Globalization, Leadership, and
US-China Relations in the (Post-)Pandemic World
Abstract: Long before the eruption of COVID-19, many symptoms of the decline or crisis of globalization were observed and the US’s declining global leadership was one of those major symptoms. A hegemonic competition between the US and China started before the pandemic, but it has become much more intense in this pandemic situation. The combination of the coronavirus crisis and a heightened hegemonic competition between the two great powers could have an enduring impact on globalization. We are entering into a (long) period of a much less globalized world or a fragmented form of our global system, which is characterized by relatively closed national systems and regional blocs without effective global leadership. Obviously, a hegemonic war between the US and China will bring about the sinking of a whole vessel of globalization. Even if there is no hegemonic war, a prolonged rivalry between them would increase instability, uncertainty, unpredictability, and volatility in fragmented global relations. The essay aims to provide an opportunity to rethink the relationship between globalization and global leadership in historical perspective and examine US-China relations in the (post-)pandemic world and their impact on the future of globalization.
Keywords: Globalization, Leadership, Global Politics, COVID-19, US-China Relations, Hegemonic Competition, a New Cold War
Note: This article is a revised and expanded version of “The Crisis of Globalization and Its Future” published at From Our Perspective: OWU Faculty Opinions (The OWU website)
Introduction
The outbreak of COVID-19 has revealed the vulnerabilities of many nations in this era of globalization. Globalization is a set of processes that facilitates the flow of goods, services, finance, information, ideas, people, and even infectious diseases across national borders and it involves the increasing integration and interconnectedness of nations and societies on a global basis. Globalization has produced many positive results including easier and cheaper access to information, goods, and services and more global cultural exchanges across political borders. On the other hand, globalization has its downsides as the current global pandemic demonstrates. They include increasing or continued economic inequalities, global environmental degradation, the increasing vulnerabilities to financial instabilities or crises, and the expansion of global terrorist groups and criminal organizations as well as the spread of infectious diseases. In the 1980s and 1990s when optimistic views on globalization were dominant, many people believed globalization was a nearly irreversible phenomenon. Since the late 1990s, however, critical views on globalization have grown and massive and violent anti-globalization movements across many nations have emerged.
Historical patterns clearly show that globalization is not an irreversible phenomenon. As this essay discusses in what follows, global leadership is a necessary condition for the smooth operation of globalization and the lack of leadership at the global level is closely related to deglobalization, a significant reduction of global flows or even the collapse of globalization. Another historical lesson is that globalization cannot be separated from states and state policies. Globalization can be accelerated when states, particularly great powers, push pro-globalization policies, but normally they have capacities to modulate the speed of globalization and restrict some of global flows when they perceive those measures are needed for their national interests.
Even way before the outbreak of COVID-19, many symptoms of the decline or crisis of globalization were detected and America’s declining global leadership was one of those major symptoms. A hegemonic competition, which was triggered by the rise of China and the US’s perceived threat, started before the pandemic, but it has become much more intense in this pandemic situation. Obviously, it is not a good sign for the future of globalization. The combination of the coronavirus crisis and a heightened hegemonic competition between the two great powers could have a more enduring impact on globalization than many people think. It may mean that we are entering into a (long) period of a much less globalized world or a fragmented form of our global system. Although a hegemonic war between the two major powers is not inevitable, recent developments suggest that its possibility has increased rather than decreased. Definitely, the occurrence of this hegemonic or global war will be devastating to globalization and it could mean the nail in the coffin for the whole process of globalization. Therefore, how to avoid this hegemonic conflict between the US and China has become one of the most important and urgent issues in the study of international or global affairs. This essay will provide an opportunity to rethink the relationship between globalization and leadership in historical perspective and examine US-China relations in the (post-)pandemic world and their impact on the future of globalization.
