Publications
"Fair Consent Transactions and Ethical Pluralism,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, forthcoming. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhaf038.
“How to be an Aesthetic Realist,” Ratio 35 (2022): 61-70. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12324.
“Meta-Ethics,” A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy. Graham Oppy ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2019), pp. 343-354. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119119302.ch23.
“Formulating Moral Objectivity,” Philosophia 46, no. 4 (2018): 1023-1040. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9942-9.
“Intuitionism in Moral Epistemology,” Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett eds. (Routledge, 2017), pp. 472-483. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315213217-31.
“Moral Realism and Ethical Naturalism in Media Ethics Theorizing,” with Patrick Lee Plaisance, Ethical Space, 13, no. 4 (2016): 11-17.
“Varieties of Moral Intuitionism.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 48, no. 2 (2014): 177-194. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9423-3.
“Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Moral Realism, Constructivism, and Explaining Moral Knowledge.” Philosophical Explorations 17, no. 2 (2014): 126-140. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2013.855807.
“Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge.” Theoria 80, no. 2 (2014): 184-190. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12044.
“In Defense of Reading Quizzes.” International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education 26, no. 1 (2014): 140-146. pdf.
“Making Sense of Explanatory Objections to Moral Realism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 1 (2013): 37-49. JSTOR
“Idealization in Ethics.” International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hugh LaFollette, ed. (Blackwell Publishing, 2013), pp. 2531–2533. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee747.
“Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge.” Disputatio 4, no. 33 (2012): 459-467. https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2012-0011.
“Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?” Theoria 78, no. 1 (2012): 26-46. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01118.x.
“Review of Sabine Roeser’s Moral Emotions and Intuitions.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 11.27 (2011). NDPR page.
“Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge.” Acta Analytica 26, no. 4 (2011): 355-366. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0126-0.
“Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 44, no. 1 (2010): 31-45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-009-9173-9.
“ ‘S Knows that P’ Expanded: Apology 20D-24B,” with Patrick McKee, Social Epistemology 24, no. 1 (2010): 29-43. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691721003632800.
“Renewing Moral Intuitionism.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 6, no. 4 (2009): 440-463. https://doi.org/10.1163/174046809x12464327133096.
“Naturalism and the New Moral Intuitionism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 33 (2008): 163-184. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2008_1.