Syllabus Information for "Heretical" Asian Metaphysics

Post date: Apr 16, 2018 5:10:24 AM

Here is some syllabus information for a course I'm wrapping up on "heretical" metaphysics from Asian philosophical traditions.

If you're an academic interested in teaching something similar (or some portion thereof), I'm happy to share my teaching materials, including written notes (about 4-5 pages per lecture, used as scripts for the sake of offering the course online). I have PDFs for all the primary source readings, as well. Be in touch at nick[DOT]jones[at]uah[DOT]edu

Also, after the syllabus information, for the sake of helping the syllabus make a bit more sense, I'm inserting some (parts of) lecture notes directed toward explaining the course scope and focus.

Course Description

This course surveys 'heretical' metaphysics in philosophical traditions from India, China, and Japan. We focus, in particular, upon the three major schools of Indian Buddhism—Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, Yogacara; various Daoist and Buddhist traditions from China; and some Pure Land and Zen traditions from Japan. We study conceptions of selfhood, agency, and responsibility; boundaries and relations between self and others; competing views about causation; and debates between realists, idealists, and nihilists. Our goal is to examine different metaphysical systems on their own terms, while avoiding simplistic explanations or comparisons to more familiar (European) systems.

More after the image...

Module 0

Studying Asian Philosophy

Welcome from the Instructor | Course Scope: India, China, Japan | Course Focus: ‘Heretical’ “Metaphysics” | Course Obstacles: Language, Culture, (Personal) Experience | Course Mechanics

Reading

Koller, “Introduction,” Asian Philosophies, xv-xx

Lewis and Wigen, "The Architecture of Continents," The Myth of Continents, Ch 1

Li and Perkins, “Chinese Metaphysics as a Fruitful Subject of Study,” 71-79

Liu, "Converting Chinese Philosophy into the Analytic Context"

Siderits, "Buddhism as Philosophy?" Buddhism as Philosophy, 1-14

Module 1

Buddhist Fundamentals I

Between Two Extremes | Interpreting the Middle | Four Truths | Three Marks

Readings

Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (SN 56.11), Setting in Motion the Wheel of Truth

Vacchagotta Sutta (SN 44.8), Discourse with Vacchagotta

Aggi-Vachagotta Sutta (MN 72), Discourse with Vacchagotta on Fire

Excerpt from Samannaphala Sutta (DN 2), Fruits of Being a Monastic

Module 2

Buddhist Fundamentals II

No Selves | Five Heaps | Responsibility and Persistence | Clinging and Craving

Readings

Khajjaniya Sutta (SN 22.79), Discourse on Being Eaten Up

Anatta-Lakkhana Sutta (SN 22.59), Discourse on the No-Self Mark

Excerpts from Milinda Panha, Questions of King Milinda

Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (SN 56.11), Setting in Motion the Wheel of Truth

Module 3

Abhidharma Buddhism

Sectarian Buddhism | Analysis and Synthesis | Many Dhammas | Two Truths | Selfless Persons

Readings

Excerpts from Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, Path of Purification

Excerpts from Acariya Anuruddha, Abhidhammattha Sangaha

Excerpts from Samghabhadra, Nyayanusara

Excerpt from Vasubhandhu, Abhidharmakosabhasyam

Excerpts from Kathavatthu, Points of Controversy

Module 4

Madhyamaka Buddhism

Mahayana Rising | Empty Causes (MMK 1) | Pacifying Objectifications (MMK 4, 5, 8) | Empty Dukkha (MMK 12, 15, 18) | Empty Truths (MMK 24)

Readings

Prajnaparamitahrdaya, Heart of the Perfection of Wisdom

Selections from Nagarjuna, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way

Module 5

Yogacara Buddhism

Empty Reform | Figurative Designations | Appearance-Only | Non-Dual Idealism | Three Natures

Readings

Excerpts from Samdhi-nirmocana Sutra [Explanation of Profound Secrets]

Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam [Verses on the Treasury of the Abhidharma], selections from Chapters 3 and 9

Vasubandhu, Vimśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi [Twenty Verses on Appearance-Only]

Vasubandhu, Trisvabhāvanirdeśa [Treatise on the Three Natures]

Module 6

Yin-Yangism

Chaotic Legends (reading the Yi Jing) | Yin & Yang | Correlative Reasoning | Unity of Opposites

Readings

I Ching: The Book of Changes

Module 7

Warring States

Eastern Zhou | Mohist Methodology | Heavenly Standards | Shendao’s Paradox | Laozian Cosmology

Readings

Mozi, selections

Daodejing, selections

Module 8

Zhuangzi

Freedom | Equality | Wu-Wei | Three Stories | Ziran

Readings

Zhuangzi, selections

Module 9

Neo-Daoism

Darkness Rises | Indefinite Completeness | Bottomless Foundation | Weak Greatness | Independent Genesis

Readings

Fragment from He Yan's Dao lun [Discourse on Dao]

He Yan's Wuming lun [Discourse on the Nameless]

Selections from Wang Bi's Commentary on the Laozi

Selections from Zhuangzi Guo zhu [Guo Xiang's Commentary on the Zhuangzi]

Module 10

Indian Buddhism Enters China

Hermeneutics | Seven Schools | Pure Land

Readings

Selections from Jizang, Zhongguanlun shu [Treatise on Madhyamaka Doctrine]

Selections from Huiyuan's Biography

Module 11

Sinitic Madhyamaka Buddhism

Madhyamaka Returns | Wondrous Insight | Neither/Nor | Two Truths | Letting Go

Readings

Lotus Sutra, Chapters 2 & 4

Vimalakirti Sutra, Chapter 9

Sengzhao, Niepan Wuming Lun [Nirvana is Nameless]

Sengzhao, Buzhen Kong Lun [Emptiness of the Unreal]

Selections from Jizang, Erdi yi [The Meaning of the Twofold Truth]

Jianzhi Sengcan, Xinxin Ming [Faith in Mind]

Module 12

Tathagatagarbha Theory

Embryo and Womb | Nonoriginal Nirvana | Deconstructing Buddha-Nature | Suchness and Samsara | Beyond Good and Evil

Readings

Selections from Srimaladevi Simhanada Sutra [Lion's Roar of Queen Srimala]

Selections from Ratnagotravibhaga

Anunatva-Apurnatva-Nirdesa

Selection from Awakening of Faith in Mahayana

Module 13

Huayan Buddhism

Revisiting Three Natures | Li and Shi | Mutual Dependence | Indra's Net | Classifying Teachings

Readings

Selections from Dushun, Huayanfajie Guanmen [Discernments of the Dharmadhatu]

Selections from Fazang, Huayan Wujiao Zhang [Treatise on the Five Teachings]

Selections from Avatamsaka Sutra [Flower Ornament Scripture]

Selections from Zongmi, Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity

Module 14

Japanese Buddhism

Buddhism in Japan | Soto Zen | Rinzai Zen

Readings

Shinran, Tannisho

Dogen, Genjokoan

Hakuin, The Four Ways of Knowing of an Awakened Person

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MODULE 0

LECTURE 2

COURSE SCOPE: INDIA, CHINA, JAPAN

In this lecture, you'll learn about the scope of this course—why this course has a geographical prefix for its name, why some intellectuals claim that there's no philosophy in Asia, how the Eurasian landmass got separated into Europe and Asia, and what parts of Asia we'll focus on in this course.

Let's begin with the course title.

If you look through our course catalog, you'll notice that this is the only course with a geographical location in its title. According to our course descriptions, Philosophy 301 covers philosophy from ancient Greece and Rome. But we don't call it Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, or even Ancient European Philosophy. It's just Ancient Philosophy.

