Working Papers:
"Police Centralization and State-Criminal Collusion under Clientelistic Governance." Under review.
Abstract: When do governments use police reform to protect rather than repress organized criminal groups? Although conventional wisdom suggests that centralization reforms respond to the threat of violence, I argue they are most likely adopted by clientelistic parties when criminal violence is already low and gubernatorial time horizons are long---conditions enabling stable rent extraction through criminal protection. Centralization transforms fragmented municipal enforcement into unified gubernatorial control, making coordinated forbearance credible across jurisdictions. Examining Mexico's Mando Único (Single Command) reform via a regression discontinuity design, I find police centralization is significantly more likely in municipalities narrowly won by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional - a party historically tied to criminal protection - particularly where violence is minimal. Panel models and outcome tests further show reform adoption is associated with criminal market consolidation. These findings suggest that the same reform can repress organized crime or enable its protection depending on who controls it and under what conditions.
This ongoing project has received financial support from the John L. Simpson ABD Research Fellowship in Area Studies, the University of California Alianza MX, Tinker Field Research Grant, and the Center for the Study of American Democracy Research Grant.
"Civil Society and the Effectiveness of Violence Against Women Interventions: Evidence from Mexico's Gender Violence Alerts." With Angie Torres-Beltran. Under review.
Abstract: When do violence against women interventions (VAWIs) reduce femicides? While existing research offers mixed evidence regarding the effectiveness of such state strategies, we argue that the efficacy of VAWIs depends on both sustained civil society involvement and time. Using administrative panel data from Mexico and a difference-in-differences design that exploits the temporal and spatial variation of the Alerta de Violencia de Género contra las Mujeres (AVGM) - a program that involves civil society organizations in policy adoption and oversight - we find that the AVGM significantly reduces female homicides two years after implementation. We also find that the effect is stronger among early adopters than among late adopters. The findings highlight how interventions rooted in sustained civil society involvement, combined with state resources, can reduce lethal violence against women over time.
"The Logic of Political Entry During Violent Electoral Cycles." With Navin Bapat.
Abstract: Elections tend to be violent events in many democratic settings, but in Latin America they lead to the systematic targeting of politicians by organized crime groups. It is thus unclear why individuals decide to run as mayoral candidates at the local level during violent elections. To answer this, we develop a formal model that explains why individuals decide to enter politics within the context of drug wars. We find that a candidate's decision to run while facing the risk of assassination is a function of both their political ideology and the probability that they are killed inadvertently in drug violence. Candidates seeking more radical changes are more likely to run even under the threat of violence. However, we also maintain that the range of candidates willing to run increases as indiscriminate drug violence worsens since not running may also impose a political cost. Our model sheds light on some of the mechanisms through which criminal organizations can undermine democracy at the local level in the Global South.
"How State Corruption Enables Criminal Market Expansion: Evidence from Mexico."
Abstract: Does state repression drive criminal portfolio diversification? This paper challenges a widely held inference that enforcement pressure compels organized criminal groups (OCGs) to restructure their illicit operations. Through a quantitative analysis of 2,487 Mexican municipalities from 2018 to 2022, measuring criminal diversification with a municipal-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, I find that repression at any institutional level - federal, state, or municipal - has no direct effect on portfolio expansion among OCGs with an established drug market presence. Instead, diversification is incentivized by criminal competition and enabled by corruption-based protection arrangements. Criminal conflict creates the strategic incentive to diversify: organizations dependent on a single revenue stream are vulnerable to displacement by competitors. Corrupt arrangements cover territorial presence rather than individual crime types, lowering the marginal cost of adding new revenue streams. These results hold under two-way fixed effects, calling into question the inference that enforcement pressure is the primary driver of criminal market restructuring.
"Patronage Protection: Violence and Migration in Depression-Era Texas." With Leonardo Arriola & Juvenal Cortes Rivera.
Abstract: There remains considerable debate concerning the extent to which Mexicans were coerced into leaving the United States through repatriation campaigns that emerged during the Great Depression. While prior research has emphasized factors such as economic crisis or xenophobic sentiment, we argue that local patronage politics conditioned the migration choices of Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants in distinct ways. We claim that White political bosses had an incentive to distinguish Mexican Americans from Mexican immigrants because only the former could trade votes for political protection. To assess this hypothesis, we examine net migration across Texas counties between 1930 and 1940. We show that Mexican Americans were less likely to leave counties controlled by patronage machines, as proxied by the effective number of candidates. Mexican immigrants, by contrast, were more likely to depart counties with identity-related factors, such as a history of anti-Mexican mob violence and slave-owning, uncorrelated with Mexican American migration.
* Drafts of these papers are available upon request.
Work in Progress:
"The Effects of Criminal Governance on Economic Development."
"Anger and Civilian Support for Organized Crime."