion” can happen without formal institutional or constitutional changes. Democracy is not only about formal institutions – it is also about norms, culture, and behavior. The decline of democratic quality typically happens through a series of incremental changes in which the power holders gradually extent their discretionary power; overstep previously respected political norms; undermine or overtake independent institutions; polarize political attitudes in society; treats the opposition not as opponents, but as enemies; and eventually does not refrain from political violence either. Some of those changes may constitute only minor deviations from previous democratic practices and do not provoke harsh reactions from the society; however, the changes add up and the regime incrementally transforms from liberal democracy to an authoritarian or illiberal system. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) stress the difficulty of identifying exactly the point when a democracy becomes an illiberal regime and point to the importance of temporality: unlike classical putsches, illiberal transformation often happens gradually.

Illiberal transformation may be promoted by a number of factors, for instance Crouch (2004) argues that neoliberal economic globalization hollows out democratic institutions; while Collier (1979) analyses the Latin American ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ of the 1960s characterized by technocratic governance, etc. It is not the aim of the present paper to review the possible forms of illiberal transformations. However, it is important to underline a specific form, that of populist illiberalism, because it is nowadays a widespread form of illiberal transformation.

In 2004 already political scientist Cas Mudde stated the presence of the populist Zeitgeist (Mudde, 2004). Since then populism has become a major concern and research topic for political science. But the term has a longer history: it was first used to describe popular political movements of the 1950s in Latin America (Lipset, 1960). In the Political Man, Lipset (1960), inspired by examples of post-war Latin American politics, treated populism as an emerging extremist mass movement that relied on the lower classes. The original ‘populism as a movement’ perspective was later developed into three different approaches:

First, populism as a political logic or political strategy

“through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers”

(Weyland, 2001:14)

Second, populism as a political communication style or discourse (Laclau, 2005; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014) characterized by a Manichean logic (‘elite’ vs. ‘people’), adversarial narratives targeting the ‘enemies of the people’ as well as the depiction of crises that justify immediate political action.

Third, maybe the most widely used approach conceptualizes populism as a thin-centred ideology without an elaborate ideological and programmatic core that expresses a heavily moralising Manichean worldview and considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, arguing that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people (Mudde, 2004).

What is the relationship between populism and liberal democracy?

Populism expresses the inherent tension between the democratic and non-democratic components of the modern political systems. Some argue that populism is essentially a democratic phenomenon, because it takes the common people as its political base and expresses a dissatisfaction with the ruling elites, institutions and politics, a dissatisfaction that may become a frustration or even resentment. Majoritarianism is a basic feature of democracy as well as populism (Pappas, 2014). In her seminal article Canovan (1999) argues that populism is a necessary ’redemptive’ face of democracy and the ’legitimacy of democracy as a pragmatic system (…) always leaves room for populism that accompanies democracy like a shadow’ (Canovan, 1999:16).

However, today’s liberal democracy is much more than a majoritarian decision-making mechanism: it is a complex institutional arrangement with checks and balances, the division of powers, multiple veto players, constitutional safeguards as well as the protection of human rights and minority interests. It is generally argued that populism has an antagonistic relationship with the institutional and normative complexity of liberal democracy. First, populism is antithetical to pluralism: while the latter allows or even expects different interests and ideologies to be present in society and politics, the former posits a homogenous people (Mudde, 2004). Therefore, populist politics has a tendency in becoming exclusionary and intolerant, rejecting any compromise. Second, populist politics is generally based on the direct relationship of the leader and their followers as well as the direct translation of popular will into decisions. This is against the logic of liberal democracy with its complex institutional machinery and the recognition of pluralism (Bartha et al., 2020). Third, the protection of human rights and minority interests clashes with the idea of supreme popular sovereignty advanced by populism (Alston, 2017). Fourth, populism, with its subversive features, tends to undermine established norms of democratic culture, including tolerance, respect of differences, decency, political correctness etc.

Populism is a diverse and malleable phenomenon therefore it is difficult to make generalizations about it. Some populist movements may strengthen democracy through filling a representation gap, as some Latin American examples illustrate the point, or promote more participative decision-making models, as the Italian 5Stars movement does. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) argue that populism might be exclusionary (building on a nativist, nationalist conceptualization of ‘the people’) or socially inclusionary and while European populism is predominantly exclusive, Latin American populism is chiefly inclusive. Both Canovan (1999) and Mudde and Rowira Kaltwasser (2013) assign some positive democratic effects to populism, chiefly in terms of filling the representation gap, reinvigorating popular rule and politically mobilizing people.