Similarly, Philosophy 302 covers philosophy from the post-Renaissance period in northern Europe. But we don't call it Modern European Philosophy. It's just Modern Philosophy. The names suggest that there's no other "modern" or "ancient" philosophy outside Europe.

If you’ve taken other courses in the Philosophy department at UAH, you might have noticed that the content tends to focus on philosophical traditions from a region of the world we now call Europe: Greece, Rome, France, Germany, England, and so on. This is fairly typical in the United States

It might surprise you to know that there remain quite a few Philosophy professors who insist that all philosophy is European philosophy. There are two common pieces of propaganda for this attitude: first, the etymological claim that philosophy is a Greek word, meaning love of wisdom; second, the dubious historical claim that philosophy begins with the ancient Greeks.

The etymological claim is true: philia is a Greek word for brotherly love; sophia is a Greek for wisdom. So there’s a sense in which philosophy means love of wisdom. Sometimes people infer from this that, since traditions not influenced by the Greeks typically don’t refer to their leading thinkers as lovers of wisdom, there’s no philosophy in those traditions.

Now this sort of reasoning should strike you as absurd. I’ll give you two reasons why.

First, you can’t infer anything about what something is by looking to its etymological roots. I’ll give you one example: hamme is an old German term referring to an enclosed pasture; burg refers to a castle or fortified settlement. But it doesn’t follow from this that hamburgers are enclosed pastures near castles. There are many other examples like this.

Second, even if philosophy really is the love of wisdom, it’s perfectly possible for a tradition to contain lovers of wisdom despite not referring to them as lovers of wisdom. It’s one thing for a society to contain lovers of wisdom. It’s quite another for the same society to determine that the best way to categorize such people is as lovers of wisdom—rather than, say, as scholars, or sages, or monks.

Here's one example. The Japanese term for philosophy is tetsugaku (哲学). It means, roughly, seeking wisdom. The term wasn't invented until the 1800s, however. Prior to that, the Japanese just referred to various traditions of thought—Buddhism, Confucianism, Shinto. But the mere fact that, prior to the 1800s, the Japanese did not refer to thinkers in these traditions as doing philosophy, or tetsugaku, tells us nothing about whether those thinkers were doing philosophy. Indeed, my mentor Tom Kasulis spent about a decade helping to assemble Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, just for the sake of showing that Japan has a history of philosophizing that stretches back at least to Kukai, founder of the Shingon School of Buddhism in the early 800s, and perhaps farther back to the Seventeen-Article Constitution of 604 CE.

This brings us to the second reason often given for insisting that all philosophy is European philosophy. It's a historical reason, often grounded upon a quotation from Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, a history of philosophy written by Diogenes Laertius in the third century CE. Diogenes says this in his Prologue:

[Philosophy] started with Anaximander on the one hand, with Pythagoras on the other. The former was a pupil of Thales, Pythagoras was taught by Pherecydes. The one school was called Ionian, because Thales, a Milesian and therefore an Ionian, instructed Anaximander; the other school was called Italian from Pythagoras, who worked for the most part in Italy.

Diogenes goes on to make an even stronger claim, for those who might disagree:

These authors [of contrary views on the origins of philosophy] forget that the achievements which they attribute to the barbarians belong to the Greeks, with whom not merely philosophy but the human race itself began.

Now Diogenes second claim is flat-out false. We know that humans existed before the Greeks. We also know that the Greeks studied in Africa, and in particular that Thales and Pythagoras imported to Greece ideas they had learned while traveling in Egypt. So, if we agree with Diogenes that only the intellectual descendants of Anaximander and Pythagoras are doing philosophy, we should locate Africa as the origin of philosophy, and we should say that philosophy begins with Africans whose names are lost to history.

