Publications

Working Papers

  1. Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, and Makoto Yokoo. Fairness and False-Name-Proofness in Randomized Allocation of a Divisible Good. In submission, 2016. (A preliminary version was published in the proceedings of AAMAS-15)

  2. Yuto Tominaga, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Manipulations in Sequential Allocation with Random Sequences. R&R to Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), 2016. (A preliminary version was published in the proceedings of AAMAS-16)

Journal Articles

  1. Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange under Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR), 63: 515-555, 2018. DOI: 10.1613/jair.1.11254 (A preliminary version was published in the proceedings of AAAI-15) [CCF B]

  2. Takamasa Ihara, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, and Makoto Yokoo. Strategy-proof Cake Cutting Mechanisms for All-or-Nothing Utility. Fundamenta Informaticae, 158 (1-3): 41–61, 2018. Special issue on "Trends in Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems." DOI: 10.3233/FI-2018-1641 (A preliminary version was published in the proceedings of PRIMA-15) [CCF C]

Refereed Conference Papers

  1. Takehiro Kawasaki, Ryoji Wada, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Mechanism Design for Housing Markets over Social Networks. To appear in Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-21), Online. May 2020. [Core A*, CCF B]

  2. Taiki Todo and Makoto Yokoo. Split Manipulations in Cost Sharing of Minimum Cost Spanning Tree. In Proceedings of the 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI-20), Santiago de Conpostela, Spain. June 2020. [Core A, CCF B]

  3. Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, and Makoto Yokoo. False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures. In Proceedings of the 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI-20), Santiago de Conpostela, Spain. June 2020. [Core A, CCF B]

  4. Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanael Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Strategy-proof and non-wasteful multi-unit auction via social network. In Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-20), New York, New York, US. February 2020. [Core A*, CCF A]

  5. Nodoka Okada, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. SAT-Based Automated Mechanism Design for False-Name-Proof Facility Location. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA-19), Torino, Italy. October 2019. [Core B]

  6. Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Groups of Agents. In Proceedings of the 25th International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON-19), Xian, China. July 2019. [Core A]

  7. Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Manipulations-resistant facility location mechanisms for ZV-line graphs. In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-19), Montreal, Canada. May 2019. [Core A*, CCF B]

  8. Julien Lesca and Taiki Todo. Service Exchange Problem. In Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 23rd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-ECAI-18), Stockholm, Sweden. July 2018. [Core A*, CCF A]

  9. Yuho Wada, Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Facility Location with Variable and Dynamic Populations. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-18), Stockholm, Sweden. July 2018. [Core A*, CCF B]

  10. Ken C.-K. Fong, Minming Li, Pinyan Lu, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Facility Location Game with Fractional Preferences. In Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-18). New Orleans, US. February 2018. [Core A*, CCF A]

  11. Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Rename and False-Name Manipulations in Discrete Facility Location with Optional Preferences. In Proceedings of the Twentieth International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA-17). Nice, France. October 2017. [Core B]

  12. Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets. In Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA-16). Phuket, Thailand. August 2016. [Core B]

  13. Yuto Tominaga, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Manipulations in Two-Agent Sequential Allocation with Random Sequences. In Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-16). Singapore. May 2016. [Core A*, CCF B]

  14. Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. False-name-proof locations of two facilities: Economic and algorithmic approaches. In Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-16). Phoenix, Arizona, US. February 2016. [Core A*, CCF A]

  15. Takamasa Ihara, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, and Makoto Yokoo. Strategy-proof Cake Cutting for All-or-nothing Utility. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-agent Systems (PRIMA-15). Bertinoro, Italy. October 2015. [Core B]

  16. Zhaohong Sun, Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Exchange of Indivisible Objects with Asymmetry. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-15). Buenos Aires, Argentina. July 2015. [Core A*, CCF A]

  17. Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, Saya Onoue, and Ken-ichi Matsusmoto. Characteristics of Sustainable OSS Projects: A Theoretical and Empirical Study. In Proceedings of the Eighth ACM/IEEE International Workshop on Cooperative and Human Aspects of Software Engineering (CHASE-15). Florence, Italy. May 2015.