Globalization and Leadership in Historical Perspective
Globalization is not a unilinear process and there have been different waves of globalization in history. If we focus mainly on the economic side of globalization, at least there have been two big waves of globalization (Ferguson 2005). The first wave lasted roughly from the mid-19th century to the early 20th century. During this period, the British Empire expanded its territories globally and the first genuine global market emerged in which major national markets were interlinked by the British Empire and its influence. The invention of steam engines, steam ships, telegraph, and the construction of canals and undersea cables facilitated the creation and expansion of the global market. Great Britain took on a leadership role in this first big wave of globalization, but the first wave began to fall down along with the decline of British power and leadership, which was caused by its military overexpansion and resultant long-term relative economic downturn. Its decline of economic status was evidenced by the fall of its share of world trade from 30% in 1850 to 14.1% in 1914 (Schwartz 2010, 147). Moreover, Great Britain’s liberal economic policies that emphasize free competition and free trade were challenged by some of rising powers. For example, Imperial Germany where cartels were formed between banks and industries experienced rapid industrialization by adopting protectionist or mercantile economic policies and its economic rise posed a serious challenge to the British economic model and its liberal economic policies. In this context, World War I disrupted the whole process of the first wave of globalization. Moreover, the Global Depression that had started in 1929 lasted as many as 10 years in part because of the lack of global leadership. Great Britain could not play as a lender of last resort because of its diminished financial capacity and the US was not ready to take on a global leadership role at that time (Kindleberger 2013 [1973]). As a result, protectionist or “beggar thy neighbor” policies ruled this period of the global economic crunch. Finally, after the end of World War II the US emerged as a new superpower and since then Britain’s already diminished status and influence has declined further.
The second wave of globalization started after the end of WWII under the new leadership of Washington, which was supported by its global economic as well as military predominance. The pre-war level of international trade volume was fully recovered by the 1970s, but it was in the early 1980s that the second wave was accelerated when the US and Great Britain began to adopt more laissez-faire economic policies based on classical economic ideas under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Washington also encouraged and even pressured many developing economies to follow in its footsteps in cooperation with the International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Bank. Moreover, the end of the Cold War and the development of information technology in the late 1980s and 1990s expedited the global flows of goods, services, and finance, and information. In particular, the US became a single superpower after the eclipse of the Cold War and optimistic views dominated discourses on globalization and the future of world politics in the early 1990s.
This new optimism, however, did not last long. The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in the late 1990s, which was the biggest economic crisis at that time since the Great Depression, revealed the dark side of globalization. Along with financial globalization, there was a dramatic increase of short-term based speculative investments and they made many countries, particularly emerging economies, vulnerable to financial instabilities or crises. Economic history tells us clearly that global financial markets have become much more unstable and insecure since the 1980s when economic and financial globalization became more accelerated (Kindleberger 2015). It is evidenced by more frequent economic crises since the 1980s, first in developing or emerging economies (e.g., the Peso Crisis in the 1980s and the AFC in the late 1990s) and then in developed or advanced economies (e.g., the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in the U.S. in 2007 and the Eurozone Crisis thereafter). Global financial flows including foreign direct investment peaked before the Global Financial Crisis in 2008/09 and have never recovered since then (Fontaine 2020). 9/11 in 2001 was another tipping point. Islamic fundamentalists felt threatened by the spread of secularism and commercialism in the Middle East and for them globalization led by the US was an evil force that could destroy their traditional cultures and religious values. The spread of financial crises and global terrorism was also followed by the rise of epidemics or pandemics. Globalization includes the global movement of people including tourists, immigrants, and migrants and the increasing availability of airline travels accelerated the spread of infectious diseases or viruses across political borders. The frequency of these infectious diseases in the 21st century is evidenced by the outbreaks of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2002-04, MERES (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome) in 2012-20, Ebola in 2013-16, and finally COVID-19 in 2019-2021.
The spread of financial crises, global terrorism, and infectious diseases, which has revealed the dark side of globalization, can be interpreted as the symptoms of the decline or even collapse of the second wave of globalization. Moreover, the rise of the increasingly violent anti-globalization movement since the 1990s and the emergence of populism, ultra-nationalism, and protectionism in the West are not the positive signs for it. More importantly, the lack of global leadership is detected in the midst of these challenges. History tells us that effective global political leadership is a necessary condition for the smooth operation of globalization and globalization can fall due to major political, economic, and social crises in the absence of such leadership (Ferguson 2005). Under president Trump, Washington has adopted nationalistic policies under the motto of America First, giving up at least some major principles of a post-WW II liberal international order including openness, free trade, and multilateralism. Washington’s new moves have embarrassed the international community including even its close allies. On the other hand, China has revealed its political ambition to expand its global influence, but has faced major criticism from its neighbors and the West because of its militarization of the South China Sea and human rights violations. Moreover, People’s Republic of China (PRC), which was an original (or at least early) epicenter of COVID-19, is losing trust from the international community because of its mishandling of the virus.