But, of course, we should not at all agree with Diogenes. Peter Park published a book in 2013 called Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy. He documents how, throughout European history, up until the 1800s, European thinkers posited multiple origins of philosophy: Zoroaster in Persia, Adam in the middle east, Thales in Greece. Park mentions, in particular, a popular history of philosophy from the 1600s, called The History of Philosophy. The author of this history, Thomas Stanley, states,

Philosophy is generally acknowledged even by the most learned of the Grecians themselves, to have had its Original in the East. None of the Eastern nations, for Antiquity of Learning, stood in competition with the Chaldeans and Egyptians.

What he's saying is that, if philosophy begins anywhere, it begins in Egypt and Chaldea—this is what we now refer to as Babylon.

European historians in the 1700s advocated far more radical claims. Voltaire, known for his role in the French Enlightenment, argued that Christianity descended from Indian religions, and that philosophy began in India and then spread westward into Greece and Africa. But perhaps the most radical claim comes from a Prussian philosopher, inspired by the Jesuits.

During the 1600s, Jesuit missionaries to China brought Chinese texts back to Europe. This was the first significant contact between Europe and East Asia since prior to the medieval era. The Jesuits aimed to show that Chinese thought and Christianty were compatible. In 1721, Christian Wolff—the foremost interpreter of Leibniz's philosophy— gave a speech called Discourse on the Practical Philosophy of the Chinese (Oratio de Sinarum philosophia practica). Wolff opined that Chinese philosophy was the oldest in the world, and that the moral system created by Confucius—the most influential intellectual of Chinese history—was equal to the morality taught by Jesus Christ.

Wolff's claims caused considerable outrage. Prussian academics persuaded the Prussian king to banish Wolff, and so Wolff was offered the choice of either death by hanging or exile. This made Wolff a bit of a celebrity in the rest of Europe—Wolff chose exile, following in the footsteps of Aristotle, who had been exiled by the Athenians.

It's not until the late 1700s, with the work of the German anthropologist Christoph Meiners, that European historians begin to give any credence to the idea of Greek origins for philosophy. Meiners claims that philosophy spread from Greece to Africa and India, and he offers the following reason: Indians and Africans—and Chinese people too—are "weaker in body and mind" and "more depraved and vicious" than the Celtic race—those from Greece, Germany, Italy, Spain, Britain, and generally what we nowadays refer to as Europe. With remarks like these, you should not be surprised that Meiners detested the Enlightenment movement in Europe, nor that his writings later ascended to wild popularity among the Nazis. I should mention that, nowadays, professional anthropologists reject Meiners scientific work as mistaken.

Meiners' ideas took some time to gain widespread acceptance. But they eventually won out, and we have perhaps the most famous of European philosophers—Immanuel Kant—doing intellectual acrobatics to support Meiners selective interpretation of history. It's worth looking at Kant's reasoning. Here's what he says in some of his lectures on Logic:

Among all peoples, then, the Greeks first began to philosophize. For they first attempted to cultivate cognitions of reason, not with images as the guiding thread, but in abstracto, while other peoples always sought to make concepts understandable only through images in concreto. Even today there are people, like the Chinese and some Indians, who admittedly deal with things that are derived merely from reason, like God, the immortality of the soul, etc., but who nonetheless do not seek to investigate the nature of these things in accordance with concepts and rules in abstracto. They make no separation here between the use of the understanding in concreto and that in abstracto. Among the Persians and Arabs there is admittedly some speculative use of reason, but the rules for this they borrow from Aristotle, hence from the Greeks. In Zoroaster's Zend-Avesta we find not the slightest trace of philosophy. The same holds also for the prized Egyptian wisdom, which in comparison with Greek philosophy was mere child's play.

Here's what I understand Kant to be saying: the Greeks do philosophy, because they reason with abstract concepts; and other traditions either don't reason with abstract concepts, or they do but only because they borrowed those concepts from the Greeks. You should keep this argument in mind as we progress through the course. But let me make just three comments.

First, if you've ever read Kant's philosophical works, you'll notice the near complete absence of concrete examples. That makes sense, given his conception of philosophy as working with abstractions. But I'm not so sure the absence of examples is a good-making feature of his work. I, for one, wish he'd bothered to give one or two, for the sake of helping his readers understand what the heck he's trying to say.

