Published Scholarly Papers 

The pdf files of articles found in this page are either the final published version of the article, or the final prepublication version accepted for publication. In the latter case, such a version already incorporates all comments and suggestions received during the peer-review process, and its content is thus identical to the final published version.

Published scholarly papers:

• V. H. Aguiar and R. Serrano,  “A New Look at the Symmetry of the Slutsky Matrix”, Journal of Political Economy: Microeconomics, forthcoming.

• Roberto Serrano, “Top5itis Revisited: Some Thoughts on the Notion of General Interest in Economics”, Ensayos, Revista de Economia, vol.43, Issue 1 (2024). 

• T. Kunimoto, R. Saran, and R. Serrano, “Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions,” Mathematics of Operations Research, forthcoming.

• Yusuke Kamishiro ®  Rajiv Vohra ®  Roberto Serrano, “Signaling, Screening, and Core Stability”, Journal of Economic Theory, 213 (2023), 105715.

• Roberto Serrano,  “The Neoclassical Economists Did Not Misinterpret Cournot on Competition: A Comment on Nomidis.”  History of Economics Review, Volume 85, Issue 1 (2023), DOI: 10.1080/10370196.2023.2232524.

• G. de Clippel, R. Saran, and R. Serrano, “Continuous Level-k Mechanism Design.”  Games and Economic Behavior, 140 (2023), 481-501.

• Y. Kamishiro, R. Serrano and M. Wooders, “Monopolists of Scarce Information and Small Group Effectiveness in Large Quasilinear Economies.”  International Journal of Game Theory 50 (2021), 801-827.

• V. Aguiar and R. Serrano, “Cardinal Revealed Preference: Disentangling Transitivity and Consistent Binary Choice.” Journal of Mathematical Economics. Volume 94 (2021), 102462. 

• R. Serrano,  “Sixty-Seven Years of the Nash Program: Time for Retirement?,” SERIEs, Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Volume 12, issue 1, March 2021, 35-48.

• E. Inarra, R. Serrano, and K.-I. Shimomura, “The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update,” La Revue Economique, 71, (2020), 225-266. Download Figures.

• Y. Kamishiro and R. Serrano, “Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies,” International Game Theory Review, 22, No. 1 (2020), DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919500129.

• T. Kunimoto and R. Serrano, “Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 44, (2019), 1326-1344. Online Companion.

• V. H. Aguiar, R. Pongou, R. Serrano, and J.-B. Tondji, “An Index of Unfairness,” in Handbook of the Shapley Value, E. Algava et al. (eds.), CRC Press Taylor and Francis, (2019).

• G. de Clippel, R. Saran, and R. Serrano, “Level-k Mechanism Design,” Review of Economic Studies, 86, (2019), 1207-1227. Online Appendix.

• V. H. Aguiar and R. Serrano, “Classifying Bounded Rationality in Limited Data Sets: A Slutsky Matrix Approach,” SERIEs, Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 9, (2018), 389-421.

• R. Serrano, “Top5itis,” Economics Bulletin, 38, No. 2, (2018), p. A2.

• R. Serrano, “Game of Trons: Normatrons and Positrons Contribute to Economic Design,” in The Future of Economic Design, J.-F. Laslier et al. (ed.), Springer, New York, (2018).

• R. Serrano, “An Annotated Bibliography of Lloyd Shapley’s Contributions,” Games and Economic Behavior, 108, (2018), 13-21.

• V. H. Aguiar and R. Serrano, “Slutsky Matrix Norms: The Size, Classification, and Comparative Statics of Bounded Rationality,” Journal of Economic Theory, 172, (2017), 163-201. Online Supplement.

• A. Cabrales, O. Gossner, and R. Serrano, “A Normalized Value for Information Purchases,” Journal of Economic Theory, 170, (2017), 266-288.

• R. Pongou and R. Serrano, “Volume of Trade and Dynamic Network Formation in Two-Sided Economies ,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 63, (2016), 147-163.

• R. Serrano, “The Nash Program: A Broader Interpretation,” From a lecture at the Mexican Colloquium on Mathematical Economics, Monterrey, Ensayos, 33 , (2014), 105-106.

