“On the Limits of Free Trade in a Cournot World: When are Restrictions on Trade beneficial?" (with R. Amir and J. Y. Jin), (2022) Canadian Journal of Economics. Published online at https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12619

We analyze the effect of marginal import tariffs, export subsidies, production subsidies and consumption taxes on country-level as well as world social welfare and consumer surplus. We find that free trade is generally not optimal: some countries’ tariffs or subsidies can always improve world welfare. Every country’s export subsidy raises the average of world social welfare and consumer surplus.

“Political embeddedness and the adoption of environmental management practices: The mediating effects of institutional pressures” (with H. T. Nguyen, T. D. Vu, and H. Nguyen, H.) (2022) Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management Vol.29 (4) , 965-983.

Firms with close government relationships are less subject to environmental regulation, but face higher indirect pressure to implement environmentally freindly management practices. Overall this leads to better environmental management practices at politically embedded firms.

“Difficult to digest: Takeovers of distressed banks in Vietnam”, (with G. Phung) (2021) Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, Vol. 30 (3), 489-516.

Similar to many other cuntries, the Vietnamese government has pushed healthy banks to take over distressed banks. In this paper we document that these takeovers have a strong detrimental effect on the acquiring banks' profitability

“Advertising patterns in a dynamic oligopolistic growing market with decay” (with R. Amir and D. Machowska) (2021) Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 131, 104-229.

In oligopoly forms will advertize strategically and adapt the characteristics of their advertising effort to the advertising decisions of their competitors. Here we anlayze how firmw will choose between generic advertising that increases all firms' sales, offensive advertising that tries to lure away the competitor's clients and defensive advertising that stabilizes existing client relatioships.

“Debt aversion, education and credit self-rationing in SMEs", (with H. T. Nguyen, H.M. Nguyen and A. T.H. Nguyen) (2020) Small Business Economics, 1-19.

Entrepreneurs who would need financing refuse to take loans because of debt aversion. This self rationing of credit might be more important than credit rationing by banks. It is particularly relevant for entrepreneurs with low educational levels and likely grounded in cultural factors.

"Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in Libor Submissions" (with A. Hernando-Veciana), (with A. Hernando-Veciana), (2019), Review of Financial Studies, 33(6), 2585-2621.

During the financial crisis risky banks were rounding their Libor submissions to remain credible.

“Containing Systemic Risk by Taxing Banks Properly”, (with M. Roe), (2018) Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 35, 181-231.

We propose and discuss a simple, revenue-neutral tax reform that could substantially increase financial stability.

“Can Foreigners Improve the Profitability of Emerging Market Banks? Evidence from the Vietnamese Strategic Partner Program” (with Giang Phung) (2018) Emerging Markets Finance & Trade, 1–14.

Foreign bankers are only improving performance if they are hired by the bank's majority owner, but not if they are send by the strategic partner.

“Free trade versus autarky under asymmetric Cournot oligopoly”. (with R. Amir R, and J. Jin), (2016) Review of International Economics 25(1): 1467-9396.

Ricardo assumed perfect competition. Without perfect competition free trade can reduce world welfare as well as total world output.

“Prices and Deadweight Loss in Multi-Product Monopoly” (with R. Amir, J. Jin and G. Pech) (2016), Journal of Public Economic Theory, 18, (3): 21–16.

In an asymmetric linear Multi Product Monopoly prices are independent of cross elasticities.

“From Basel to bailouts: forty years of international attempts to bolster bank safety” (with C. Kobrak), (2015) Financial History Review, Volume, 22 (02):133-156

The 1988 Basel I regulations focused on credit risk, but the most important risks in the 70s, 80s and 90s were fraud, foreign exchange and interest rate risk. Losses at failed banks were substantially higher than capital levels required under Basel I.

“The Insider’s Curse” (with A. Hernando-Veciana), (2011), Games and Economic Behavior, 71, (2) : 339-350.

Information has negative value for an insider in an auction if he is bidding against many non informed outsiders.

“On the Effects of Banks’ Equity Ownership on Credit Markets”, (with R. Amir), (2011), Annals of Finance, 7,(1) : 31-52,

If banks own equity stakes in a company, the credit market becomes less competitive and interest rates will increase. Share owning lenders can therefore extract rents and harm other shareholders.

“Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: Incentives and welfare effects” (with R. Amir and J. Jin), (2010), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 46 (5): 855-866

Voluntary sharing of firm specific cost or demand information in Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly is always socially beneficial. This has important consequences for how antitrust law should treat information sharing.

“Demand Expansion and Elasticity Improvement as Complementary Marketing Goals”, (with C. Halmenschlager et A. Mantovani), (2010), Manchester School, 79 (1): 145-158

Marketing expenses can increase demand or make it less price sensitive. Which strategy is better?

“R&D Competition and Endogenous Spillovers” (with J. Jin), (2006), Manchester School, 74 (1): 40-51

Even in an asymmetric oligopoly endogenous spillovers will be symmetric.

“Applying the Market Economy Investor Principle to State Owned Companies - Lessons Learned from the German Landesbanken Cases”, (with H. Friederiszick), (2006), EC Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1 : 105-109

Applying the Private Investor Principle in state aid cases can easily produce absurd outcomes.

“On Taxation Pass-Through for a Monopoly Firm” (with R. Amir and I. Maret), (2005), Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 75/76 : 155-172

Tax pass-through on monopoly prices is under (in excess) of 100% according if the direct demand function is log-concave (log-convex).

“Do Bank-Firm Relationships reduce Bank Debt? Evidence from Japan” (with T. Miarka), (2005), European Journal of Finance, 11:75

Japanese firms with good bank relationships use more bonds and less bank debt. This indicates that bond market investors free-ride on monitoring by banks.

“Learning by doing , Spillovers and Shakeouts” (with J.Jin and J.Perote-Pena ), (2004), Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 14: 85-98

R&D spillovers are essential for maintaining a competitive economy and should be encouraged by public policy .

“Timing of public information and cost reduction“, (with J. Jin), (2002), Journal of Economics, 75 (3): 227-237.

Better information about demand increases social welfare but reduces profits of R&D intensive firms.

“On the Limits of Free Trade in a Cournot World: When are Restrictions on Trade Beneficial? (with R. Amir R, and J. Jin)

International trade is dominated by oligopolistic firms. We show that in these markets free trade is never optimal. There always exists one country that can increase world welfare by introducing a small tarif or an export subsidy. Other small distortions of trade will also frequently increase the world welfare.