Globalization and the Lack of Leadership in the Pandemic World
In my definition, global leadership is a hegemonic power’s or major powers’ capabilities in cooperation with other major actors including international organizations that create and maintain global public goods such as global (multilateral) rules, global political stability, and smooth global economic flows. As mentioned previously, Washington was stepping back from its global leadership under president Trump and the lack of leadership was detected even before the eruption of COVID-19. For example, in 2017 Washington decided to withdraw unilaterally from the Paris Agreement, which is an agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The US also withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council in 2018 and maintains a critical view toward the International Criminal Court (ICC) because it views the ICC violates American legal sovereignty. Additionally, the Trump administration raised trade barriers against China by imposing high tariffs on major Chinese products in 2018 and 2019. Moreover, the Trump administration had a very critical view toward the World Trade Organization (WTO), the rules-based multilateral trading system, and there was a voice in Washington that the US should withdraw from the WTO. The Trump administration complained that the WTO had not been able to correct PRC’s unfair trade practices and claimed that PRC should not be treated as a developing economy (Mason and Lawder 2019). Many observers worried that political power would prevail over rules and laws when there are trade disputes among major countries in the absence of the well-functioning multilateral trading system.
The outbreak of COVID-19 exposed the problem of a deficiency of reliable and effective global leadership more conspicuously. President Trump made efforts to deflect criticism toward his slow response to the pandemic in the US by blaming China. We cannot deny the mishandling of the virus by the Chinese government as will be discussed below, but Trump praised Xi and emphasized US-China cooperation in handling COVID-19 through January and February in 2020. But he began to harshly criticize Beijing in April when the spread of the virus came to be really serious in the US. His statement on China’s handling of coronavirus was not consistent and he blamed Beijing to reduce criticism to him (McDermott and Kaczynski 2020). In any case, Washington chose the blame game rather than closer cooperation with Beijing in addressing the global pandemic and Beijing also responded by pointing fingers at Washington. Anti-Chinese sentiment has grown stronger in Washington after the widespread of the virus to the US and US-China relations have gotten worse.
On the other hand, under president Xi China has made efforts to expand its global influence on the basis of its rapid economic expansion and the accumulation of surplus capital. Despite its neighbors’ protest, China has adopted aggressive policies to militarize the South China Sea and began to control de facto most of the area. Beijing also launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its global trade networks as well as for strategic purposes. As well, Beijing has enhanced its ties with many African, Latin American, and central European nations. In spite of these efforts, China still remains largely a regional power or a “potential” global power because of its lack of soft power as well as hard power (particularly military capabilities). China’s culture, economic model, and political system do not have universal appeals and it does not have enough capacities to design a new international order and shape global affairs. Therefore, China has not taken initiatives on global affairs and have been reluctant to lead the world proactively (Shambaugh 2018).
It is also worth noting that China has benefitted a lot from the post-WW II international liberal order created under American leadership and it is arguably the biggest beneficiary of the second wave of economic globalization that was accelerated since the 1980s. Many countries including the US opened their markets widely to Chinese products and many foreign companies have invested heavily in the Chinese market. China has also made efforts to join many global and regional multilateral institutions including the WTO and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). All of this does not happen overnight and it took a lot of time for China to develop into a normal great power in the international community by building confidence and trust with other countries, particularly western powers. Confidence and trust are crucial political capitals in interstate relations and normally it takes considerable time and efforts to build them as the case of PRC shows (Wang 2020).
