Kikcho S., M. A.,Marini, R.D. Saulle, J.-F. Thisse (2025) "Monopolistic Competition under Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation", mimeo.
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to extend the CES model of monopolistic colmpetition to the case where varieries are both horizontally and vertically differentiated. A distinctive feature of our model is the presence of a network externality, which operates through the number of varieties available at each quality level. We show that, depending on the quality gap, there can either be corner equilibria in which consumers purchase only high-quality or low-quality varieties, or an interior equilibrium, in which consumers are split between the two qualities. Differently from the standard CES model of monopolistic competition, the equilibrium can be inefficient and the market may even select the outcome that generates the lowest surplus.
Iwan Bos, M. A. Marini, A. Tasnadi (2025) "Endogenous Cournot-Bertrand Duopoly: The Role of the Demand Allocation Rule", mimeo.
Abstract: This note examines a two-stage homogeneous-good duopoly game. In the first stage, firms select price or quantity as their strategic variable and then determine the magnitude of this variable in the second stage. We show the existence of a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Depending on how demand is allocated at equal prices, the equilibrium outcome is either a Cournot or a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly. The latter emerges when market demand is shared sufficiently equally at price ties.
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