Still, despite the great variety of populism we can safely posit that populism has a difficult relationship with liberal democracy, especially with its ‘liberal’ aspects: constitutionalism, rule of law, division of powers and protection of human rights, as well as its basic norms - openness to compromise, tolerance, respect for differences. Both theoretical arguments and empirical studies demonstrate that populism is leaning towards illiberal politics (Huber and Schimpf, 2017; Pappas, 2014). That is, if populism will stay with us, let alone rise further, we have reasons to worry for the future of liberal democracy.

Populism may affect the liberal institutions mostly when in power; however, it can influence democratic norms as well as the practice of democracy even from the opposition. The next section points a particular feature of populist politics which has a definite negative effect on democracy: increasing polarization.

Polarization and the Erosion of Democratic Norms

Polarization refers to the division of the polity along ideological lines. It is not evident that this should pose any problems – after all, democracy is based on the competition of different ideologies, values, and policy proposals. There are actually arguments in favour of at least some extent of political divergence. Politics, as Karl Schmitt convincingly put it, is about conflict. In fact, if the policy and ideological position of parties converge, elections have no real stakes and mobilizing potential. Conversely, polarization has a mobilizing effect on citizens (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008) which is, ceteris paribus, good for democracy: without mobilization and participation democracy may hollow out and decisions will increasingly be taken by either non-elected institutions or political bodies with low legitimacy. The 2020 US presidential election offers an illustration to the mobilization potential of polarization: after four years of polarizing politics by Donald Trump the turnover at the elections was record high.

However, even the pluralist democratic polity needs some ties that bind citizens together, the “sentiments of sociability” as Jean-Jacques Rousseau put it. They need to share a common identity and feel part of the same community: identity is a strong predictor of cooperative behaviour, and norm abidance (Tyler, 2011). People need to trust each other in order to be able to engage in collective action – self-interest is not a sufficient motivation (Ostrom, 1998). Citizens need to have some basic values in common and accept the “minimal consensus” on the principles of democracy (Downs, 1962). It is also needed that their political and policy preferences converge to some extent: otherwise,

“(…) half the electorate always feels that the other half is imposing policies upon it that are strongly repugnant for it. In this situation, if one party keeps get re-elected, the disgruntled supporters of the other party will probably revolt (…)”

(Downs, 1957: 143).

Anthony Downs is perhaps the first who warned about the dangers of extreme political polarization. Some level of polarization is bearable or might even be beneficial to democracy, however we don’t have exact measures of the ‘healthy’ level of polarization, and today it appears that increasing and excessive polarization is more menacing than the lack of it in a number of countries, including the US as well as Eastern and Southern European countries (Patkós, 2019; Somer et al., 2021). Somer et al. (2021) coined the term ‘pernicious polarization’ to describe the extreme division of the society into mutually distrustful ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’. They argue that there is a negative relationship between the level of polarization and the democracy ratings of countries. Patkós (2019) has a similar finding: political polarization erodes democratic quality, increases the risk of corruption, and diminishes the overall level of satisfaction with democracy as well as trust in political institutions.

What is the mechanism through which political polarization leads to negative democratic consequences? Körösényi (2013) argues that polarization undermines public accountability of politics, therefore good governance and democratic quality through the following effects: information selectivity (polarization fosters parallelism in the media system as well as media use – common understanding of what ‘is’ is vanishing); moral bias (common understanding of what ‘ought’ to be is undermined); patronage effect (frequent dismissals in the public administration erodes its attractiveness and ultimately its quality); delegitimizing politics (contributes to spreading political cynicism); poor policy-making (policy reforms are stopped if politics changes).

Extreme polarization leads to a disintegration of the polity in which the members cease to share a common understanding of the political reality; cease to accept a minimal consensus on democratic norms; and cease to respect the other camp. Again, the four years of Donald Trump in office as well as the 2020 US presidential election and the bitter fight over the result offer a shocking illustration to these arguments.

Polarization has several causes – and populist politics is among them (Pappas, 2014; Schulze et al., 2020). Although the populist discourse posits and constructs the concept of the homogenous people, it is contrasted to their enemies. The enemies are first and foremost elite groups, like old political elites (the ‘Washington swamp’), George Soros, the banks and financial institutions, or the European Union. But their supposed internal allies might also be easily targeted by populist politics, thus conducing to an effective division and polarization of the polity. Venezuela is a strong example where the populism of Chavez caused the extreme political division of the country and led it to the verge of a civil war – and a total economic breakdown.

Populism has a subversive nature. It has a penchant for questioning established institutions and norms, overstepping boundaries, and among them the limits of civility and political correctness. While this may seem liberating to some, it hurts those minorities (immigrants, LMBTQ people, etc.) which are also often targeted by populist since they do not fit into the idealized and normalized concept of ‘the people’.

