The Concept of Being

Content

A)   Definition of Being – Types of Being – Characteristics of the notion of Being - Being as analogical – Distinction between Being in general (ens), being in reality (ente), the Act of Being (esse), and Existence

B)   First Principles of Metaphysics: Principles of Non-Contradiction and the justification for the Principle - Principle of Identity and Excluded Middle - Principle of Finality - Principle of Causality

A. The Definition of Being

We cannot define being; for, to define something accurately, it must have generic (genus) and specific difference (species). Since being is common to all, it is not genus, nor species; therefore, it cannot be defined, but described. 

Being can be described as “that which is.” In Latin, it is written as follows: “Id quod est.” There is no concept which can explain what being is, because being encompasses all reality. Being signifies things in so far as they are. We designate as “being” (substantive sense) only whatever we conceive as actually existing or at least as capable of existing.

Being as ens or in general sense means anything “that is” or something endowed with the act of being. A tree is a being, man is a being and bird is a being, and so on. In all these, being expresses the fact that they (tree, man and bird) are.[1]

Being as such does not necessarily mean any actual existent or existence, but it is from the participle sense, which implies actual existence, that the substantive sense has been derived.[2] A being refers to a thing that is as a student refers to the one who studies.   

In metaphysics being means “anything that is in the world.” Being (ens) signifies primarily the thing which is; being designates it insofar as it has the act of being[3] (esse). Consequently being signifies the esse of that thing, because a thing can only be if it possesses the act of being. Therefore, being refers to something which is in reality. All things possess the act of being (esse) and by virtue of which we call them beings.

Types of Being

Being of reason or logical (conceptual) being is the one which exists only in the mind, such as fictitious images in the novels (flying horse). Their actuality or existence consists in their being thought of by our intellect. They are mental images and mere concepts devoid of any existence outside our mind. On the contrary, real being is the one which exists outside our mind in reality. Real being is independent of a human mind’s actual knowing. Whether the human mind thinks of it or not, it is there as real. There is also ideal being (also known as cogitational being or intentional being). This is intermediary being in the mind, because it is in between the subject or the thinking self and the object. This is the image or phantasm produced in me either by the senses or the intellect. 

Some Specific Nature of Being:

a. Being is first in logical order, i.e., every idea contains it and idea is always the idea of something. In other words, being is prior to all our intellectual knowledge. 

For example, when we understand “a tree” or “a horse,” we understand that those things “are” and they possess the act of being in some particular way. The notion of being is implicitly contained in all our intellectual concepts. Therefore, the notion of being is there inseparably in the knowledge we acquire. 

b. Being is the first in chronological order. It cannot be proved, but demonstrated. For example, before we say what a thing is, we first come to know that that thing ‘is.’ it is a being first, then it is something.

c. Our notion of being is initially imperfect, and we gradually perfect this notion through experience, as we come to know more things and diverse manners of being. For example, a student of computer science initially knows something about computer and how it functions, but he develops his knowledge about computer after getting wider experience in that field. In the same way, our knowledge about being will be widened and deepened as we discover the manifold characteristics and different manners of being.

d. Being is narrowest in comprehension, but widest in meaning. It’s content is minimum, but it is predicated of all that is.

e. It is empty of all ideas, but you can put into it anything that is.

f. It is positive in its content; it is not nothing.

g. Being is not a generic notion. What is generic notion? A generic notion is that which is applied equally and indeterminately for various things because it signifies only the characteristics which are common to them all and leaves out the features which differentiate them. For example, the notion “animal” is a generic notion which is applied to all beings that have sensitive life. Now to differentiate the species, man, we need to add the differentiating aspect, namely rational to the former differentiating principle sensation which belongs to genus, animal. Here the notion of being is not genus, since no differentiating elements can be added to it, which would not already be contained in it. The notion of being indicates not only what things have in common, but also the differentiating aspects of things. Being is so extensive, thus, there is no differentiating principle outside its scope. It means it includes all differentiating principles within itself, whereas the notion of animal does not include the differences which distinguish one animal from another.

