SHASHWAT AGRAWAL

Hi, I'm Shashwat.

I am a PhD candidate in Finance at Boston College. I am an empirical researcher in corporate finance. My research interests include financial intermediation, political economy, and corporate governance.

Here's my CV.

Before graduate school, I spent over 3.5 years at American Express. Additionally, I have over 1 year of consulting experience advising American Express. I am a certified Financial Risk Manager (FRM) and have cleared all three levels of the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) program. I earned my Master’s and Bachelor’s degrees from the Indian Institute of Technology.

Email: shashwat.agrawal@bc.edu

Research

Working Papers

[1] Credit Risk and Systemic Spillovers from an Unexpected Bank Rescue: Evidence from India

Abstract: I exploit an unexpected rescue of a private sector bank to examine spillover effects on other banks. The unprecedented protection of shareholder claims in the failed bank increases bailout expectations among other private sector banks, triggering two opposing channels of systemic risk. Affected banks engage in individual risk-shifting by increasing credit risk, lending more to risky borrowers, and restructuring loans. Yet, they also increase loan specialization due to weaker incentives to correlate assets with peers. On net, their contribution to systemic risk rises by about 23%, highlighting how bailouts can reshape risk-taking and amplify fragility across the banking system.

[2] Does Systemically Important Bank Status Affect Loan Performance?

(with Nishant Kashyap, Sriniwas Mahapatro, and Prasanna Tantri)

Revise & Resubmit: Management Science

Abstract: We test whether the policy of designating some banks as systemically important (SIB) impacts loan performance. Our tests show that the same borrower is more likely to default on a bank after that bank is identified as an SIB, compared to a non-SIB. Evidence suggests that the increase in loan delinquency is due to a reduction in the monitoring of borrowers by SIBs and not due to their prompt recognition of losses. Thus, our results show that the policy of explicitly identifying systemically important banks could result in moral hazard, where the banks become less diligent in monitoring their borrowers.

Work in Progress

[3] Patent and IPO?

(with Thomas Chemmanur and Jingxuan Zhang)

[4] NBFC and Financial Frontier

(with Andrey Malenko)

[5] Governance and Bank Lending