Special thanks is due to Pusey House and St Cross College for hosting the event, and to Centre for Theology, Law and Culture at Oxford for their assistance with the logistics.

Abstracts

Session 1 - Middle-Sized Things Metaphysics

Vera Hoffmann-Kolss - Higher-Level Causation, Causal Models, and the Proportionality Constraint

A crucial question in the contemporary debate about causation is at what level causal relations occur, that is, whether causation occurs only at the physical level or also at higher levels, such as the biological or psychological levels. A closely related question is whether causal explanations for phenomena that occur at the level of ordinary middle-sized objects should be at the same level as the phenomena, or should be reductive in the sense of invoking phenomena at lower levels. A prominent anti-reductionist approach is based on proportionality considerations: causes should be proportional to their effects, that is, have the same level of grain as their effects. In this paper, I critically examine this proportionality constraint from the perspective of a causal modelling approach. I argue that proportionality requirements are problematic in the context of complex causal models and explore the implications of this result for the way causal models can be used to describe causal relations occurring at higher or intermediate levels.

Aaron Cotnoir - Measuring Naturalness? Moving away from a metaphysics of building, grounding, and fundamentality

The notion of metaphysical naturalness is often used to characterize a special class of entities to do certain theoretical work. Naturalness is often thought to be a gradable notion utilizing a scale of degrees. In this paper, I use Lewis’s (1983b) approach to naturalness as a foil, highlighting problems that any theory of naturalness needs to avoid: (i) the Problem of Definitional Precision; (ii) the Problem of Too Many Scales; (iii) the Problem of Ratios. I use insights from Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM) to solve these problems. Along the way, I argue that naturalness theorists should reject definitional complexity accounts, and any account that ties naturalness to the fundamental level. Rather they should treat relative naturalness as primary. I close by suggesting an approach to naturalness that is more holistically motivated and compatible with emergence.

John Pemberton - (Middle-Sized) Things – an acting-arrangement account 

In this presentation, I show how non-elementary middle-sized things can be understood as the surviving acting-together of their physical parts. I explore the implied notion of acting as the bringing about of changing-through-time (e.g. attracting, pushing, heating, cutting, building), noting similarities with Aristotle’s account of powers (as distinct from many contemporary accounts of powers). I explain the sense in which, on this acting-together account of middle-sized things, the spatial arrangement of a plurality of physical things is ontologically irreducible, and I show how the arrangement of physical parts may underwrite genuine novelty at the level of the whole – e.g. the power of a pendulum to oscillate (as none of its parts have this power). I explore the similarities and dissimilarities of such arrangements (of parts) with the notion of hylomorphic forms. Hence, I outline a simple ontology that underwrites an intuitive and compelling account of middle-sized things, noting its attractions as compared to other leading accounts of ontology, including neo-Humean accounts, like David Lewis’s Humean mosaic.

Christopher Oldfield - Hylomorphism and the Inverse Special Composition Question 

There were two special composition questions in Peter van Inwagen's (1990) book. To answer The Special Composition Question (SCQ) is to formulate a principle of composition of the form: ⌜(∃y the xs compose y) ↔ φ[the xs]⌝. To answer The Inverse Special Composition Question (ISCQ) is to formulate a principle of composition of the form: ⌜(For some xs, the xs compose y) ↔ φ[y]⌝. ISCQ is rarely mentioned or discussed. The first and to my knowledge still the only other philosopher to consider its significance in print was the late great Katherine Hawley (2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2014). Unfortunately, Hawley’s less formal presentations rested on a series of false equivalences with one of Ned Markosian’s (1998, 2010) complex questions about mereological simples, and with Simon Saunders’ (2006) questions about the individuation of quantum particles in entangled states. This generated some effective rhetorical associations between the logic of the special composition questions and speculative microphysics. I show why this matters for the development of Hylomorphism and for the very complex idea of a middle-sized object being identified as composite.

Session 2 - Middle-Sized Things in Science and Religion

Mark Harris - Arthur Peacocke's Emergent Theology: Implications for a Theology of Condensed Matter Physics

Arthur Peacocke, one of the most illustrious Directors of Oxford’s Ian Ramsey Centre, was also highly distinctive in the science-and-religion field for his emphasis on the providential and scientific realities of middle-sized things. Famously, this emphasis was manifest in a robust treatment of ontological emergence to unify the sciences and humanities, and to capture the nature of the God-world relationship. When God acts in the world, God must first change the entire world on every (synchronic) level. In this centenary of Peacocke's birth the science-and-religion field is doing a great deal to celebrate Peacocke's lasting contributions. This talk will look at ways in which Peacocke's emphasis on top-down divine action and emergence may inform a theology of condensed matter physics, that branch of physical science which spans micro-, meso-, and middle-sized matters.

Javier Sánchez-Cañizares - Causal Physical Constraints: An Epistemic Defense of Higher-Order Causality

Constraints are pervasive in Nature. They play a crucial role in the emergence of dissipative systems that give rise to increasingly complex phenomena. However, some trends in the philosophy of science, such as higher-level causal eliminativism (HLCE), deem constraints non-causal explanations (Lange) or derivative causal explanations (Siegel and Craver), compromising the existence and causality of middle-sized things. Recently, philosophers like Ross and Ben-Menahem have defended the causal role of constraints, but they still fail to satisfactorily account for how microphysical and macrophysical states interact. In our proposal, (1) we advocate for the non-derivative causal activity of physical constraints via ontological selection of microphysical states, and (2) we claim that HLCE is bound to superdeterminism, which, by severing the link between ontological and epistemic selection, requires an arbitrary selection of boundary conditions for the universe.

Robert Verrill - Christianity and Quantum Monism: addressing the threat

Atomistic reductionism is often perceived as a threat to a Christian worldview. However, a growing number of physicists are rejecting it in favour of quantum monism, which posits the existence of only one fundamental object, namely, the universal quantum state. In my presentation, I will briefly explain some of the attractions of quantum monism, whilst highlighting the threat which it likewise poses to a Christian worldview. I will then explain how Aquinas’s theory of hylomorphism can counter this threat by facilitating an interpretation of the quantum state as a description of the real potencies of the universe, rather than as a complete description of the actual universe. This allows for the possibility of there being formal principles that complement the quantum state and actualize some of these potencies. I will distinguish this interpretation of quantum theory from other interpretations (like wave function realism), and I will distinguish my adaptation of hylomorphism from extant adaptations (such as Koons’s and Simpson’s), explaining how it overcomes the threat of quantum monism whilst preserving some of its attractive features.