Publications
Publications
We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.
We study the implementation of social choice rules in environments with externalities. We prove the impossibility of implementing efficient and α-individually rational rules in dominant strategies. We prove that the α-core is implementable in Nash equilibrium under mild restrictions and discuss the maximality and the minimality of our results. We extend our analysis to weakly efficient rules.
We study coalition formation problems with externalities. We prove that, if expectations are not prudent a stable coalitions structure may fail to exist. Under prudent expectations a stable and efficient coalition structure exists if the set of admissible coalitions is single-lapping. However, under this assumption the stable set is not a singleton, and no stable strategy-proof revelation mechanism exists, differently from the case without externalities. Finally, the stable correspondence is Nash implementable.
We consider marriage markets with externalities. We focus on weak externalities, that is, markets in which each agent is primarily concerned about her partner. We formalize and prove the claim that weak externalities are not so significant in the marriage market: in this case, the 𝜔-core and the 𝛼-core coincide and are both nonempty. In addition, we show that, if we allow agents to block matchings without changing their mate, the results do not longer hold.
Coalitional stability under myopic expectations and externalities (with Agustin Bonifacio and Pablo Neme)
Submitting to Games and Economic Behavior
Interrogando al Sistema de Pensiones Chileno: Rendimiento y Riesgo en Perspectiva (with Octavio Martínez)
Forthcoming in Revista CEPAL
Expectations, cores, and strategy-proofness under externalities (with Matteo Triossi)
In progress
Affirmative action policies and externalities in school choice problems (with Damián Gibaja and Octavio Martínez)
In progress