But China is currently losing this hard-earned confidence and trust because of its mishandling of coronavirus. In China, early warnings were ignored and whistle blowers were repressed by the local authorities. They restricted free flow of information and made efforts to cover up the eruption of this mysterious virus. Therefore, people could not get timely information on the diffusion of this virus at an early stage and the central government in Beijing was very slow in responding to the crisis. As a result, Beijing failed in containing this virus effectively and this allowed the virus to develop into a global pandemic. The authorities in China compromised the public health and safety of Chinese people and people around the world for their political survival or interests and these non-transparent responses to the virus outbreak revealed serious problems with China’s political system and its leadership (Wang 2020). After it recovered from a deadly health crisis, Beijing provided many European countries with medical supplies under the name of “mask diplomacy.” In a sense, the pandemic provided China with a window of opportunity to expand its global leadership and fill the global political vacuum when Washington was stepping back from its global leadership. Despite this mask diplomacy, however, confidence and trust in China from the international community were not recovered as evidenced by a considerable increase in a negative view of China in many western democracies. According to a survey outcome released by the Pew Research Center in October 2020, more than 70% of people have a negative view of China in countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, and Australia. There was a double-digit increase in their negative view of China in all these countries compared to last year (Pew Research Center 2020). Moreover, the British government, which was disappointed by Beijing’s nontransparent and non-trustworthy handling of the virus, decided to ban British mobile companies’ purchase of new 5G equipment from Huawei, a Chinese tech giant for a national security reason.
In short, a system leader, the US, who had led the (second) wave of economic globalization, was drawing back from its global leadership under president Trump and the lack of global political leadership was found even before the outbreak of the pandemic. On the other hand, China falls short of a global hegemonic power yet and furthermore its mishandling of COVID-19 revealed serious problems with its political system and leadership. China has lost hard-earned confidence and trust considerably from the international community despite its mask diplomacy and China has not been able to fill the global political vacuum. More importantly, two great powers have not chosen to cooperate closely to cope with the global pandemic and rather decided to engage in blame games and a hegemonic competition between the two would be likely to be much more intense in the (post-)pandemic world.
US-China Relations and the Future of Globalization
As discussed previously, the symptoms of the decline of globalization were detected way before the eruption of the global pandemic, but the outbreak of COVID-19 is causing the much further decline of global flows. It seems to be clear that at least an age of “hyper-globalization,” which is characterized by relatively unrestricted global flows, is over. Shocked by the eruption of the pandemic, many governments imposed lockdowns, travel bans, and export restrictions and the global health crisis has seriously disrupted global supply chains. As a result, the global flows of people, goods, and services have been interrupted enormously. According to WTO, the volume of international trade of goods would drop by 9.2% in 2020 and the world economy would experience the biggest contraction since the end of WW II (WTO 2020). The global pandemic is dealing a blow to global supply chains and it could lead to a renationalization or localization of production. Moreover, it could strengthen the political position of nationalists in many nations who favor protectionist trade policies and immigration restrictions. It could also produce a more fragmented form of the global system as it enhances regional and bilateral relations rather than global integration (Fontaine 2020). Like-minded countries would form or strengthen their economic as well as security ties and particularly, the worsening US-China relations could accelerate this trend.
Along with the development of vaccines, the pandemic situation will be eased and the volume and speed of global economic flows would be recovered to some extent, but the worsening US-China relations could play as a major stumbling block against this recovery given the both economies account for around 40% of the world economy in terms of total economic output. Many experts indeed worry about the start of a new Cold War between the two great powers. The new Cold War would be different from the old one because the US and China are much more interdependent economically than the US and the Soviet Union were and China that has embraced capitalistic elements in its economic system is much wealthier than the Soviet Union was (Rachman 2020). But if it starts, a commonality that the old one and the new one share would be continuous confrontations between the two powers on almost all fronts: security, economy, technology, diplomacy, culture, and sports. If it starts, there will be “decoupling” and “disengagement” from each other (Bader 2020). The worst case scenario is a direct armed conflict between them in the Asia Pacific, which could be anathema to the whole process of globalization.
