Below is a mix of peer-reviewed papers and shorter online essays, organized by topic. If you are unable to find something, feel free to request a copy (derek.turner@conncoll.edu). There are also some quick summaries of my philosophical views.
In principle, I think there could be situations where the argument for de-extinction (i.e. using biotechnology to create ecological proxies for recently extinct species) might have some force. The problem is that the actual work that people are doing on de-extinction makes no ecological sense.
Turner, D. "Game of Clones," Daily Nous, June 2, 2025.
Turner, D., “Rewilding,” in Ben Hale, Andrew Light, and Lydia Lawhon, eds., Routledge Companion to Environmental Ethics. London: Routledge, 2022.
Turner, D. "De-extinction as Artificial Species Selection," Philosophy and Technology (online 18 September, 2016), doi:10.1007/s13347-016-0232-4.
Turner, D. “The restorationist argument for extinction reversal,” The Ethics of Animal Re-Creation and Modification: Reviving, Rewilding, Restoring, edited by Markku Oksanen and Helena Siipi, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 40-59.
I'm a bit skeptical about the precautionary principle. I worry that the most plausible versions of the principle actually build in some form of cost-benefit analysis. I also tend to see certain applications of the principle in international relations (e.g. doctrines of preemptive or precautionary war) as a real problem. But I'm also skeptical about cost-benefit analysis.
So much environmental activism that we might want to endorse is place-protective activism. Many people use "NIMBY" as a pejorative, but Simon Feldman and I argue that it's very hard to say, in any kind of principled way, how the bad sorts of NIMBY activism differ from the more laudable forms of place-protective activism.
The "living fossil" concept is much contested. I tend to think of it as having a normative dimension that connects to issues in conservation biology. Living fossil taxa are those whose distinctive evolutionary histories might justify prioritizing them for conservation.
Turner, D. "In Defense of Living Fossils," Biology and Philosophy (April 2019), 34:23.
Turner, D. "A Metasequoia Moment," Extinct: The Philosophy of Palaeontology Blog, October 1, 2018.
I like to think of distinctively evolutionary contingency as unbiased lineage sorting. This way of thinking treats contingency as the macroevolutionary analogue of drift, and it also helps clarify the relationship between contingency and other parts of macroevolutionary theory, such as species selection and passive diffusion models.
Turner, D., and A. AboHamad, "Narrative Explanation and Non-Epistemic Value," Journal of the Philosophy of History 17(2023): 53-76.
Ereshefsky, M., and D. Turner, "Historicity and Explanation," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 80(2020): 47-55.
Turner, D. "What if Prehistory?" Extinct: The Philosophy of Paleontology Blog (18 January, 2016).
Turner, D. “Historical contingency and the explanation of evolutionary trends,” in Explanation in Biology: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences, edited by Christophe Malaterre and Pierre-Alain Braillard, Springer, 2015, pp. 73-90.
Inkpen, R. and D. Turner, “The Topography of Historical Contingency,” Journal of the Philosophy of History 6(2012): 1-20.
Turner, D. “Gould’s Replay Revisited,” Biology and Philosophy 26(2010): 65-79.
One theme of my work in this area is that there are positive feedback effects between the asthetic and the epistemic dimensions of historical and environmental science. I tend to think of scientific investigation itself as a form of aesthetic engagement with the world around us. I also defend a cognitivist approach to aesthetics.
Turner, D. “Philosophy of the Earth Sciences,” Historiographies of Science. Handbook of the Historiography of the Earth and Environmental Sciences, edited by Elena Aronova, David Sepkoski, and Marco Tamborini. Springer, 2024.
Turner, D., and A. AboHamad, "Narrative Explanation and Non-Epistemic Value," Journal of the Philosophy of History 17(2023): 53-76.
Currie, A., and D. Turner, "Creativity Without Agency: Evolutionary Flair and Aesthetic Engagement," Ergo (in press).
Just how much we can learn from fossils has been a long-running interest of mine. One theme of my work in this area has been epistemic caution. At times I've been a bit too pessimistic. But I'm still very interested in thinking about the limitations of fossil evidence.
Turner, D. “Speculation in the Historical Sciences,” Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 11(2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0011.011.
Turner, D. “Three Kinds of Realism about Historical Science,” in the Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism, edited by Juha Saatsi, 2018, pp. 321-332.
Currie, A. and Turner, D., “Scientific Knowledge of the Deep Past (Introduction to Special Section),” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 55(2016): 43-46.
Turner, D. “A Second Look at the Colors of the Dinosaurs,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A (2015).
