Job Market Paper
J. O'Donnell (2017).
"Moral Hazard in Social Insurance Networks"
Examines the effect that informal social insurance has on work incentives in communities that lack formal insurance contracts. This primary innovation in this paper is in examining the important role that network effects play in the determination of income and consumption in the presence of moral hazard. Agents generate income by exerting effort, but this initial income is subject to a stochastic negative shock. A second stage sub-game then allows agents to transfer income freely. It can be shown that under general assumptions the equilibrium exists and is unique. Moreover, we characterize the conditions under which Nash equilibria coincide with the efficient solution. Effort is shown to be non-monotonic in the level of altruism, due to agents needing to balance free-riding against a desire to help out in the event of a neighbor suffering a negative income shock.
Working Papers
J. O'Donnell (2015).
"Characterization of Stable Manea Bargaining Networks"
Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2709520
This paper extends the work of Manea (AER, 2011) to allow for endogenous formation of networks. The set of link stable networks is characterized for all positive fixed costs per link. It can be shown that for all positive costs link stable Manea bargaining networks are of degree two or less. This means that link stable Manea networks are circles and line segments. This paper also describes the structure of the link stable networks for all costs. For high enough costs, below autarky levels, the only link stable networks involve bilateral bargaining. The analysis is also extended to Nash stable and strongly Nash stable networks.
J. O'Donnell (2015).
"Optimal Network Structure with Asymmetric Demands"
Draft available upon request
This paper studies the forces that affect optimal network structure and prices for a monopolist airline with the freedom to choose which markets to serve. The primary contribution of this paper is to extend the work of Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1995) to the case of asymmetric demands. Once markets are allowed to vary in size, it can be shown that the results change markedly. Optimal networks consist of a connected core with several spokes connected to each core. The core consists of direct connections between the largest cities.
Published Works
J. O'Donnell (2011).
"Characterization of Stable Manea Bargaining Networks" Honours Thesis
Published by: University of Queensland, available at http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:268619