Second, if you've ever studied Plato, you know the Platonic dialogues are awash with concrete examples—they're literally everywhere. Just take the Republic. We have the Ring of Gyges, myths about metallic souls, the cave and sun analogies. So it's not obvious that Kant's argument shows what he thinks it shows.

Third, we can find non-philosophical texts in the ancestry of every European philosophical tradition. Christians have their testaments. Greeks have their epic poems. Muslims have their holy books, as well. What we find is that philosophy often develops as a tradition tries to make sense of its religious texts.

So much for the claim that the Greeks have an exclusive claim to inventing philosophy, and that only traditions descended from the Greeks qualify as philosophy. If you were wondering why this is the only Philosophy course we offer with a geographical location in its title, you now have an answer: it's because the German academic tradition continues to exert a heavy influence on our naming conventions.

You might think this idea of influence is a bit absurd. I assure you it is not. You find it even among those who insist upon the existence of autonomous and legitimate philosophical traditions beyond Europe. A good example is John Koller's textbook on Asian Philosophy, now in its sixth edition. You have access to a PDF of the Introduction to this text. Skim it when you have a chance. You'll notice right away the influence of Kant's thinking. Koller makes European philosophy out to be uniquely focused on conceptual analysis and argumentation—paradigmatically abstract skills. And while he doesn't go so far as Kant in saying that Asian philosophers lacks such skills, he paints them as more focused on practices and ways of life—paradigmatically concrete concerns.

I'm not going to try to convince you that there is philosophy in Asia—not with arguments, anyway. I think there is, and that claims to the contrary are not only unfounded but also false. You can judge for yourself as we go through the course. So far as I'm concerned, this is a course in philosophy, rather than a course in thought or religion or some other discipline or activity.

Let me close with a few remarks about the parts of Asia we'll be studying. Asia, as a geographical landmass, definitely excludes most other continents in the world: Africa, the two Americas, Australia, Antarctica. So, among the many things we won't study in this course, we won't study any philosophy from any of these five other continents.

Now it just so happens that Europe is part of the same landmass as Asia—which is why geographers sometimes refer to the landmass as Eurasia. Way back in the 400 BCEs, the Greek historian Herodotus used the term Ἀσία—Asia—to refer to the Persian Empire, to the east of the Aegean Sea—the area we now know as Turkey, in contradistinction to Greece and Egypt. But Herodotus was well aware that his division was artificial—for one thing, he thought all land east of the Nile was part of Asia, despite this boundary splitting Egypt into two.

St. Jerome, who translated the Bible into Latin in the 400s CE, gave theological significance to Herodotus' tripartite division of the world, claiming that Noah gave each of his three sons their own part of the world: Asia for Shem, Africa for Ham, Europe for Japheth. As the centuries passed, the theological interpretation made Herodotus' divisions seem as though they were natural—and map-makers of the period conceptualized the world as a circle divided into three parts by a T. Whence we have the famous T-O maps of medieval Europe.

This medieval division between Europe and Asia is pretty much the basis for determining what qualifies as "European" philosophy. But it's a bit odd. It excludes some countries from Eastern Europe, such as Russia and other Slavic nations. It also excludes traditions that, through history, were most influenced by, and which influenced, European philosophy—especially Persian and Arabic traditions. This is because the T-O map groups Russia, Persia, and Islamic countries as belonging to Asia rather than Europe.

Some professionals follow the T-O map in conceptualizing what qualifies as "Asian" philosophy. For example, John Koller's textbook Asian Philosophy categorizes Islamic philosophy—but not Russian philosophy—as Asian. We're going to be even more restrictive than Koller, by focusing on philosophical traditions from exactly three countries: India, China, and Japan.

This excludes Russian and other Slavic countries. It excludes the Islamic traditions from what's known as Asia Minor: everything west of India and China. We're also excluding all of what's known as Southeast Asia: everything south of China and east of India. And we're excluding philosophy from a few remaining countries, too, such as Korea and Tibet.

