This paper examines how shifts in media revenue structures affect information quality and political coverage. I show that declining advertising revenues do not necessarily degrade information quality. Instead, falling advertiser demand incentivizes outlets to transition toward subscription-based business models. As reliance on subscription revenue increases, outlets raise subscription prices and cater to the preferences of their most engaged readers, who demand more informative content. This mechanism is consistent with empirical evidence showing that political coverage contracts as advertising revenues fall: as information quality improves, politicians receive less favorable coverage.
Institutional Design for Sustainable Resource Extraction
This paper studies present-biased governments in resource rich countries that overextract natural resources due to short-term fiscal pressures. I develop a dynamic political economy model comparing deficit limits, extraction caps, and international conservation treaties, and characterize the optimal mix of domestic and supranational commitment mechanisms to sustain efficient intertemporal resource extraction.
Unintended Effects of the Vaccine Mandate on the News Market
This paper documents a surge in coverage of “dog-whistle” news about sudden or unexplained deaths following Italy’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate. I develop a model in which profit-maximizing outlets anticipate vaccine-skeptical demand and strategically amplify such content to cater to readers seeking confirmatory evidence against the mandate.
Strategic Response to Tie-Breaking Rules
This paper studies how asymmetric tie-breaking rules affect strategic behavior in sequential contests. Using an event-study design, I exploit variation in the adoption and abolition of the away-goals rule in the UEFA Champions League and Copa Libertadores tournaments to examine whether the rule discourages attacking play, particularly by home teams in first legs.