Research
Publications
Conditional cooperation is the tendency to cooperate if and only if others do so as well. It is the most common behavior in social dilemmas. We study how the incidence of conditional cooperation in the Public Goods game, the most widely studied social dilemma in experimental economics, varies with group size. In a laboratory experiment, we apply the strategy method to elicit how participants’ willingness to contribute to a public good depends on other group members’ decisions. A within-subject design allows us to evaluate and compare an individual participant's contribution behavior in different-sized groups. Two main findings emerge. First, the share of players who are conditional cooperators is consistent across group sizes. Second, the strategies chosen imply that conditional cooperators hold a (correct) belief that others are more cooperative in a larger than in a smaller group.
Working Papers
with Charles Noussair
Why some countries are rich and others poor? Studies of economic growth have explored numerous factors. In this study, we investigate the effect that different political and economic institutions have on economic growth in a laboratory experiment. We study both inclusive and extractive institutions. Inclusive institutions allow a broad range of individuals to participate in the economy or the political process and access their benefits, while extractive institutions concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a small group of individuals, often at the expense of the broader population. Experimental methods allow us to observe and track consumption, investment, and welfare in the economy. Our findings show that a combination of inclusive political and economic institutions increases consumption, welfare, and capital stock. Extractive political institutions are detrimental to both growth and equality.
with Charles Noussair
The feeling that one is less qualified than one's peers, known as imposter syndrome, is very common. In this paper, we study imposter syndrome and its relationship to overconfidence. We conduct an experiment in which individuals first take a mathematics test. They are then sorted into levels based on their performance, and matched with a competitor who scored at a similar level. The matched pairs then take a second mathematics test. Before sorting into levels, they are asked to predict the probability that they perform better than the person that they are paired with. If they properly condition on the rule that sorts participants into pairs, they would predict a probability of 50% of being the better performer in their pair. We find that participants do condition on the way their opponent has been sorted but do not sufficiently condition on their own sorting. We argue that such a bias can generate imposter syndrome. Individuals are less optimistic about outperforming a similarly selected peer, the higher performing their group. This effect co-exists with a general pattern of overconfidence, a belief that one has a greater than 50% chance of outperforming a peer with a similar qualification.
Work in Progress
🟤 How Declining Informal Taxation Facilitates the Declining Competitiveness in Village Elections in Single-Party Vietnam
with Xiran Chen and Paul Schuler
🟤 Faces of Nations: The Psychological Roots of Personality Cults
with Paul Schuler, Chris Weber, Fatih Erol