Dr. Claudia Landeo is a Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics of the University of Alberta. She received her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh in 2002, where she was the recipient of the Andrew W. Mellon Award and the Reuben E. Slesinger Research Award. Professor Landeo has served as Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School (2011-2012) and Senior Research Scholar in Law at Harvard Law School (2012). Dr. Landeo has also served as Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law (2011, 2009-2010), Research Scholar in Economics at Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management (2007), and Visiting Associate Professor of Economics (2006-2007) and Research Scholar in Economics (2005) at Carnegie Mellon University John H. Heinz School. Professor Landeo's work has been published in top general-interest economics journals such as THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, GAMES & ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, and THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, top law and economics journals such as THE JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS and THE JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, and top law journals such as THE YALE JOURNAL OF REGULATION and THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW. Her research has been funded by major granting agencies such as the Russell Sage Foundation and the National Science Foundation.

Professor Landeo's research is focused on the ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW. She applies game-theoretic modeling, experimental economics methods, and legal analysis to the assessment and design of market and legal institutions. Her recent theoretical work on the economic analysis of legal disputes, published in GAMES & ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR in 2018, generalizes seminal economic models of litigation, presents the first formal definition of "Access to Justice," and provides methodological contributions to the economic analysis of law. She presented the findings from this study at the NBER Summer Institute in Law and Economics in July 2016. Professor Landeo's theoretical work on the design of optimal law enforcement mechanisms with ordered leniency, published in THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS in 2020, extends seminal work on the control of harmful externalities and provides the first formal analysis of enforcement policies with ordered leniency for short-term harmful group activities. She discussed her findings at the Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association in May 2019 and at the NBER Summer Institute in Law and Economics in July 2018. Dr. Landeo has also studied the efficiency properties of bargaining institutions in legal settings including partnership dissolution provisions and pretrial bargaining mechanisms. In addition, her work has provided insights about the use of vertical restraints by incumbent monopolists to exclude potential entrants, and the design of incentive contracts for teams. Professor Landeo is currently working on the design of optimal law enforcement mechanisms, the design of optimal legal systems, and debiasing through law mechanisms.


Economic Analysis of Law

Industrial Organization

Game Theory

Mechanism Design

Experimental and Behavioral Economics


Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency (with Kathryn Spier). THE JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 63, pp. 71-111 (2020)

Financially-Constrained Lawyers: An Economic Theory of Legal Disputes (with Maxim Nikitin). GAMES & ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 109, pp. 625-647 (2018)

Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities (with Kathryn Spier). THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 99, pp. 1850-1877 (2009)

Trigger Happy or Gun Shy: Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts (with Richard Brooks and Kathryn Spier). THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 41, pp. 649-673 (2010)

Shotguns and Deadlocks (with Kathryn Spier). THE YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, 31, pp. 143-187 (2014)

Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust: Experimental Law and Economics Contributions. Chapter 3. In Kathryn Zeiler and Joshua Teitelbaum (eds.), THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, E. Elgar Publishing (2018)

Settlement Escrows: An Experimental Study of a Bilateral Bargaining Game (with Linda Babcock). THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 53, pp. 401-417 (2004)

Deterrence, Lawsuits and Litigation Outcomes under Court Errors (with Maxim Nikitin and Scott Baker). THE JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 23, pp. 57-97 (2007)

Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock (with Kathryn Spier). THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, 81, pp. 203-229 (2014)


Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency (with Kathryn Spier). NBER W25095 (2018)

Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting (with Kathryn Spier). NBER W25094 (2018)


Ordered Leniency and Self-Enforcing: The Effect of Communication (with Kathryn Spier). UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA & HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Debiasing through Law: An Experimental Study of Unrealistic Optimism and Consumer Safety Law (with Christine Jolls). UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA & YALE UNIVERSITY

Optimal Civil Litigation Mechanisms (with Maxim Nikitin and Sergei Izmalkov). UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA, HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & NEW ECONOMIC SCHOOL