The notion of being, however, encompasses everything: it has maximum extension as well as maximum notional content or comprehension. Ens not only embraces all realities in the world, but also signifies them with all their singular characteristics. In order to signify a particular being, it is not enough that we mention that it is a being, but also we need to indicate the manner of its being (its essence). For example, it is a car. For ens (being) is taken from esse which is the perfection of all perfections, and all other factors that determine it are just modes of being.

h. Being is an analogical notion. The notion of being is analogical, because it is attributed to all things in a sense which is partly the same and partly different, i.e., in different proportions or measures of which to only the principle one or the principle analogue it applies in full measure and to others in the group, i.e., to other analogues it applies proportionately. Analogical notions are notions which signify the same perfection found in many subjects but possessed in different ways. For example, we can say of knowledge; knowledge is said to be analogical, because it is possessed by God, angels, humans, and even animals, but in different degrees according to the different intellectual capacities and proportionalities. In the same way all things in the universe have esse, but they have it in different ways.

Therefore, being is neither one nor many, but it is both one and many, and in fact it is analogous. 

For the topic: Aquinas on Analogy, please follow the link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1X0HkEkZkYa6JMCASbnBNleNZK278n5Iu/view?usp=sharing 

B. First Principles of Being

What is a principle?

A principle is the basis of something or that which is understood in/from its own nature. These are principles of reality and these are applicable to all reality: God, humans, and the world. A first principle is a basic proposition or assumption that cannot be deduced from any other proposition or assumption. In philosophy the first principles are from the first causes. There are five supreme metaphysical principles. These principles directly flow from the being and therefore, they are applicable to all beings.

1.    Principle of non-contradiction

2.    Principle of identity

3.    Principle of excluded middle

4.    Principle of sufficient reason

5.    Principle of finality and causality

These are fundamental, ontological and logical principles. All our understanding is based on these principles. They are foundational, and self-evident, because the denial of them is either contradictory or impossible. They are also laws of thought. These are the rules upon which every rational discourse is based. They are laws that guide and underlie everyone’s thinking, thought, expressions and discussions.  

1. Principle of non-contradiction

This is the most fundamental. The first one who talks about this is Parmenides. This is the most basic condition of things. According to this, a thing cannot ‘be’ and ‘not be’ at the same time. It is impossible for a thing ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ at the same time and in the same respect. Such a principle is founded upon being. Such principle is a judgment that concerns about the way being, thing or reality exist or in other words, the way being is. This is the metaphysics of both the judgment about reality exist (epistemology) and the way reality exist (ontology). We cannot affirm and deny anything at the same time.  We cannot make contradictory statements about reality. We cannot think in contradiction. It says that reality/being is not self-contradictory.

This principle is applicable to the way we talk and think, the way our mind functions and the way things are. This principle is something central to human reasoning. If we were to deny this principle, we have to reject all reasoning. Either we accept the principle or we reject it. We cannot maintain the middle ground. The very fact that we cannot maintain the middle ground is itself an evidence for the principle. Therefore, the knowledge of the principle is self-evident and spontaneous.

Eight reasons in the defense of the principle of contradiction by Aristotle

1.      To deny this principle is self-contradictory. If we want to affirm anything, we must deny its opposite, the contrary view.

2.      If we deny this principle,

2.1.There cannot be anything solid, any substance, but flus or process. It is like saying there is dream without a dreamer.

2.2.There would no longer be a distinction between things; for example, between a wall and man.

2.3.It would mean the destruction of all truth.

2.4.It would destroy all thoughts or even opinions. For, for the affirmation of any truth, the negation is the must.

2.5.No differences will be there between the absolute and the relative truth – between good and evil.

2.6.No possibility to distinguish the degree of errors. Everything would be equally false and true at the same time.

2.7.It will put an end to the very motion of being and becoming.

2. The Principle of Identity

This principle states that an object is the same as itself. The truth can be symbolically put in the following way: P = P.  Each thing is inseparable from itself; in other words, a thing is identical to itself. On the outset, it is a tautology. If the statement is true, then it is true.

Keenly observe the following statements:

“Whatever is, is;” “Whatever is not, is not;” “Everything is what it is;” “everything is its own being;” “being is being;” and “Not being is not being.”

The above statements are well evident; we don’t; need any proof; and these are recognized in all our statements or affirmations. In every affirmative statement, the predicate can be connected with the subject. The judgment attributes a predicate to a subject which really possesses it. For example, “dog is an animal” or ‘A’ is ‘A.’ what we learn from the statements is that there is basic identity between subject term and the object term. The principle of identity says that an object is the same as itself. Each thing is inseparable from itself.

