Frictions in a Bayesian persuasion game, such as the receiver's rational inattention, can constrain the feasible information structures beyond Bayes' plausibility. In a conventional persuasion scenario with a binary state and binary action, we examine the properties of the inattention constraint under which the sender is likely to benefit from extending the persuasion game. These properties transform the sender's persuasion problem into an intertemporal one, where her strategy not only determines the current chance to succeed but also the receiver's prior belief in the next persuasion attempt, if necessary. In contrast to the optimal static persuasion strategy, the intertemporal approach may lead the sender to adopt a “piecemeal” information disclosure strategy, where she sacrifices the chance of immediate success to ensure that the receiver can be persuaded in subsequent attempts should her current attempt fail. While extending the persuasion game can improve overall persuasiveness beyond the static efficiency level, frictional constraints continue to define the efficiency limits of this sequential strategy. Friction-free efficiency remains unattainable, even with unlimited opportunities to persuade.
In conspicuous consumption, if consumers lack information about market demand, they are uncertain about the exclusivity for which they are willing to pay a premium. The price set by a monopolistic firm with an information advantage can be a signal of product exclusivity to consumers. In a signaling game, we show that the consumer's heuristic, that higher prices justify higher levels of exclusivity, supports the equilibria where prices are pooling or separating signals. In these equilibria, as compared to the perfect-information benchmark, the firm earns a higher profit in the premium luxury market, where most potential consumers are high-type, and a lower profit in the affordable luxury market, where there is a large proportion of low-type consumers. In addition, the difference in consumption value between high- and low-type consumers, as well as consumers' preference for exclusivity, affect the firm's profit in imperfect-information equilibria, which generate important managerial implications for product design and marketing strategies.
We study persuasion where the sender is fully informed about the payoff-relevant state but must communicate via reviewers, whose types are defined by mappings from the true state to signals. The sender publicly chooses the distribution of reviewer types ex ante; then a reviewer randomly drawn from this distribution delivers a signal to the receiver. We establish that persuasion through reviews is equivalent to a two-stage direct persuasion problem, allowing the analysis to proceed within the conventional Bayesian persuasion framework. We apply this approach to a binary-state context where the sender can optimally pool across states on the same reviewer distribution so that information is transmitted through persuasion rather than signaling. Relative to direct persuasion, the sender tends to make the favorable signal more likely rather than make signals more favorable because her private information makes her better positioned to manage probabilities of signal occurrence. We examine both a frictionless benchmark, in which the sender can fully manipulate the reviewer distribution over four pillar types, and a frictional case, where the distribution is constrained.
(Presented at 2023 Midwest International Trade & Theory Conference at Georgia Institute of Technology) (Slides)
The sender may have to use the same persuasion strategy to persuade a group of receivers. An optimal strategy to persuade targeted receivers may provide unnecessary information to some other receivers with different prior beliefs. Such unnecessary information may change these receivers' beliefs and actions in ways that the sender does not desire, resulting in over-persuasion. This study investigates when the over-persuasion issue arises and how mechanism design can address it. We propose a mechanism in which contract transfer is contingent on signal realizations. Receivers can accept the contract to process the persuasion signals and pay the transfer, or they can decline it and maintain their prior beliefs. The mechanism exploits confirmation bias, which arises from receivers' heterogeneous beliefs, to create their heterogeneous incentives to accept the contract. We apply the general theorem to the market with a monopolistic seller and heterogeneous consumers who are uncertain about the product's value. This application demonstrates an important managerial implication for the optimal pricing of a product trial or demo, which was largely overlooked previously.
For conspicuous consumption to occur, certain price levels must exclude low-income consumers while retaining as many high-income consumers as possible to create exclusivity. This phenomenon necessitates the income effect if consumers with different incomes share similar preferences for a status good. However, as a result of the income effect, the direct value determined by the product quality and the conspicuous value determined by exclusivity may act as substitutes for consumers. Therefore, when a product becomes a status good, its quality may decrease. Consumers who purchase a good solely for its direct value may incur a loss, and the market may experience a decrease in efficiency. Moreover, the quality decline of a status good reduces the effectiveness of price as a signal of product quality, whereas a high price indicates only high quality if the good is an ordinary good under the same conditions.
(Accepted in the 2024 International Conference for Computational Social Science (IC2S2 24') at the University of Pennsylvania)
The Sender who decides how information is disclosed in a game can benefit by selling information, if additional information helps the Receivers make decisions, and by garbling the information, when these decisions are relevant to her payoff. These two objectives are usually not perfectly aligned, but they coexist, especially when Receivers have heterogeneous prior beliefs as private information, which motivates the Sender to design screening mechanisms. We investigate the optimal information disclosure strategy and its determinants in a bilateral trading game where the Sender has dual objectives and the Receivers have heterogeneous prior beliefs. We show that the screening mechanism is effective only when the Sender's primary objective is to sell information to some Receivers while still needing to persuade others. In other cases, the Sender either fully discloses the information or employs a non-discriminatory information-garbling strategy to persuade all Receivers.
Optimal Discretionary Mechanism Enforcement
Advertising Information Goods
Buying to Qualify: Audience and Exclusivity in Conspicuous Consumption
Price Discrimination Design in Conspicuous Consumption