NEW "Inequality, Welfare, and the Cost of Coordination Failure ," with Philip Ushchev, May 2026.
Abstract: Coordination failures arise when society gets stuck in a "bad" equilibrium when a Pareto superior one exists. How does wealth inequality affect coordination failure? This paper models a large, heterogeneous society where individuals' consumption-savings choices are influenced by investment spillovers. The cost of coordination failure (CCF) in this society is the welfare difference between the "good" (high investment) and the "bad" (low investment) equilibrium. We provide natural conditions under which the CCF is increasing under mean-preserving spreads in wealth inequality. We also establish a trifurcation result in which high enough inequality creates a coordination failure where none had existed. Starting from a stable equilibrium where investment is unaffected by inequality, the equilibrium becomes unstable as inequality increases, and two other stable equilibria - a good one and a bad one - emerge. In the bad equilibrium, inequality always reduces both aggregate investment and aggregate welfare. In the good one, inequality is always investment-enhancing. Furthermore, there is a range of parameters where inequality is actually Pareto-improving in the good equilibrium. In all cases, the welfare gap (the CCF) between the two equilibria increases with inequality.
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NEW "The Radicalizing Power of Group Inculcation: A Dynamic Model," May, 2026.
Abstract: How do ethical values and behaviors change over time? This study models the consequences of group inculcation - the persistent reinforcement of ethical values instilled in the young by coalitions of parents, religious figures, or political leaders. Every individual is a part of a lineage, i.e., a dynastic sequence of individuals, each endowed with discounted but fully altruistic preferences for one's successors. At each date, each individual in a cohort chooses an ethical act from a left-right continuum. Her choice reflects a balance between societal norms and her own ethical anchor inculcated from her "parent." She then inculcates her "children" who, in turn, make their own ethics-based decisions, and so on. Society is divided into either nonaligned, individual inculcators or one or more organized coalitions that collectively inculcate their child-members. In Stationary Markov Perfect equilibria, coalitions radicalize their members. Specifically, a coalition transmits values that moves its successors away from societal norms and toward extreme ethical positions. This happens even though coalition members at a point in time would find the values of their descendants abhorrent. Equilibrium paths are not necessarily monotone. A coalition that starts moving left can reverse itself and eventually radicalize to the right. The trajectory of a coalition's ethics depends on the discount factor, the initial distribution of values, and on the relative sizes of the coalitions. I explore several factors that could mitigate or de-radicalize society. These include limited commitments and alternative transmission mechanisms like imprinting.
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"From Demographic to Behavioral Dispersion," with Philip Ushchev, September, 2025.
Abstract: We study the effects of increased dispersion in a large, heterogeneous population. Individuals differ in a characteristic like productivity or wealth. Each individual's payoff depends on her type, her choices, and the aggregate distribution of behavior across the population. The comparative statics of relative dispersion refers to the difference between the change in the distribution of behavior in a given Nash equilibrium and an initial mean-preserving spread in the demographic distribution. The equilibrium amplifies (attenuates) dispersion when this difference is positive (negative). We show an equilibrium amplifies (attenuates) dispersion when (i) an individual's choice is a strategic complement (substitute) to population moments of the behavior distribution, and (ii) the sensitivity to changes in these moments is increasing (decreasing) across population types. We apply the results to environments with knowledge spillovers, social conformity pressures, and common pool resource extraction.
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"Carbon Consumption, the Carbon-Based Ecosystem, and Output," with C. Figueroa, R. Harrison, and M. Miranda, April, 2020.
Abstract: This paper studies the effects of the carbon-based ecosystem on a country's output. We propose and estimate a dynamic game production model in which a country's ecosystem, as measured by its reservoir of carbon in land biomass and soils, is a productive input. This reservoir is diminished when higher levels of greenhouse gas concentrations reduce land sink absorption of atmospheric carbon. In equilibrium, a country's land carbon policy accounts for its direct effects on the ecosystem and on diminished land sink as GHG concentrations increase.
We first estimate land sink absorption rates and the output elasticities of land use and the land carbon ecosystem for 152 countries. Calibrating the model to these estimates, we simulate the model to 2100 under four standard Representative Concentration Pathway scenarios.
In the simulations, all countries experience higher average annual GDP growth under lower GHG concentration scenarios. The growth differentials between high and low scenarios are starkest for more developed countries. When compared to a counterfactual constant sink model, the "active" sink makes little difference in low concentration scenarios, but decreases global GDP growth by around 1.3% per year over the next 80 years in the highest scenario. Again, the differences are most pronounced in developed countries.
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"A Dynamic Model of Authoritarian Social Control," forthcoming in Review of Economic Studies, 2025.
"Power, Property Rights, and the Dynamics of Local Wealth Appropriation," with Dan Cao and Yingqi Xu, forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025.
"Status Quo Property Protection in Politico-Legal Systems," American Economic Review: Insights, 5:191-206, 2023.
"The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies," with Dan Cao, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15:305-53, 2023.
"Optimal Collateralized Contracts," with D. Cao, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 12:45-74, 2020.
"Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Commons," with R. Harrison, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 163:386-408, 2019.
"Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons," with R. Harrison, International Economic Review 58: 751-82 , 2017.
"Auditing, Disclosure, and Verification in Organizations" with L. Anderlini and D. Gerardi, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 131: 393-408, 2016.
"Revealed Political Power," with J. Bai, International Economic Review, 54: 1085–1115, 2013.
"Communication and Learning," with L. Anderlini and D. Gerardi, Review of Economic Studies, 79(2): 419-450, 2012.
"On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power, with J. Bai, Review of Economic Studies, 78: 17-48, 2011.