3. The Principle of Excluded Middle - Aristotle

This principle is also a result of trying to compare between ‘being’ and ‘non-being’. We must either affirm or deny any one predicate of a subject (Met. 1011 b, 23-24). “Either P or not P;” Not “P and non P”. What is said here is that there cannot be a middle ground or a third thing such as, ‘being and non-being’ as if there were something which is half a being and half a non-being. A thing is either is or is not. And between being and non-being there is no middle or third thing possible. In another way, it is impossible to have a judgment which would be neither true nor false under the same aspect of perception.

What it is, it is and what it is not, it is not. It is not something is true and false at the same time. Either affirmation or negation is true. The basis for this principle is found in the notion of contradictory oppositions. So it is ultimately between being and non-being. E.g., wither Socrates is ill or not ill. Either of the two opposites may be true or false, but not both of them true or false at the same time. In other words, neither contradictory is true and false at the same time. One or the other contradictions is true or false.

4.    Principle of sufficient Reason

What this principle says is that there is an adequate reason to account for the existence and nature of a thing. In other words, everything must have a reason, cause or ground for its existence. It says that “for every fact, ‘f’ there must be a sufficient reason why ‘f’ is the case. Every ‘x’, there is ‘y’ as sufficient reason. ‘y’ has binary relation to ‘x’. This principle is restricted by the type of object which seeks for sufficient reason. The differences or variants of the PSR may differ according to how we restrict the kinds of objects that require a reason. For example, one might require PSR to only actual entities; others may extend to possible entities. It may be required for only the existential things or may be to non-existing things. It may be restricted to propositions which are contingent or to only necessary propositions.

Two versions of PSR

The two versions are: strong and weaker version. Strong version says that this principle is a necessary condition for anything to be. And the weaker version says that this principle is contingently true. It says that the principle is not necessary.

What PSR states?

The principle states that all things can be explainable. On the other hand, we ask whether the PSR itself needs explanation. Of course, PSR needs explanation. This is one objection to PSR. Second question we raise: what about self-explanatory facts and self-caused entities? And what about primitive concepts which cannot further explained?

Historical perspective

In the beginning, the principle was coined by Leibniz. But one can say that it is Spinoza who realized its importance first.

Spinoza: in the book, “Principles of Philosophy” written by Descartes, it appears: nothing exist of which it cannot be asked, what is the cause? Why it exists?, etc.

Spinoza answers: since to exist is something positive, we cannot say that it has nothing as its cause. Therefore, we must assign some positive cause or reason why somethings exists. The cause may be external or internal one. That means, “ex nihilo nihil fit” (from nothing, nothing comes). This is PSR. An existing thing and its perfections cannot have nothing as its cause. He also says that God does not need any cause in order to exist, because He is all reason. There cannot be any reason for anything beyond or against reason.

What about miracles? Why people fail to explain certain things in terms of natural causes? People do not have enough reasons for certain things (miracles). People are content with an extraordinary fact resulting from natural phenomenon. Sometimes, we are happy with the familiarity. Familiarity with the phenomenon does not render it intelligibility. So we need PSR.  We have to de-familiarize ourselves with certain events which are thought to be miracles and question the natures of the facts and then attempt to answer it. 

In “Ethics,” Spinoza says, “what cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself.” Everything that happens has a cause both for its existence and non-existence. That means it allows one to explain the non-existence of God. But one thing we have to know is the god is self-subsistent substance, so his existence or non-existence cannot be explained externally. Were God not to exist, he would have to be the cause of his own non-existence just as square-circle is the cause for its non-existence. Since God is not contradictory entity, he cannot internally rule out his existence. Therefore, he must exist.

Spinoza accepts strong version of PSR. He gives unlimited extension and takes it to be necessary. He follows a necessitarianism that says that everything must have a cause. PSR dictates him that there could be only one universe.

In his book, Ethics, he talks about causa sui (self-cause). Self-subsisting beings are conceived through itself. What about legitimacy for self-causation? Self-causation says that the reason for something’s existence flows from their essences - the nature. For example, the very nature of square-circle gives its reason why it does not exist, because it involves contradiction. But the existence or non-existence of circles and triangles do not depend on their natures, but on the order of the whole of corporeal nature.

He then talks about the legitimacy of infinite regress. Theory goes like this: “Every single thing or anything which is finite and has a determinate existence can neither exist nor be determinate to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another cause which also finite and has a determinate existence.” And again this cause can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another. ……. It goes infinitely.

In this infinite regress, the cause of present link is always the preceding link. Now what is the cause of entire chain? Usually people propose an uncaused cause in order to escape the infinite regress. These people are theists. Others may say that there is nothing in nature to whose essence it pertains to exist necessarily. This is absurd to conclude this way. Atheists do that.