• R. Saran and R. Serrano, “Ex-Post Regret Heuristics under Private Values (II): 2X2 Games ,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 54, (2014), 112-123.

• R. Saran and R. Serrano, “Ex-Post Regret Heuristics under Private Values (I): Fixed and Random Matching ,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 54, (2014), 97-111.

• K. Eliaz and R. Serrano, “Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners’ Dilemma,” International Journal of Game Theory 43, (2014), 245-267.

• R. Serrano, “Lloyd Shapley’s Matching and Game Theory,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115, (2013), 599-618.

• F. Forges and R. Serrano, “Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems,” International Game Theory Review 15, No. 2 (2013), DOI: 10.1142/S0219198913400094.

• R. Pongou and R. Serrano, “Fidelity Networks and Long-Run Trends in HIV/AIDS Gender Gaps,” American Economic Review 103, Papers and Proceedings, (2013), 298-302.

• G. Artemov, T. Kunimoto and R. Serrano, “Robust Virtual Implementation: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine,” Journal of Economic Theory 148, (2013), 424-447. Online Appendix.

• A. Cabrales, O. Gossner and R. Serrano, “Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors,” American Economic Review 103, (2013), 360-377. Online Appendix.

• R. Saran and R. Serrano, “Regret Matching with Finite Memory,” Dynamic Games and Applications 2, (2012), 160-175.

• A. Cabrales and R. Serrano, “Stochastically Stable Implementation,” SERIEs, Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3, (2012), 59-72.

• T. Kunimoto and R. Serrano, “A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies,” Journal of Economic Theory 146, (2011), 2583-2595.

• A. Cabrales and R. Serrano, “Implementation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics: Towards a General Theory of Bounded Rationality in Mechanisms,” Games and Economic Behavior 73, (2011), 360-374. Corrigendum

• Y. Kamishiro and R. Serrano, “Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies,” Mathematics of Operations Research 36, (2011), 552-567.

• R. Serrano and R. Vohra, "Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: a Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics 46, (2010), 775-785.

• A. Kar, I. Ray and R. Serrano, "A Difficulty in Implementing Correlated Equilibrium Distributions," Games and Economic Behavior 69, (2010), 189-193.

• R. Serrano, “On Watson’s Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation,” Economics Bulletin 29, No. 3, (2009), 2357-2367.

• R. Serrano, "Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value," in Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, R. Meyers (ed.), Springer, New York, (2009).

• A.M. Feldman and R. Serrano, "Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: Two Simple Single-Profile Versions," Harvard College Mathematics Review 2, No. 2 (2008), 46-57.

• R. J. Aumann and R. Serrano, "An Economic Index of Riskiness," Journal of Political Economy 116, No. 5, (2008), 810-836.

• G. de Clippel and R. Serrano, "Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value," Econometrica 76, (2008), 1413-1436.

• R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth’s Recontracting," Economic Journal 118, (2008), 1719-1741.

• Kandori, M., R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare," Journal of Economic Theory 140, (2008), 328-338.

• R. Serrano, "Bargaining," in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, (2nd edition), S. Durlauf and L. Blume (eds.), McMillan, London (2008).

• R. Serrano, "Nash Program," in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, (2nd edition), S. Durlauf and L. Blume (eds.), McMillan, London (2008).

• R. Serrano and R. Vohra, "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Journal of Economic Theory 134, (2007), 117-137.

• R. Serrano and K.-I. Shimomura, "A Comparison of the Average Prekernel and the Prekernel," Mathematical Social Sciences 52, (2006), 288-301.

• I. Palacios-Huerta and R. Serrano, "Rejecting Small Gambles under Expected Utility," Economics Letters 91, (2006), 250-259.

• P. Gottardi and R. Serrano, "Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading," Journal of the European Economic Association 3, (2005), 1279-1317.

• R. Serrano, "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas 29, (2005), 219-258.

• R. Serrano and R. Vohra, "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation", Games and Economic Behavior 50, (2005), 312-331.

• R. Serrano, "The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic", Economics Bulletin, 1, No. 3, (2004), 1-6.

• R. Serrano, "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules", SIAM Review 46, (2004), 377-414.

