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Sebastián Arechaga
Haas School of Business
I am on the 2025–2026 job market.
My research spans labor economics, public economics, state capacity, and electoral preferences. I currently study policies designed to improve educational outcomes in underserved communities, with a particular focus on the role of teachers. Other projects include local government redistribution, workers' responses to incentives, and voters' preferences for policies.
Contact Information
Email: sebastian_arechaga@berkeley.edu
Phone: +1 (510) 833 8197
Job Market Paper
This paper examines the effects of the Teacher Incentive Allotment (TIA), a statewide performance-pay program launched in Texas in 2019. TIA provides annual bonuses ranging from $3,000 to $32,000, determined by a teacher’s performance and the socioeconomic status of their school. Its staggered rollout across nearly 400 school districts and 3,000 schools enables an event-study design that compares early adopters, late adopters, and non-adopting districts.
The findings show modest but meaningful impacts. On average, TIA increases standardized test scores by 0.04 standard deviations, with larger gains in disadvantaged schools. Teacher turnover declines, resulting in higher average experience levels. Decomposition suggests that teacher selection accounts for approximately one-fifth of the achievement gains. Mobility patterns shift toward high-need schools where bonuses are larger. These results provide evidence on the effectiveness of high-stakes performance pay programs, highlighting the potential for well-designed incentives to improve both efficiency and equity.
Work in Progress
What Drives Teachers Electoral Engagement
I use data from teacher school rosters and records of contributions to parties to examine the following questions: Do teachers free-ride on others' contributions? Are they more responsive to the contributions of peers or neighbors? To what extent is teachers' contribution to parties affected by school districts?
Teachers' Contribution to Parties and School Performance in the Electoral Cycles
Using data from teacher school rosters, standardized test scores, and records of contributions to parties, I examine the patterns of contributions among teachers and its relationship with student academic performance. My analysis reveals that, in the post-COVID-19 period, teachers have made significantly more contributions than individuals in other occupations. Notably, teachers that contribute are often found in schools with lower test scores. The causal impact of teacher electoral participation on student achievement remains an area of ongoing research.
Government Size and Ideology. The Case of California Local Bond Measures
In California, local governments must obtain voter approval through ballot measures to issue general obligation bonds backed by property taxes, particularly for school and infrastructure projects. These ballots specify how the funds will be used, providing a clear link between voters’ political preferences and their support for different sizes of government. Using precinct-level data from school finance ballot measures in the largest California counties, I document two main findings. First, precincts with more conservative electorates are less likely to approve bonds and property tax increases. Second, these same precincts exhibit higher voter turnout in such elections.
In ongoing work, I develop a model that rationalizes these patterns by incorporating uncertainty about the benefits of proposed spending and the relative certainty of its fiscal costs. The model aims to explain how ideological preferences and perceived risk shape voter behavior toward local government size and public investment.
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