Some people might believe economic interdependence between the two powers is so deep and there will be no decoupling of two economies or a war between them. But history tells us that economic interdependence is a very weak deterrent to a war between great powers. Before WW I, Germany was a major economic and trade partner of Great Britain, but Great Britain felt threated by the rapid industrial development of Germany that embraced mercantile economic policies. Economic independence between a system leader and a rising power tends to develop into economic conflicts or trade wars and they tend to precede shooting wars (Layne 2018). Others might think that the two great powers will not engage in a direct armed conflict because of nuclear deterrence. Surely, nuclear weapons can deter the escalation of a war between the two powers, but they do not seem to be a perfect deterrence. The idea of nuclear deterrence is based upon the rational actor assumption. But even rationalists admit that there is always the possibility of actors’ miscalculation and miscommunication between them due to the lack of information, the complexity of international affairs, and uncertainty about others’ intentions (Glaser 2010). It is particularly so when there is no trust or confidence between actors. Moreover, states do not always behave rationally and historical grievances, territorial disputes, and political ambitions tend to make them behave emotionally (Choi 2018). Thus we cannot rule out a nuclear war between the two powers although its possibility is low. When it comes to a conventional war, the possibility is higher given increasingly heightened tensions between Washington and Beijing over the South China Sea and Taiwan. Therefore, how to avoid a direct military conflict between the two great powers has become one of the most crucial issues in the study of international or global affairs (Allison 2017).
By and large, it looks like there are two scenarios that can avoid a hegemonic war between the US and China. The first scenario is that Washington shares it power and positions in the international system with China and it may mean Washington gives up its hegemonic position in the Asia Pacific. The second scenario is that China gives up its revisionist aims to become a new hegemonic power particularly in the Asia Pacific. If one of them happens, global leadership will be recovered as it is shared by the two powers or under US’s direction and it will definitely make a good contribution to the recovery of globalization. As of now, however, the possibility is very low that one of these will happen. The perception that China is a long-term strategic rival of the US became deeply rooted in the minds of both Democrats and Republicans in Washington. Former vice president Joe Biden was elected as a new US president in November 2020, but no dramatic Washington’s policy changes are expected toward Beijing. He might not be imposing high tariffs on Chinese products and he will make more efforts to cooperate with America’s allies in addressing China, but he will not sit back and allow Beijing’s continuous militarization of the South China Sea and (illegal) transfer of American technologies.
On the other hand, president Xi secured his rule for life by eliminating term limits and China has adopted more assertive or even aggressive foreign policies under him. Moreover, Chinese nationalism has been increasingly propped up by popular support although it has been partially promoted by the communist party’s propaganda through public media. It is also noteworthy that national economic and security interests alone cannot fully explain this hegemonic competition or rivalry. For example, even if the US gives up its hegemonic position in East Asia, it may not cause a serious and direct security threat to the American mainland (Layne 2018, 137-138). The US can still enjoy it dominant position in the western hemisphere and other regions. But normally national pride and prestige are deeply involved in this hegemonic competition or rivalry and it is not easy for a system leader to totally yield its long-held positions and status. Furthermore, as the British-German rivalry did prior to WW I, it is not only a competition for national economic and security interests, but also the one for defending your political ideology and economic model (Layne 2018, 131).
Unstable and insecure relationships between the two powers characterized by suspicion, distrust, competition, and rivalry could last a long period time in a much less globalized world or a more fragmented global system. But an ideal situation is that the US and China reach a dramatic compromise through a grand bargaining. For example, the US may allow China to exercise more leadership in the Asia Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia that include pro-Chinese nations like Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Brunei. It may mean the US gives up its hegemonic position “partially” in Southeast Asia. Washington also may suggest the co-development of oil and natural gas in the South China Sea by China and its neighboring countries. American companies may be able to participate in this development. But Beijing should stop its militarization of the Sea until maritime border issues are clearly resolved. Beijing also has to promise not to invade Taiwan. In return, Washington may have to promise to limit exporting weapons to Taiwan in terms of volume and/or types. Definitely, other issues can be discussed through dialogues and negotiations between both sides. In this process, a third party, for instance, the European Union (EU) can mediate between Washington and Beijing through shuttle diplomacy. In addition to the EU, other regional powers, international organizations including the UN, global non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and global media should promote global public opinions on this critical issue and put pressures on both powers to reach a compromise. It is still tough to achieve this compromise, but as of now, it looks like there are few options other than that for avoiding a cold or hot war between the two powers and recovering the process of globalization.