We say the force of the argument does not lie in the impossibility of there being an infinite regress of causes, but only in the supposition that things which do not exist necessarily by their own nature are not determined to exist by a thing which does not necessarily exist by its own nature.  

For Spinoza, the chain is full of contingent beings. Therefore, the chain itself is contingent. So there must be a reason to explain its instantiation in reality. So the ultimate reason for this chain would be a being which is not contingent and which exists by its essence necessarily.

Leibniz Gottfried Wilhelm

Leibniz considered the principle of sufficient reason along with the principle of non-contradiction. Our reasoning is based on two great principles: principle of sufficient reason and principle of non-contradiction. They concern what we find and judge. They have metaphysical and epistemic import. According to him there is sufficient reason for every truth and fact, even if that reason is unknowable to us. The scope of the principle is fact and truth. Of course regarding scope, he says that there is nothing that happens without a reason. It means it applies to fact, truth and even to events. This principle for him is absolutely general and wider.

He conceived separate domains for each of these principles: principle of non-contradiction rules over the domain of necessary truths and PSR rules over the domain of contingent truth. According to the subjects we study, we can allot the domains for these principles. For example, principle of non-contradiction helps us to study mathematics whereas PSR metaphysics, natural theology and physics. At times, metaphysics and natural theology would include necessary propositions and thus PSR would encroach upon the territory assigned to principle of contradiction. 

5. Principle of Finality

A principle commonly accepted by scholastic philosophers as one of the first principles; it is succinctly stated by St. Thomas Aquinas: "Every agent acts for an end" (C. gent. 3.2), i.e., all beings when acting tend to some definite effect.

The principle is applicable to all beings (intelligent and non-intelligent) analogically. An intelligent being knows the end and sometimes freely choose the end for which it is acting, whereas a non-intelligent being, however, does not formally know the end to which its action tends, even though it is the agent tending to that end, i.e., even though the action is its own. The mere fact that a being tends towards its own end presupposes there is intelligence at work. If intelligence is not manifested on the part of the agent that acts, then it is presupposed on the part of another being who directs the agent to so act. This other being may direct the agent in a wholly extrinsic manner, as a writer moves the pen to inscribe words. The other being may direct the agent by placing certain tendencies or appetites within its very nature.

Tendency or appetite, in this context, must also be understood analogously. It may denote an intellectual, a sensory, or a natural appetite. End is then related to appetite as its object; it is something suitable, and hence good, for the agent. It is suitable or good because the agent has a particular nature and because its tendencies are the basis for actions that realize or perfect that nature. Thus understood in this manner, the principle of finality implies a limited kind of determinism.

The principle of finality is closely related to the principle of intelligibility, which states that all being is intelligible. Those who deny the latter principle are led to reject the principle of finality, considering it anthropomorphist in inspiration. Francis bacon and Immanuel Kant thus attacked the validity of the principle of finality, and, more recently, Julian Huxley and Ernest Nagel rejected this principle.

Clarifications. The principle does not claim, as some have misinterpreted it to, that every effect is for an end. It merely asserts that every agent acts for an end. Thus chance events do not invalidate the principle of finality. Neither does the principle state that every agent actually attains the end for which it acts; even if impeded from attainment, the agent originates activity that is end-directed. In fact, at root, the denial of finality implies a denial of activity. Finality promotes activity; it moves the agent to such activity. If the agent did not act for an end, there would be no reason for it to act this way rather than that way. Being indifferent to all ends, it would be unable to act for any.

The ontological grounds for acting, and thus acting for an end, are rooted ultimately in the goodness of being. If being and the good were not convertible, there would be no activity. Finality accounts as well for the regularity and uniformity manifested in the laws of nature. It makes nature predictable and scientific knowledge possible, thus providing the ontological basis for physical laws and for the moral natural law.

It should further be noted that an end is sought because it is a principle of perfection; however, this does not necessarily imply that the end perfects principally the being acting for the end. In propagating its species, a plant acts for an end that is not so much its own perfection or good as it is the good of another. 

6. Principle of Causality

1. Notions of principle, ground, cause, condition, and occasion

Principle: It is a fundamental assumption or a guiding belief that comes first, from which something proceeds in any manner whatsoever; it is first in order: logical or real.

Ground: that through which something is or is posited. Principle refers to both the logical and real order, while ground refers to the ontological, real order only. 

