Some Jamie Dreier Papers
"Do de re necessities express semantic rules?”, Inquiry 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2225567
“Blessed Lives, Bright Prospects, Incomplete Orderings”, Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 12 (2022).
“The Normative Explanation of Normativity”, in Billy Dunaway and David Plunkett (eds.), Meaning, Decision, & Norms: Themes from the Work of Allan Gibbard, pp. 437–455. Maize Books 2022, online ebook. DOI:http://doi .org/10.3998/mpub.9948199
“Two Models of Agent-Centered Value”, Res Philosophica 97/3, pp. 345–62 (2020).
“World-Centered Value,” Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems, Christian Seidel editor (2019).
“Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism?” Philosophical Studies. Vol: 176. Issue: 6 pg. 1391 (2019).
“The Real and the Quasi-Real: Problems of Distinction,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, DOI 10.1080/00455091.2018.1432394 (2018).
“Explaining the Quasi-Real,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics volume 10 (2015).
“Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question?” in Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press (2015).
“Another World”, in Robert Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.), Passions and Projections Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn. Oxford University Press (2015), 155-171.
“Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence”, Analytic Philosophy 53 (3) (2012), 269-287.
“In Defense of Consequentializing” in Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1 (2011).
“When Do Goals Explain the Norms that Advance Them?” in Russ Shafer-Landau 5 (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (2010), 5-153.
“Practical Conditionals” in David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press (2009). 116-133.
“Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement”, Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1) (2009), 79-110.
“Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism”, in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, David Copp (ed.), Oxford University Press (2007). 240–264.
“Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for Their Solution” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1 (2006),217-233.
“Was Moore a Moorean?”, in Metaethics After Moore, Horgan & Timmons (eds.), Oxford, 2006.
“Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism”, Philosophical Perspectives 18 (Ethics) (2005), 23-44.
“Pettit on Preference for Prospects and Properties” Philosophical Studies 124 (2) (2005), 199 - 219.
"Decision Theory and Morality" in Al Mele and Piers Rawling, Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press (2004). 156–181.
“Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t”, in Satisficing and Maximizing, Michael Byron (ed.), Cambridge University Press (2004). 131–154.
“Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions”, Analysis 64 ( 2004), 84–91.
“Metaethics and Normative Commitment”. Philosophical Issues 12 (2002) 241-263.
“The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1) (2002), 136–143.
"Humean Doubts about Categorical Imperatives", in Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Elijah Millgram (ed.), MIT Press (2001), 27–47.
“Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Modal Motivation”, Philosophy and Phenomenlogical Research 61 (3) (2000), 619-638
“Transforming Expressivism”, Noûs 33 (4) (1999), 558-572
“Accepting Agent Centered Norms: A Problem for Non-Cognitivists and a Suggestion for Solving It”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3) (1996), 409-422
“Rational Preference: Decision Theory as a Theory of Practical Rationality”, Theory and Decision 40 (1996), 249–276.
“Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth”, Philosophical Studies 83 (1) (1996), 29-51
“Structures of Normative Theories”, The Monist 76 (1) (1993), 22-40
“The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism”, Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1992), 13-38
“Internalism and Speaker Relativism”, Ethics 101 (1990), 6-26