  18. Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, and Makoto Yokoo. Fairness and False-Name Manipulations in Randomized Cake Cutting. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-15). Istanbul, Turkey. May 2015. [Core A*, CCF B]

  19. Mingyu Guo, Hong Shen, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, and Makoto Yokoo. Social Decision with Minimal Efficiency Loss: An Automated Mechanism Design Approach. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-15). Istanbul, Turkey. May 2015. [Core A*, CCF B]

  20. Atsushi Iwasaki, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Hidenao Iwane, Hirokazu Anai, Mingyu Guo, and Makoto Yokoo. Parametric Mechanism Design via Quantifier Elimination (Extended Abstract). In Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-15). Istanbul, Turkey. May 2015.

  21. Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange with Multiple Indivisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-15). Austin, TX. January 2015. [Core A*, CCF A]

  22. Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, and Makoto Yokoo. Predicting Own Action: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy induced by Proper Scoring Rules. In Proceedings of the Second AAAI Conference on Human Computation (HCOMP-14). Palo Alto, CA. November 2014.

  23. Dengji Zhao, Siqi Luo, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. False-name-proof Combinatorial Auction Design via Single-minded Decomposition. In Proceedings of the Twenty-First European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI-14). Prague, Czech Republic. August 2014. [Core A, CCF B]

  24. Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Two Case Studies for Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-14). Quebec, Canada. July 2014. [Core A*, CCF A]

  25. Taiki Todo, Haixin Sun, and Makoto Yokoo. Strategyproof exchange with multiple private endowments. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-14). Quebec, Canada. July 2014. [Core A*, CCF A]

  26. Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo, and Makoto Yokoo. Coexistence of Utilitarian Efficiency and False-name-proofness in Social Choice. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-14). Paris, France. May 2014. [Core A*, CCF B]

  27. Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yujiro Kawasaki, Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, and Makoto Yokoo. Optimal False-name-proof Single-item Redistribution Mechanisms. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-14). Paris, France. May 2014. [Core A*, CCF B]

  28. Taiki Todo and Vincent Conitzer. False-name-proof Matching. In Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-13). Saint Paul, MN. May 2013. [Core A*, CCF B]

  29. Atsushi Iwasaki, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Miao Yao, and Makoto Yokoo. VCG-equivalent Mechanism in Expectation: General Framework for Constructing Iterative Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms. In Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-13). Saint Paul, MN. May 2013. [Core A*, CCF B]

  30. Taiki Todo, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. False-name-proofness in Online Mechanisms. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Automous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-12). Valencia, Spain. June 2012. [Core A*, CCF B]

  31. Taiki Todo, Runcong Li, Xuemei Hu, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. Generalizing Envy-Freeness Toward Group of Agents. In Proceedings of the Twenty-second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-11). Barcelona, Spain. July 2011. [Core A*, CCF A]

  32. Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. False-name-proof Mechanism Design without Money. In Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-11). Taipei, Taiwan. May 2011. [Core A*, CCF B]

  33. Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Makoto Yokoo. Characterization of Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions. In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT-10). Toronto, Canada. September 2010. [Core B]

  34. Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Taiki Todo, Yoshifusa Omori, Yuko Sakurai, and Makoto Yokoo. Worst-case Efficiency Ratio in False-name-proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms. In Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-10). Toronto, Canada. May 2010. [Core A*, CCF B]

  35. Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, and Yuko Sakurai. Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-09). Budapest, Hungary. May 2009. [Core A*, CCF B]

Dissertation

  • Taiki Todo. Toward Characterization of False-name-proof Mechanisms under Cardinal Utilities. Doctoral Dissertation. Department of Informatics, Kyushu University. January 2012. (under supervision of Makoto Yokoo)

  • Taiki Todo. Characterization of False-name-proofness and Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions (in Japanese). Master's Thesis. Department of Information Systems, Kyushu University. March 2010. (under supervision of Makoto Yokoo)

Other Talks

  1. Market Design and Game Theory. At the 24th Emergent System Symposium. Chino, Nagano. September 10, 2018. (Invited Lecture, in Japanese)

  2. Facility Location with Variable and Dynamic Populations. At ShanghaiTech University. Shanghai, China. April 27, 2018.

  3. Facility Location on Discrete Cycles and Grids with Variable Population. At Bar-Ilan University. Ramat Gan, Israel. June 28, 2017.

