Research

As my publications indicate [Publications] my areas of research cover different but related areas. One specialization is in Ancient Greek Philosophy, with a particular interest in the philosopher Aristotle; a second is the philosophy of the emotions. Concerning the former, I am particularly interested in the ways in which Plato and Aristotle bring their philosophical psychology to their account of value, and virtue theory in particular. Aristotle’s understanding of the emotions is a major interest. I can best explain these and other interests by briefly speaking to a few of my papers.

“Aristotle and the Emotions" [article] attempts to understand Aristotle’s depiction of the passions in his Rhetoric, to understand the ways in which he can explain emotions begetting changes in judgment, and the roles for pleasure and pain. As well, I try to show that there 'ta pathē' comes very close to our understanding of the emotions. I take Aristotle here to be drawing boundaries that were not clear prior to his thinking, boundaries that very much remain with us today.

Some of these interests are further developed in "Passion and Persuasion" (in Blackwell's Companion to Aristotle)[Introduction], including the ways and the extent to which passions change our judgments, are themselves open to reason, and how the appeal to the persuasive powers of passion can be seen by Aristotle to be an appropriate part of rhetoric. On this last matter the contrast with Plato is illuminating. The contrast between Aristotle and Plato on the value of passion in the ethical realm is considered in "The Value of Passions in Plato and Aristotle"[article].

In other papers that concern Aristotle on passion and value, I have tried to depict particular emotions, their roles in specific virtues, and (at times) to defend Aristotle's understanding against some current criticisms (e.g."Aristotle's Courageous Passions" [Article] and "Aristotle's Account of Anger: Narcissism and Illusions of Self Sufficiency" [Introduction]). Although both of these papers are concerned with Aristotle on these questions, the position Aristotle takes has seemed to me to be both plausible and promising.

“Aristotle's Exclusion of Anger from the Experience of Tragedy" [Introduction] reflects on the account and role Aristotle gives to the emotions in tragedy. Most famously, Aristotle highlights fear and pity in this context, but he mentions other emotions as relevant, and opens the door to still others. My question here is whether he can think that anger is an appropriate response to tragedy and why. Thinking about this leads to a better appreciation of Aristotle's understanding of tragedy and the role various emotions are to take. In this work I am, in part, reacting to the thinking of Richard Bosley (See: http://www.themean.ca).

“Relativizing Moral Excellence in Aristotle" [Article] and “The Mean Relative to Us" [Article] reflects on Aristotle’s account of virtue, and his claim that virtue is a mean relative to us. I depict several ways Aristotle's idea of a mean relative to us has been or can be understood, and argue that the claim comments not only on the activities of virtue, but also on the character of those involved. If Aristotle’s analogy of the differences between Milo and the beginner at athletic exercises is to be taken seriously, then not only are each of their training regimens different, but also the realizations of particular virtues can differ amongst us, while each remains fully virtuous. Again, pursuing Aristotle’s analogy, these differences arise through differences in the persons and their activities, and their stage of development. All of this is meant to be so without the account descending into any kind of subjectivism. That virtue is relative to us becomes no more outlandish than it is that our health or pant size is relative to us. As with Aristotle's understanding of the value for diverse emotions, I take his position here to be a plausible way and promising way to understand human virtues.

Contemporary theorizing about the emotions is a second area of interest. To some measure I am influenced by Aristotle’s reflections on these same matters, but my writing is most usefully seen in terms of Robert Solomon’s attempt to analyze emotions in terms of judgements, and his denial (at least initially) that feelings are relevant to emotion's occurrence. While one can see that and how Solomon’s cognitivist approach (particularly his identification of emotions with special kinds of judgments) can explain a great deal about the emotions, I take him to be mistaken. This has lead me in two directions. First, I have attempted to show that cognition and or judgment is not sufficient to explain the emotions, and, in cases, not necessary either (e.g. “A New View of Emotions"[New]). Second, I have been interested to examine the role that feelings have been given in contemporary accounts, and argue for what I take to be a better understanding.

In “Feelings and Emotions” [ Feelings]), I show that contemporary theorizing about the emotions has tended to cast feelings as dependent presences -- where their identity is to be given by present judgments deemed relevant to the particular emotion. A feeling is to be seen as a feeling of anger not because of the feeling itself, but because of presumed present evaluative judgments. As well, as showing the ways in which (and the extent to which) contemporary theories have have come to these conclusions, I argue that both the dependency claim and the claim about the role for judgments are mistaken. The argument is furthered in “On Feeling Angry and Elated” [Introduction]. “Unfelt Feelings in Pain and Emotions”[Unfelt]) argues that our feelings can be taken to be a component of emotion, and that they can be present unfelt.

In “Modern Theories of Emotion” [Modern]) I provide what I take to be a more satisfactory account of the emotions. Unsurprisingly, my emphasis is on the importance of feelings. In Philosophy and the Emotions [Philosophy] I bring together a number of essays concerned with the ontology and make-up of the emotions, including works by Solomon, Griffiths, Greenspan, De Sousa, Stocker, and Robinson.

“What we Love" [Introduction] is a paper which looks at Plato’s account of love in order to discern why he thinks that the more abstract is a truer, more valuable object of love. It also traces similar lines of thought in some contemporary thinking; and then tries to show that and why this way of thinking is mistaken. The aim is to allow that and explain why a person can be love's highly valued object.

My more recent recent work in contemporary theories of the emotions has turned to consider the values emotions take in our lives, and the bases for them. This can be seen in papers such as "What we Love" and "Aristotle's Account of Anger" (above). In "On Pity and Its Appropriateness" [Introduction]), I note a cultural change in attitudes towards pity (once thought an appropriate and valuable emotion, but no longer), and argue that and why the emotion remains appropriate and valuable.

In Inappropriate Passions (in Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics': A Critical Guide) [Introduction] I try to account for the nature of and differences in passions' inappropriateness as understood by Aristotle. In part, I am concerned with the nature and differences between passions being inappropriate in certain circumstances (e.g. anger) vs. passions said to be simply inappropriate (e.g. envy). One interesting complication concerning both cases is whether and the extent to which the domain in which the passion occurs (e.g. in tragedy, comedy, in mundane life) makes a difference that passion's inappropriateness or appropriateness, the nature of the difference (if any), and how Aristotle can account for this.

I continue to work on a book concerning Aristotle's account of the emotion. The project speaks to Aristotle's debts to Plato on the topic, his diverse depictions of the passions, and the reasons for this, his understanding of the ethical roles and values for the passions, and particular studies of the same. One interesting puzzle here concerns the possibility of certain passions being inappropriate to ethics, but apt elsewhere.

More recently, I have been thinking further about Aristotle's account of fear. "Aristotle's Understanding of Fear's Expression" is an attempt to comprehend how Aristotle thinks fear leads to activity (when it does), and why it does not do so (when it does not). Unlike his thinking about anger, he does not have a desire based explanation -- yet he does think that fear can yield activity in humans and non-humans (Abstract and Opening). "Fear, Tragedy, and Insight" is a companion study. It tries to discern whether Aristotle can capture the intuition that the passions experieinced in response to tragedy (the art form) can bring insight, indeed be particularly insightful, using fear as way into this problem (Opening).

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