If Washington is not willing to pursue any compromise with Beijing, it may have to upgrade and enhance its military capabilities considerably to maintain its military superiority in the Asia Pacific. But the problem is that it will not be an easy task for Washington. Although the US is currently ahead of China in terms of total military budget and capabilities, this gap is being narrowed continuously. For instance, in certain military areas China is matching or even exceeding the US including military ships and submarines, ballistic and cruise missiles, and air defense system (Rachman 2020). Furthermore, the American economy has been much more heavily damaged by the global pandemic than the Chinese economy. In the second quarter of 2020, the percentage decline of the US’s GDP relative to the same quarter in 2019 was -9.5 %. On the other hand, the Chinese economy grew by 3.2% in the same period compared to a year ago, rebounding relatively quickly from the first quarter’s sharp shrinkage (CNBC 2020). So according to the Center for Economics and Business Research based in the UK, the Chinese economy will be able to surpass the US economy in terms of total economic output by 2028, 5 years earlier than estimated (BBC 2020). It takes a tremendous amount of financial resources to create and maintain land and naval military bases around the world and engage in global arms race. The continuous (relative) decline of the American economy will serve as one of main barriers against achieving its military goals in the Asia Pacific.
Some people might think that the US has many allies in the region and they will support the US. But US’s security allies in the region are very close economic partners of China and moreover they are highly divided among themselves. For example, Japan and South Korea are divided by unresolved historical issues and some of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member countries including Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Brunei have adopted pro-Chinese policies. According to a 2020 survey, 74% of people in Laos favored China over the US, 69% in Brunei, 62% in Myanmar, 61% in Malaysia, and 58% in Cambodia respectively. Other ASEAN countries are reluctant to openly side with Washington because of China’s threat of economic and/or military retaliation. (Iwamoto 2020). All in all, time seems to be on China’s side. The more time passes by, the more difficult it will be for the US to achieve its military goals in the Asia-Pacific. Even if America wins an armed conflict with China, it should kept in mind that China has enough military capabilities to deal a heavy blow to Americans, causing a large amount of human casualties and tremendous economic sufferings. We should not forget a historical lesson that Great Britain was a victorious country of WW I and WW II, but its economic and industrial bases were totally devastated and it lost its dominant economic and political position and status in the international system.
Given the seriousness of the issue at hand and the worsening global political landscape, it think it is time for us to be more cool-headed and face up to reality. A hegemonic armed conflict between the two great powers is not inevitable, but the chance is increasing. This armed conflict could end as a limited one such as a skirmish or naval clash, but it could develop into WW III, resulting in millions of human casualties if other regional powers are involved such as Russia, Japan, and India. As well, it would cause the collapse of the whole process of globalization. Obviously, the total collapse of globalization would double economic and social sufferings for many individuals and societies who are still struggling with the current pandemic crisis. The lack of global leadership destabilizes global relations, but a war between great powers could bring about the sinking of a whole vessel of globalization. Even if there is no hegemonic war, a prolonged rivalry between the two powers would give rise to a more fragmented global system, disrupting global flows and relations very seriously.
As discussed previously, “hyper-globalization,” which has been accelerated since the 1980s, has produced negative outcomes as well as positive ones that include the spread of financial crises, global environmental degradation, and the spread of infectious diseases. Therefore, the speed and volume of globalization may have to be modulated depending upon sectors and issue areas, but it may not mean that nations including major powers have to return to isolationism and protectionism and ultra-nationalism in the early 20th century that caused WW II. There are certain structural factors in the international or global system that cannot be fully controlled by human actions, but despite this fact, we should do our utmost to prevent the worst case scenario in global politics as long as there is a glimmer of hope. Who knows? We may enter a new period of long peace among great powers and global economic prosperity if we can pass this dangerous transitional period in global politics without a hot or cold war between a system leader and a rising power.
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