Cause: Cause is anything which has a positive influence of any sort on the being or happening of something else. St. Thomas defines cause as “that upon which something else follows of necessity,”[1] as the result of its influence. Aristotle explains cause as “the why of something.”[2] We can also define cause as that, which really and positively influences a thing, making this thing dependent upon it in some way.

Condition: Condition is that which underlies the possibility of something – an event, an activity, the ‘coming to be’ of some reality. It is a prerequisite for the action of the cause. Putting on the switch is a condition for lighting the bulb by electricity. We can say some more examples: a clear road for a fast traffic; an open door for the entrance into the room. Condition does not positively influence the effect.

Occasion: Occasion is any favourable opportunity for a free cause to exercise its causality. A free cause can exercise its causality even when this opportunity is absent. E.g., a dinner party to meet a business man and conclude a contract. In this example, the dinner party becomes an occasion to fix a contract.

2. The Notion of Cause

Cause is a principle which by itself influences positively the “to be” of something else.

It is a real principle, i.e., source, starting-point of something else. There must be real distinction between cause and effect, and the effect depends upon the cause.

Dependence: the need the reality has for something other than itself for its “to be.”

Causality: is the influence of a cause that is actually exercised on a being (efficiently, or finalistically, as a model, materially and formally).

3. Genera of Causes

Cause and causality vary according to the different modes of influencing the esse of another.

a.     These are grouped under five headings:

i)               The material cause: it is that out of which the thing is produced: marble

ii)             The formal cause: that through/after/of which the thing is produced: the shape of an angel

iii)           The efficient cause: that by which the thing is produced: sculptor

iv)            The final cause: that for the sake of which the thing is produced: to make the statue

v)             The explanatory cause: that according to which the thing is produced: model

See the different formulations about the principle of causality:

1.     Everything which begins “to be” has a cause. This condition can be applied to any thing that has a beginning in time or anything that is temporal. For example, anything that does not have color white has to receive the whiteness from something which has it.

2.     Anything which moves is moved by something else. This formulation is found in Aristotle.[3] This movement can mean the movement from potency to act or from non-being to being. No potential thing can confer actuality upon itself. It needs an agent. Therefore, this formulation led Aristotle discover the unmoved mover who is the First Mover, a Pure Act.

3.     Everything contingent requires a cause. Contingent means anything which in itself has a potentiality for ceasing to be is contingent. All material creatures are contingent, because they have potentiality to cease to be. They are corruptible, because they are composites (composition of matter and form). These corporeal being can either “be” or “not be.” If they come to “be,” then there must be a cause. This cause can be contingent; in this sense, in order to avoid the infinite series of contingent causes, we must look for an adequate cause which is not contingent (absolutely necessary being). This is St. Thomas’ third way of proving God’s existence, which leads to God as absolute necessary being.

4.     If something possesses perfection which is not derived from its essence, that perfection must come from an external cause.[4] Every being has perfections which depend on its nature. For example, human beings have intelligence and other bodily properties which stem from their nature; they pertain to human nature; therefore, we do not need to look for reasons outside their nature or essence. On the other hand, beings may have perfections which do not pertain to their essences and which are caused by agent distinct from their being. For example, even though knowledge is innate in man, the philosophical knowledge that you get now originates from an external agent, namely a lecturer of philosophy.

b.    Intrinsic causes: Material and formal causes constitute the effect. Hence they are called intrinsic causes

The material cause influences the effect, i.e., the composite by communication of itself to the effect as the determinable and limiting subject.

The formal cause influences in the effect, i.e., the composite by determining and specifying the material cause.

Essence (material cause) Esse (formal cause)     -      these are the intrinsic causes of the finite beings

Material principle, and Formal principle      –        intrinsic causes of a material essence

Substance (material cause) and Accidents (formal cause).     -        intrinsic causes of finite beings in a higher level of reality 

c.     Extrinsic causes: The efficient, final and exemplary causes do not constitute the effect, but exercise their influence from outside to make the effect “come to be.”

The efficient cause: The sculptor makes the statue. His activity exercises real influences in the ‘to be’ of the statue.

The final cause: “intention to make the statue”, influences the sculptor to make the statue. Its influence is in the order of intention. It gives direction and determination to the activity of the efficient cause.  

The exemplary cause: influences the efficient by presenting a plan or pattern to the intellect according to which the efficient cause exercises its activity to produce this particular effect.