  4. Facility Location on Discrete Cycles and Grids with Variable Population. At Technion. Haifa, Israel. June 26, 2017.

  5. Facility Location on Discrete Cycles and Grids with Variable Population. At The Open University of Israel. Ra'anana, Israel. June 25, 2017.

  6. Fairness and False-Name-Proofness in Randomized Allocation of a Divisible Good. In Dagstuhl Seminar 16232: Fair Division. Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany. June 9, 2016.

  7. Establishing a Theory for Exchange of Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences. In Microsoft Research Japan-Korea Academic Day 2016. Tokyo, Japan. May 20, 2016. (Poster Presentation)

  8. False-name-proof Mechanism Design without Money. At University of Adelaide. North Adelaide, Australia. November 25, 2015.

  9. False-name-proof Mechanism Design without Money. At City University of Hong Kong. Kowloon, Hong Kong. June 4, 2015.

  10. Establishing a Theory for Exchange of Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences. In Microsoft Research Korea-Japan Academic Day 2015. Seoul, Korea. May 7, 2015.

  11. Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences: Beyond Sönmez's Result. In the Sixth International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis (AMEC/TADA-14). Paris, France. May 5, 2014.

  12. A complexity approach for Pareto efficient exchange with multiple indivisible goods. In Warsaw Workshop on Economic and Computational Aspects of Game Theory and Social Choice (ECAGS 2014). Warsaw, Poland. March 15, 2014.

  13. Strategy-proof exchange with multiple private endowments. In the First International Workshop on Market Design Technologies for Sustainable Development. Yokohama, Japan. November 26-28, 2013.

  14. False-name-proof Matching. In Duke CS-ECON Seminar. Durham, NC. February 20, 2013.

  15. Mechanism Design in Highly Anonymous Environments. In the 21st Gathering of JSPS Japanese Fellows. Boston, MA. October 26, 2012.

  16. Generalizing Envy-Freeness Toward Group of Agents. In the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-12). Valencia, Spain. June 6, 2012. (Poster Presentation)

  17. Envy-Freeness for Groups of Agents: Beyond Single-Minded Domain. In the Joint Workshop on Trading Agent Design and Analysis and Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (TADA/AMEC-12). Valencia, Spain. June 4, 2012.

  18. False-name-proof Mechanism Design without Money. In Duke CS-ECON Seminar. Durham, NC. April 27, 2012.

  19. False-name-proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real Line. In the Sixth Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-10). December 14, 2010.

  20. False-name-proofness in Online Mechanisms. In the First International Joint Agent Workshop and Symposium (iJAWS-10). Furano, Japan. October 29, 2010.

  21. False-name-proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real Line. In Hitotsubashi G-COE Workshop on Choice, Games, and Welfare. Tokyo, Japan. October 23-24, 2010.

  22. Characterization of Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions. In the Twelfth International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC-10). Toronto, Canada. May 10, 2010.

  23. Characterization of False-name-proof Social Choice Mechanisms. In AAMAS-10 Doctoral Mentoring Program. Toronto, Canada. May 9, 2010. [poster]

  24. False-name-proofness in Online Mechanisms. In COST-ADT Doctoral School on Computational Social Choice. Estoril, Portugal. April 9-14, 2010.

  25. Characterization of Strategy-proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-name-proofness. In the Fifth Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-09). December 2009.

  26. Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions. In Hitotsubashi G-COE Conference on Choice, Games, and Welfare 2009: Mechanism Design. Tokyo, Japan. September 24-25, 2009.