These exclusions aren't for any good academic reason: philosophy in these excluded areas is plenty interesting. Our reason is pedagogical: our choice is superficial coverage across the majority of Asia, or more in-depth coverage for a select portion therein.

I've opted for more in-depth coverage, because depth is more suited for philosophy—as opposed to intellectual history—and because I happen to have an expertise only for philosophy from India, China, and Japan.

Ok. Enough on the scope of Asian Philosophy. You should have some knowledge about why this course has a geographical prefix for its name, about some reasons intellectuals have given for supposing that there's no philosophy in Asia, about the history of separating the Eurasian landmass into Europe and Asia, and about what parts of Asia we'll focus on in this course.

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MODULE 0

LECTURE 3

COURSE FOCUS: 'HERETICAL' METAPHYSICS

Asian Philosophy—even when restricted to philosophical traditions from India, China, and Japan—contains a massive amount of human thought. We cannot cover any significant portion of it over the course of just one semester. This lecture is meant to explain to you the portions we will cover: what they are, how they relate to the parts we won't cover, and why they've been selected.

Let's begin with a rough and general overview of the intellectual terrain, by touching upon the major philosophical traditions from the history of India, China, and Japan.

India's philosophical history includes the six "orthodox" traditions of Vedic philosophy—or darśanas, worldviews, as they are known in India: Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Vedanta. These traditions are orthodox, in two senses: they arise from thinking about the Upanishads and the Vedas, some of the oldest religious texts available in India; and they dominated the intellectual scene for much of India's history.

India contains a few "heterodox" traditions as well, such as Jainism and Buddhism and Islam. These are heterodox in a double sense: they arise as reactions to the orthodox traditions, and they have been minority views for much of India's history.

The history of philosophy in China contains an orthodox tradition, too—known to us as Confucianism and, later, as Neo-Confucianism. This orthodoxy is the basis for much of China's history, from ancient times until the Communist Revolution in the 1900s. It is marked by thinkers such as Confucius, Mencius, and more recently Fung Yu-lan.

The Confucian tradition stands in contrast to a few more heterodox traditions from China: from the classical era, thinking classified under the category Daoism; from the medieval era, Chinese adaptations of Buddhism; and from our era, Chinese adaptations of Marxism.

Japan's philosophical history does not as easily divide into "orthodox" and "heterodox" traditions. If there's any orthodox tradition in Japan, it'd be Shinto—a religious tradition stretching back to the earliest history of Japan. Shinto emphasizes sensitivity to nature and, equally, reverence for Japan as a distinctive place home to a distinctive people. Tom Kasulis, my mentor in Asian philosophy, gives a book-long philosophical treatment of this tradition in his 2004 Shinto: The Way Home.

But, judging by Kasulis' Sourcebook in Japanese Philosophy, Shinto philosophizing doesn't seem to emerge in Japan until the 1700s, nearly 1,000 years after Buddhist and Confucian philosophy arrives in Japan from China. So Shinto is orthodox in one sense: it arises from the oldest religious tradition in Japan. But it's not orthodox in a second sense: distinctively Shinto philosophizing arises as a reaction to other philosophical traditions.

Of the philosophical traditions not indigenous to Japan, Confucianism has a better claim to orthodoxy than Buddhism. Confucian texts arrived to Japan sometime between the 3rd and 5th centuries. These texts influenced the Seventeen-Article Constitution of 604 CE—the earliest Japanese attempt to articulate a foundation for their government, and so arguable the first distinctively Japanese work of political philosophy. Moreover, after the rise of Neo-Confucianism in China during the 10th century, Japanese intellectuals gradually came to favor Confucian ideas to Buddhist ones.

