On the Relation of Good to Being

For centuries, the notions of being and good have been topics of interest investigated in the field of metaphysics. Consequently, many philosophers have also attempted to determine the relationship between these two concepts. By researching and building on earlier philosophers’ ideas, St. Thomas Aquinas advanced his own metaphysical interpretation of the association between these notions through two main investigations found in his Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate and Summa Theologica. The first investigation concerns how good and being are identical in reality, yet conceptually distinct, by articulating how the notion of good resolves to the notion of being. 1 The second investigation begins with the objection that good admits of more or less whereas being does not (i.e., you can become a more good [better] human being, but you cannot become more of a being; you either exist or you do not). Therefore, being and good cannot be the same in reality. To refute this argument, Aquinas highlights how being and good are expressed in different ways; he then proceeds to outline the degrees of being and goodness. 2 Since then, there have been countless scholarly interpretations of Aquinas’s account on the connection between being and good. One noteworthy example is Jan A. Aertsen, who accurately articulated these two investigations in an especially valuable way for readers looking to understand this relationship. Aertsen begins his exposition by explaining what the transcendentals are in Aquinas’s thought and effectively elaborates on the difference between the transcendental good and the Platonic Idea of the Good. Aertsen writes, “According to the Platonists, the good is first in the sense that it is prior to and more universal than being. Thomas criticizes this view and bases his critique on another aspect of the transcendentals, their convertibility.”3 In Aquinas’s Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, he explains that the transcendentals are considerations of being in general and do not limit the notion of being. With this conclusion, Aertsen emphasizes that “transcendentals are coextensive with being and are accordingly studied by the ‘common science’ of being as being.”4 Therefore, they “transcend the special modes of being that Aristotle called ‘the categories.’”5 He then illustrates how being and good are the same in reality and defines the type of distinction Aquinas makes between good and being. Additionally, Aertsen correctly interprets Aquinas’ argument that being and good are really identical. However, “This does not mean that ‘being’ and ‘good’ are synonymous...[but that] there is a conceptual difference between the two, for ‘good’ adds something to ‘being,’ namely, the aspect of ‘desirability.’”6 Here, Aertsen interprets Aquinas’s explanation of the transcendental good, its expression as a general mode that follows upon every being, and the distinction between the notion of being and the notion of good. Building upon his argument, Aquinas explains how the notion of good is resolved to the notion of being in four main steps, which Aertsen precisely extracts in his own interpretation.7 The importance of this argument is to lay the groundwork in explaining that being is the first concept of the intellect, and thus, that the notion of good presupposes being. 8 Aertsen begins the first step of this argument by highlighting the definition of good and its relation to the appetite. Good, according to Aquinas and interpreted by Aertsen, is that which all things desire. 9

Moreover, as Aertsen explains, Aquinas’s second step in the argument is that “‘desirable’ is identified with ‘perfect’ (perfectum),” because all things desire their own perfection.10 Aertsen continues, writing, “In this step the transition is made from the concept of good to the nature of the good. Proper to the good as good is that it is perfect. ‘Perfect’ is that which has attained its end; the notion expresses completeness.”11 This is an accurate explication of the idea of perfection according to Aquinas’s thought and is necessary for readers to understand when analyzing this argument.

Aquinas’s third step in his argument that the notion of good resolves to the notion of being is understood from the “identification of what is ‘perfect’ with what is ‘in act.’”12 Here, Aertsen outlines Aquinas’s explanation that a thing cannot be perfect without its potentialities being actualized. In other words, “it is not completed until it has attained its act...only then is the thing what it can be.”13 As a result, Aquinas’s fourth and final step is revealed when Aertsen notes that the connection between good and being is now established since to be (esse) is the actuality (actualitas) of every thing.14

Aertsen appropriately extends the argument following this last step and carefully makes the connection between this conclusion and the foundation of the idea that every being is good insofar as it is a being.15 Finally, “It is manifest that good and being are really identical.”16 As with the explanation of the transcendental good and its conceptual distinction from the notion of being, Aertsen’s account of Aquinas’s argument that the notion of good resolves to the notion of being, once again, demonstrates the strength of his interpretation of this first investigation into the relationship between good and being.

The second investigation on this relationship between good and being begins with Aertsen’s crucial debunking of the idea that Aquinas’s thesis of convertibility of being and good can be taken solely in the moral sense. Aertsen starts this part of his article by citing the words of the philosopher, John F. Crosby, that “values... are irreducible to being: ‘The person as substantial and the person as having nobility, excellence, dignity are to all eternity distinct dimensions of the being of the person.’”17 This interpretation, as Aertsen accurately identifies, plays off of Boethius’s De hebdomadibus, where he wrote, “I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing, that they are is another.”18 In other words, to exist as a being is one thing, but to be morally good is something completely different; therefore, it must be the case that being and good are really distinct concepts. To refute this claim, Aertsen essentially repeats Aquinas’s conclusion that being and good are really identical. He goes further to explain that from the conceptual difference between being and good, a real distinction does follow, “that between being absolutely (ens simpliciter)...and good absolutely (bonum simpliciter).”19 On this note, Aertsen not only sustains the identity of being and good inAquinas’s investigation but also introduces the real difference that comes about from the conceptual difference of the two notions when they are not taken in the general sense.20 In doing so, Aertsen again exhibits the precision and strength of his interpretation of Aquinas’s investigation.