4. Efficient Cause:

Efficient causes are extrinsic to the effect which is brought about by the real influence of these causes. This real influence exercised on the ‘to be’ of the effect differs in their manner of influencing. Hence, there are some divisions of efficient causes.

a. First and second causes:

i. First cause: God, who receives from none the power of causing. He alone is the cause of being as such; he alone creates, conserves all beings, and gives concurrence to every activity in the universe.

ii. Second cause: All finite agents have received the power of causing from the first cause. These cannot cause being, but they really influence the ‘coming to be’ of effects substantially and accidentally. 

b. principle and instrumental causes: The carpenter, using tool, makes the table. Poet writes the poem with his pen. God operates sanctification through the sacraments. In all these sentences, the carpenter, the poet, and God are principle causes and tools, pen and sacraments are instrumental causes. Both are real efficient causes; both exercise influence on the ‘esse’ of the effect.

The power of causing is inherent in the principle cause; the instrument has some power inherent in it, but this power, by itself, cannot produce the effect in question. Hence, it receives a direction, and often a supplement of energy from the principle cause. The instrument causes this or that effect insofar as it is moved by the principle cause.

The instrument is not a mere conveyer of the influence of the principle cause, but it works dispositively through its own power for the effect intended; otherwise it would be futile to use it.

c. Second causes and instrumental: both are lower active causes acting under the influence of a higher cause. But they differ: the second cause produces effect through its inherent power, even though this power is received from the first cause. The instrument’s inherent power has to be supplemented by the principle cause to produce the effect.

5. Final Cause:

Final cause is that which influences the esse of the effect in as much as it influences the agent by being the object of tendency (appetite) or intention. Natural appetite or tendency is the inclination innate in beings to tend to definite ends or goals

Cognitive and conscious tendency is the inclination towards goal or end, after this end is known through sensation or intellection. Knowledge of the good is only the condition; it is the good that moves the agent.

Finality or teleology is the causality of the end or goal; it is the being ordered or directed towards a goal which is a good or perfection in some sense or other.

·      Formal finality: if the ordering of means to attain the end is done through knowledge and volition.

·      Material finality: if the ordering of means to the end is in the nature of the agent itself as natural inclination.

Note: Material finality as an intelligent ordering of means to an end presupposes knowledge in some other being, i.e., the ordering of parts in the watch to indicate time presupposes conscious ordering of it by the watch-maker.

6. Exemplary Cause:

Exemplary cause is something which may be imitated by another existent. It is something which through its imitable essence exerts a certain influence upon another (the agent). Insofar as it exerts a real influence on the efficient cause, it is a real cause. Like the final cause, it supposes an efficient cause to become active. While the final cause acts immediately upon the will, the exemplary cause acts immediately upon the intellect, which knows the model and induces the will to reproduce it.

The exemplary cause is related to the formal cause, since it provides the mind with the form which is to be reproduced in the object. But unlike the formal cause, it does not enter into the object (effect) as its constituent element.  It is an external cause.

[1] St. Thomas Aquinas, in V Metaphysical lect. 1, no. 749.

[2] Aristotle, Physics, bk. II, ch. 2; 194b 17.

[3] Aristotle, Physics, bk. VII, ch. 1, 241b 24.

[4] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1, ch. 22.

 Notes:

[1] Thomas Alvira, Luis Clavell, and Tomas Melendo, Metaphysics (Manila: Sinag-Tala Publishers, Inc., ), p. 6.

[2] Peter Coffey, Ontology or the Theory of Being (Ireland: Theophania Publishing, 2012), Ch. 1, a.1.

[3] St. Thomas calls this “act of being” as actus essendi. Aquinas saw that in any subsisting extra-mental thing one finds a couplet of metaphysical principles: one is the ‘essence’ which makes the thing to be what it is, the other is the actus essendi which gives to the thing and to its ‘essence’ actual existence. The observation that individual things display instantiations of a particular ‘essence’ led Aquinas to postulate that what gives actual existence to a thing and to its ‘essence’—the actus essendi—is unique, in the sense that the perfection of actus essendi cannot be said to be common in the way an ‘essence’ is said to be common. Aquinas saw that the metaphysical principle of actus essendi is the “act of all acts, the perfection of all perfections,” and “a proper effect of God.” see, Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia, q.7, a.2, ad 9. See also, Summa Theologiae, part I, q.4, a.1, ad 3 & q.45, a.5; and Summa Contra Gentiles, book II, ch.54, no. 5 & book III, ch.66, no. 4.