Inference to the More Robust Explanation

Kinda proud of (finally!) landing an article in British Journal for Philosophy of Science.

Inference to the More Robust Explanation

There is a new argument form within theoretical biology. This form takes as input competing explanatory models; it yields as output the conclusion that one of these models is more plausible than the others. The driving force for this argument form is an analysis showing that one model exhibits more parametric robustness than its competitors. This article examines these inferences to the more robust explanation, analysing them as variants of inference to the best explanation. The article defines parametric robustness and distinguishes it from more familiar kinds of robustness. The article also argues that parametric robustness is an explanatory virtue not subsumed by more familiar explanatory virtues, and that the plausibility verdicts in the conclusions of inferences to the more robust explanations are best interpreted as guidance for research activity, rather than claims about likely truth.

• Introducing Inference to the More Robust Explanation
• Inference to the More Robust Explanation in the Study of Apoptosis

• Regulating apoptosis
• Competing models and evidential indecision
• Measuring robustness
• Robustness as a guide to plausibility
• Varieties of robustness

• Inference to the More Robust Explanation as Inference to the Best Explanation

• The structure of inference to the best explanation
• Parametric robustness as an explanatory virtue rather than an explanandum
• Relation of parametric robustness to other explanatory virtues

• Epistemological Significance of Inference to the More Robust Explanation

• Plausibility in practice
• Plausibility in principle

• Conclusion