In the Summa, Aquinas is presented with an objection that the notion of good admits of more or less but the notion of being does not. For instance, you can become a more good (better) human being, but you cannot become more of a being; you either exist or you do not. As Aertsen thoroughly outlines in his own work, Aquinas responds to this objection with a valid explanation that being and good are said of things in different ways.21 Following Aquinas’s interpretation, Aertsen explains that being properly expresses actuality while good properly expresses perfection.22 He then painstakingly draws out Aquinas’s degrees of being and degrees of goodness by using the terms “being absolutely” (which he calls B1), “being in a certain respect” (which he calls B2), “good absolutely” (which he calls G1), and “good in a certain respect” (which he calls G2).23 In relation to the original investigation, Aertsen’s B1 is equivalent to Aquinas’s “unqualified being,” B2 is equivalent to Aquinas’s “qualified being,” G1 is equivalent to Aquinas’s “qualified good,” and G2 is equivalent to Aquinas’s “unqualified good.”24 Once these terms are accurately identified, Aertsen sets out to explain the degrees of each notion and does so by adhering to Aquinas’s investigation. According to Aquinas, interpreted by Aertsen, B1 is understood as the substantial being of each thing (i.e., me existing), while B2 is understood as a substantial being with actualities added to it (e.g., me existing with brown hair).25 Aertsen goes on to helpfully recognize that “with respect to the good the reverse applies.”26 He elaborates on this aspect found originally in Aquinas’s investigation by saying:

The concept “good” says that something is perfect and has therefore the aspect of being final (rationem ultimi). Hence, something is called G1 when it possesses its ultimate perfection through actualities added to the substantial being. A thing that has substantial being but not the ultimate perfection it ought to have is called “good in a certain respect,” G2, because it has a certain perfection insofar as it is a being. To be a being is a good, but this is not identical with being a good human being.27

To understand the rationale behind this part of the investigation of the degrees of goodness and being and outline his own interpretation, Aertsen identifies Aquinas’s difference between being absolutely and good absolutely. He then highlights the inverse ordering between the two: “What is B1 in only good initially, G2: [and] what is G1 is accidental in an ontological respect, B2.”28 From this inference, Aertsen reveals a critical specification for the interchangeability of being and good by demonstrating that the notion of convertibility applies to being and to good only when expressed generally (as transcendentals). This conclusion is both accurate and loyal to Aquinas’s investigation of these two notions. Following this, Aertsen elaborates on the inference in greater detail and explains that “when the thesis bears upon ‘being absolutely’ and ‘good absolutely,’ it is no longer valid. Good in the primary sense is not interchangeable with being in the primary sense,” but this type of good divides being (not every being is good absolutely).29 By following Aquinas’s investigation of being and good said of things in different ways, Aertsen, once again, articulates an easy-to-follow outline of this metaphysical theme on the relationship between the notion of good and the notion of being.

Through Aertsen’s concise and straightforward interpretation of Aquinas, readers are offered a strong resource that is valuable in comprehending Aquinas’s sometimes convoluted philosophical work. The relationship between the notion of being and the notion of good is addressed using two investigations found in Aquinas’s Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate and Summa Theologica— how good is resolved to being and the degrees of goodness and being. Aertsen gracefully employs an interpretation of these two investigations in his own work highlighting the definitive relationship between good and being. Through the crucial distinction he makes, Aertsen articulates the invalidity of using these terms interchangeably when discussing them in absolute terms. By demonstrating how they are said of things in different ways, readers are then able to understand the interchangeability of being and the transcendental good more readily. His contribution exists as a tangible clarification between the relationship between being and good that is both noteworthy in its accuracy and valuable in its intelligibility.

ENDNOTES

1. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (hereafter QDV), q. 1, a. 1, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952); Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (hereafter ST), I, q. 5, a. 1-2, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2018), 31-3.

2. ST, I, q. 5, a. 1.

3. Jan A. Aertsen, “Thomas Aquinas on the Good: The Relation between Meta- physics and Ethics,” in Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1999), 235-53.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. QDV, q. 1, a. 1.; ST, I, q. 5, a. 1.; Aertsen, “Thomas Aquinas on the Good,” 240-1.

7. ST, I, q. 5, a. 1.

8. ST, I, q. 5, a. 2.

9. QDV, q. 1, a. 1; Aertsen, “Thomas Aquinas on the Good,” 237.

10. Aertsen, “Thomas Aquinas on the Good,” 240.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.; cf. ST, I, q. 3, a. 4; q. 4, a. 1.

15. Aertsen, “Thomas Aquinas on the Good,” 240; cf. ST, I, q. 5, a. 3.

16. Aertsen, “Thomas Aquinas on the Good,” 240.

17. Ibid., 241.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Aertsen, “Thomas Aquinas on the Good,” 241-2.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 241; cf. ST, I, q. 5, a. 1.

26. Aertsen, “Thomas Aquinas on the Good,” 241.

27. Ibid., 242.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.