This leaves the Buddhist tradition in Japan as the best contender for heterodoxy. Japanese intellectuals much preferred Buddhism to Confucianism from the 6th to 10th centuries. But its fortunes waned considerably after this brief period of dominance. This makes Japanese Buddhist heterodox in the sense of not dominant for much of Japan's history.

Japanese Buddhism is heterodox in another sense as well, in comparison to Indian and Chinese Buddhist traditions. The Japanese tradition tends toward the esoteric—emphasizing secret teachings, rituals with hidden meanings, and tantric bodily practices.

That covers the major philosophical traditions from India, China, and Japan. We can use the distinction between orthodox and heterodox traditions to group them roughly as follows:

Orthodox: Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Vedanta, Confucianism, Shinto

Heterodox: Buddhism, Jainism, Islam, Daoism

One semester is not enough to cover all of these traditions in depth. So we face a choice: superficial coverage across the majority of traditions, or more in-depth coverage for a select portion therein.

I've opted for more in-depth coverage, and I've done so by choosing to focus on the heterodox traditions. There are two reasons for this choice. The first reason is that, were we to prefer coverage over depth, the course would resemble a class in intellectual history more than a philosophy class. This is because there would not be enough time to engage in any meaningful way with arguments, objections, and replies.

The second reason is more practical: I happen to have more expertise for the heterodox traditions than for the orthodox ones. In fact, of the heterodox traditions, I have expertise only for Buddhism and Daoism—I know very little about Islamic philosophy, and next to nothing about Jain philosophy.

Let's pause for a moment, to orient ourselves. This is a course on Asian Philosophy. But not all the philosophy in Asia—just the philosophy from India, China, and Japan. And not all of the philosophy from these countries: just the heterodox traditions. And not all of the heterodox traditions: just Buddhism and Daoism.

This focus for the course is not as arbitrary as it might seem. Of the philosophical traditions from India, China, and Japan, Buddhism is the only tradition that touches all three regions. Buddhism arises in India, around the 5th century BCE. It crosses the Himalayan Mountains into China about 700 years later, in the 3rd century CE. The Chinese use philosophical resources from their own Daoist traditions to make sense of the Indian teachings, and within 400 years these efforts give rise to distinctively Chinese traditions of Buddhism. These Chinese traditions are the ones Japanese travelers encounter and take back to Japan, where they interact with indigenous Shinto religion and morph into distinctively Japanese traditions of Buddhism.

It turns out, then, that Buddhism is a sort of focal point for this course. We'll start with Buddhist philosophical traditions in India: the early foundations, and three subsequent traditions that develop from those foundations—Abhidhamma, Madhyamaka, and Yogacara. We'll encounter some big names: Siddharta Gotama, Nagasena, Nagarjuna, Vasubhandu. Then we'll move to China.

Since we can't understand Buddhist philosophy in China without knowing something about indigenous Chinese philosophy, we'll examine pre-Buddhist Chinese philosophy. We'll focus on the traditions that most influence the Chinese reception of Buddhism: very early suggestions from what's known as the yin-yang school, early Daoist ideas from the well-known Daodejing and Zhuangzi, and later refinements of those ideas in a tradition known as Dark Learning—or, more prosaically, Neo-Daoism. This takes us to the rough midpoint of the course.

Next we'll talk about Chinese Buddhism: Buddhism's initial reception into China, some distinctively Chinese innovations to the Buddhist tradition, and my favorite school of Chinese Buddhism, Huayan—including my favorite philosopher, Fazang. I've published quite a bit about Fazang's Huayan philosophy, and in my mind Fazang represents a pinnacle of Buddhist philosophical thought—a Chinese equivalent to an Immanuel Kant, if you don't mind the comparison. But the Buddhist tradition continues after Huayan, and many like to conceptualize the Zen tradition as a sort of practical descendent of Huayan. So we'll spend the last week of the course in Japan, looking at some Zen traditions.

There is no good textbook to buy that covers exactly these traditions. So, instead of assigning a required textbook, I'll be making readings available to you as PDFs.