Polarization, the erosion of democratic norms and the growing incivility of political camps towards each other is a deep wound on democracy. Populist politicians may lose their appeal, they may be defeated on elections – but polarization is hard to heal because it exploits deep psychological mechanisms and creates social identities that are difficult to change. For me this is one of the most alarming consequence of populism.

On the Roots of Populism: Inequality

However, while populism contributes to social and political polarization, it is also a product of social division. The roots of populism are manifold. Hawkins and Rowira Kaltwasser (2019) argue that populist attitudes are widely present in the society, but specific context and factors are needed to activate them. The latter refer to the ‘supply-side’ of populism in terms of politicians and political entrepreneurs who exploit the existing problems and frame them along the populist discourse. The former, according to Hawkins and Rowira Kaltwasser (2019: 8), is usually an intentional failure of democratic representation, a “situation in which politicians act knowingly against one set of constituents in order to benefit others. The result is a feeling of indignation and resentment.” That is, in terms of social context the authors blame populism on the division of the polity by the ruling elites.

On the other hand, division can happen not only along political, but socio-economic lines as well. There is overwhelming evidence on the role of socio-economic problems, like marginalization, joblessness, and inequality in fuelling populist sentiments. Burgoon et al. (2018) argue that positional deprivation and inequality increases the support for radical right populist parties. In the DEMOS project[1] we found that the lack of activation policies and the exclusion of a significant proportion of young people from the labour market clearly feeds populist attitudes (Bartha et al. 2020).

A dramatic illustration of this point is that during the 2016 US presidential elections, Donald Trump overperformed the most in counties with poor health conditions, and the highest drug, alcohol, and suicide mortality rates – strongly linked to economic distress.[2]

The problem of growing inequalities in most of the countries is well known. Once again, its causes are complex, the explanations ranging from the capital accumulation mechanism of capitalism (Piketty, 2013), the increasing return of knowledge and education (Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios, 2009), the inherent logic of globalisation (Reich, 1991). Its dire consequences are also well documented. In their convincingly written study Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) show that income inequality is a factor lying behind a number of social ills including substance abuse, health problems, shorter life expectancy, homicide rates, teenage birth rate, poor school performance. In their recent book, The Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism, Case and Deaton (2020) argue that in the US life expectancy has fallen for three years in a row which is mainly due to the fast-increasing death rates of working-class Americans struck by economic hardship and joblessness.

Compared to the US the European welfare-states provide more social protection to vulnerable groups, but the growth of inequality did not spare them either. These problems fuel populist sentiments and political entrepreneurs are ready to capitalize on them. An illustration is provided by the long struggle of the ‘gilets jaunes’, the French grassroot movement originally mobilized against the introduction of a new environmental fee by President Macron, turning into a general populist revolt. The ‘gilets jaunes’ expressed deep resentment about their socio-economic problems and criticized the establishment with typical populist arguments.

Unless mainstream politics is able to meaningfully address the problems of growing inequalities and social precarity, populism will continue to have a solid basis to build on. This is, of course, not to say that inequality is the only factor that shapes populism or the single most important problem to deal with in this context. Other phenomena, like the role of social media in spreading populist messages, fake news and conteos as well as creating ‘echo chambers’ that also contribute to political polarization, is also an extraordinary challenge to deal with. But I wanted to emphasize that if we blame populism, and rightly so, for polarizing the polity we should keep in mind that our societies are already highly divided. This is a serious problem on its own right – and it contributes to both strengthening populism and potentially eroding the culture of democracy.

Conclusion

Liberal democracy is more than a specific institutional arrangement of political rule and collective decision making. It comprises a set of norms, values, and acceptable behaviours – a kind of political culture. Liberal democracy cannot properly function without some level of unity, integration, and cooperation inside the polity. Populism undermines the unity of the polity through its highly polarizing logic and therefore it undermines democratic quality as well. However, our societies must face the challenge of already existing and deepening socio-economic divisions which effectively fuel populist sentiments. From this perspective, populism should be considered not only as a threat, but also as a warning sign.

The fragmentation of our polities, the spread of populism and the erosion of the culture of democracy pose extraordinary challenges to our societies. I am convinced that political culture studies should play a role in better understanding these, highly interrelated, phenomena.

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[1] See at https://demos-h2020.eu/en/

[2] https://www.economist.com/united-states/2016/11/19/illness-as-indicator and https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2016/12/09/daily-202-trump-over-performed-the-most-in-counties-with-the-highest-drug-alcohol-and-suicide-mortality-rates/584a2a59e9b69b7e58e45f2e/?utm_term=.8639211d5cf4

Corresponding Author:

Dr. Zsolt Boda, Professor, ELKH Centre for Social Sciences, Hungary. Contact Address: boda.zsolt@tk.hu

Copyright @ 2021, Zsolt Boda

European Journal of political Culture Vol.1(1):36-45.

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