Turner, D. “Philosophical Issues in Recent Paleontology,” Philosophy Compass 9(2014): 494-505.
Turner, D. “Comments on Kyle Stanford’s, ‘Projective Evidence and the Heterogeneity of Scientific Confirmation’,” The Modern Schoolman LXXXVII (2010): 245-249.
Turner, D. “Beyond Detective Work: Empirical Testing in Paleobiology,” in M. Ruse and D. Sepkoski (eds.), The Paleobiological Revolution: Essays on the Growth of Modern Paleontology, University of Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 201-214.
Turner, D. “How Much Can We Know About the Causes of Evolutionary Trends?” Biology and Philosophy 24(2009): 341-357.
Turner, D. “Local Underdetermination in Historical Science,” Philosophy of Science 72(2005): 209-230.
Turner, D. “Misleading Observable Analogues in Paleontology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 36(2005): 175-183.
Turner, D. “The Past vs. the Tiny: Historical Science and the Abductive Arguments for Realism,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 35 (2004): 1-17.
Turner, D. “The Functions of Fossils: Inference and Explanation in Functional Morphology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science C: Biology and Biomedical Sciences 31(2000): 193-212.
Turner, D. “Philosophy of the Earth Sciences,” Historiographies of Science. Handbook of the Historiography of the Earth and Environmental Sciences, edited by Elena Aronova, David Sepkoski, and Marco Tamborini. Springer.
Turner, D. “Historical Geology: Methodology and Metaphysics” in Baker, V.R., ed., Rethinking the Fabric of Geology: Geological Society of America Special Paper 502(2013): 11-18.
Turner, M., and D. Turner, “Leaving Traces: Fairy Houses, Kindness Stones, and Constructed Heritage,” American Anthropologist126(2024): https://doi.org/10.1111/aman.13937
Turner, D., and M.I. Turner, “I’m not saying it was aliens: An Archaeological and Philosophical Analysis of a Conspiracy Theory,” Explorations in Archaeology and Philosophy, edited by Anton Killin and Sean Hermanson, Synthese Library, 2020, pp. 7-24.
Much of my work in this area explores the relationships among different macroevolutionary ideas: species selection, punctuated equilibria, passive evolutionary trends, and historical contingency. One theme of my work is that there is more unity to macroevolutionary theory than is often realized. I'm pretty favorable toward species selection.
Turner, D., and J.C. Havstad, "Philosophy of Macroevolution," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (3 June, 2019).
Turner, D. “Paleobiology’s uneasy relationship with Darwinian tradition: Stasis as Data,” in R. Delisle, ed., The Darwinian Tradition in Context: Research Programs in Twentieth Century Evolutionary Biology, Springer, 2017, pp. 333-352.
Turner, D. "De-extinction as Artificial Species Selection," Philosophy and Technology (online 18 September, 2016), doi:10.1007/s13347-016-0232-4.
Turner, D. “Gould’s Replay Revisited,” Biology and Philosophy 26(2010): 65-79.
Turner, D. “Punctuated Equilibrium and Species Selection: What Does it Mean for one Theory to Suggest Another?” Theory in Biosciences 129(2010): 113-123.
Turner, D. “How Much Can We Know About the Causes of Evolutionary Trends?” Biology and Philosophy 24(2009): 341-357.
Narrative explanations are not normatively neutral. Decisions about what to foreground and what to background often reflect a variety of non-epistemic value commitments.
Turner, D., and A. AboHamad, "Narrative Explanation and Non-Epistemic Value," Journal of the Philosophy of History 17(2023): 53-76.
Ereshefsky, M., and D. Turner, "Historicity and Explanation," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 80(2020): 47-55.
One distinctive feature of my view is that unlike most other secularist philosophers, I'm quite skeptical about methodological naturalism and other accommodationist ideas. I'm pretty sure that the idea that science should be theologically neutral is self-referentially inconsistent, because the ideal of theological neutrality is itself theologically controversial.
In the 2000s, I wrote a couple of papers about vandalism and property destruction as tactics for environmental activism. At that time, there was very little written about this, and I was trying to reconstruct and assess the sorts of arguments that activists themselves might make. At the time, I suggested that these arguments don't succeed in justifying property destruction.
Turner, D. “Ecosabotage,” in the Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, edited by J. Baird Callicott and Robert Frodeman, Thomson Gale publishers, 2009, pp. 281-284.
Turner, D. “Are We at War With Nature?” Environmental Values 14(2005): 21-36. Reprinted in M. Ruse, ed., Philosophy of Biology, second edition. Prometheus Books, 2007, pp. 329-345.