• T. Kunimoto and R. Serrano, "Bargaining and Competition Revisited," Journal of Economic Theory 115, (2004), 78-88.

• A. Ben-Shoham, R. Serrano and O. Volij,"The Evolution of Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory 114, (2004), 310-328.

• Y. In and R. Serrano, "Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53, (2004), 385-399.

• Y. In and R. Serrano, "Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining (II): Unrestricted Agendas," Economics Letters, 79 (2003), 325-331.

• A. Greenwald, K. Hall, and R. Serrano, "Correlated Q-Learning," in Proceedings of the Workshop on Multiagent Learning in NIPS, 2002. Published as Greenwald and Hall, in Proceedings of the 2002 AAAI Spring Symposium and ICML (2003).

• R. Serrano "Decentralized Information and the Walrasian Outcome: a Pairwise Meetings Market with Private Values," Journal of Mathematical Economics 38, (2002), 65-89.

• R. Serrano and R. Vohra, "Implementing the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set ," Investigaciones Economicas 26, (2002), 285-298.

• R. Serrano and R. Vohra, " Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Games and Economic Behavior 39, (2002), 292-308.

• R. Serrano, R. Vohra and O. Volij, "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information,," Econometrica 69, (2001),1685-1696.

• M. R. Blouin and R. Serrano, "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," Review of Economic Studies 68, (2001), 323-346.

• R. Serrano and R. Vohra, "Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica 69, (2001), 785-792.

• S. Baliga and R. Serrano, "Multilateral Negotiations with Private Side-Deals: a Multiplicity Example," Economics Bulletin 3, No. 1, (2001), 1-7

• R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Walrasian Allocations without Price-Taking Behavior," Journal of Economic Theory 95, (2000), 79-106

• N. Dagan, R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition," Economic Theory 15, (2000), 279-296

• N. Dagan, R. Serrano and O.Volij, "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Review of Economic Design 4, (1999), 57-72.

• R. Serrano and K.-I. Shimomura, "Beyond Nash Bargaining Theory: the Nash Set," Journal of Economic Theory 83, (1998), 286-307.

• N. Dagan, R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein 'Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium'",Econometrica 66, (1998), 1231-1233.

• R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Axiomatizations of Neoclassical Concepts for Economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics 30, (1998), 87-108.

• R. Serrano and I. Zapater, "The Three-Legged Race: Cooperating to Compete," Games and Economic Behavior 22, (1998), 343-363.

• N. Dagan and R. Serrano, "Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games," Economics Letters 58, (1998), 43-49.

• R.Serrano, "Reinterpreting the Kernel," Journal of Economic Theory 77, (1997), 58-80.

• R. Serrano and R.Vohra, "Non-Cooperative Implementation of the Core," Social Choice and Welfare 14, (1997), 513-525.

• R. Serrano,"A Comment on the Nash Program and the Theory of Implementation," Economics Letters 55, (1997), 203-208.

• N. Dagan,R. Serrano and O. Volij, "A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Games and Economic Behavior 18, (1997), 55-72.

• R. Serrano and O. Yosha,"Welfare Analysis of a Market with Pairwise Meetings and Asymmetric Information," Economic Theory 8, (1996),167-175.

• V. Krishna and R. Serrano, "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies 63, (1996), 61-80.

• S. Baliga and R. Serrano, "Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory 67, (1995), 578-589.

• R. Serrano,"A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory 67, (1995), 285-294.

• R. Serrano and O. Yosha,"Decentralized Markets with Pairwise Meetings: Recent Developments," Journal of International and Comparative Economics 4, (1995), 223-241.

• V. Krishna and R. Serrano, "Perfect Equilibria of a Model of n-Person NonCooperative Bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory 24, (1995), 259-272.

• R. Serrano, "Strategic Bargaining, Surplus Sharing Problems and the Nucleolus," Journal of Mathematical Economics 24, (1995), 319-329.

• R. Serrano, "Non-Cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus: the 3-Player Case," International Journal of Game Theory 22, (1993), 345-357.

• R. Serrano and O. Yosha, "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: the One-Sided Information Case," Economic Theory 3, (1993), 481-499.