Study Guide
For most of us, moral principles play an important role in our moral assessments. We blame someone because her action violated a moral principle. Alternatively, we praise someone because she did something that abides by moral principles and standards.
Moral philosophers, however, are divided as to whether such principles should really have a role in our moral assessments. Moral generalists think that they do play a crucial role; moral particularists deny this.
For moral generalists, our moral judgments could only be warranted by moral principles. According to them, our moral reasoning proceeds as follows:
X's action is an A-type action. (evidential premise)
All A-type actions are morally good. (moral principle)
Thus, X's action is morally good.
For moral generalists, moral principles are exceptionless and must hold true whatever the situation may be.
Moral particularists, on the other hand, deny all these. For Jonathan Dancy, one of the main proponents of moral particularism, our reasons for acting are always context-sensitive. You might be motivated to fulfill a promise to a friend because you think that keeping a promise is good. But this not mean that you also believe that all types of promise-keeping actions are good. (Consider the case of promising to do something wrong!) Dancy concludes that no moral principle (or reason for acting) could always provide a reason for or against performing an action. At most, these principles could serve as useful rules of thumb that guide, but not govern, our actions.
Key Questions
Does your moral judgment depend on absolute moral principles? Or does it depend on context-sensitive factors?
Can you think of exceptions to other moral principles?
How would a moral generalist respond to Dancy's argument?
Suggested Readings and Materials
