MENGQI ZHANG

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Colorado Boulder. My research focuses on information design and mechanism design on the market and how they combine to provide theoretical insights and managerial implications in practice.

My current research agenda encompasses the following topics:

Consumers are willing to pay a premium for conspicuous information designed by the seller. However, they may be uncertain about what conspicuous information will be revealed to the public in the equilibrium. My Job Market Paper on this topic shows how conspicuous consumption is affected in this scenario, where the price not only designs the conspicuous information but also serves as a signal that influences the consumer's perception of this information.

Persuading Receivers with heterogeneous prior beliefs warrants screening mechanisms. My Working Paper on this topic addresses the over-persuasion issue in public persuasion and discusses signal-contingent mechanisms as a solution. This research has important implications for pricing strategy for trials, as it advises against the widely used strategy of providing trials to potential consumers for free.

I am currently on the job market. Please find my CV here. I am available for interviews. Kindly contact me at mengqi.zhang@colorado.edu.