Stephan Lauermann

LatestThinking Video on "Informal Elections" 


CV 


Publications

Bidding in a Common-Value Auction with an Unknown Number of Competitors
2022, with Andre Speit, accepted at Econometrica

A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation
2022, with Asher Wolinsky, Theoretical Economics

Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections
2022, with Mehmet Ekmekci, Theoretical Economics

The Balance Condition in Search-and-Matching Models
2020, with Georg Nöldeke and Thomas Tröger, Econometrica.

Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation  [Slides]
2020, with Mehmet Ekmekci, Review of Economic Studies.

Learning and Price Discovery in a Search Market [Slides]
with Wolfram Merzyn and Gabor Virag; Review of Economic Studies, 2017.

Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition
with Asher Wolinsky; American Economic Review, 2017.

Search with Adverse Selection [Slides]
with Asher Wolinsky; Econometrica, 2016.

Existence of Steady-State Equilibria in Matching Models with Search Frictions
with Georg Nöldeke, Economic Letters, 2015.

Stable Marriages and Search Frictions [Slides]
with Georg Nöldeke; Journal of Economic Theory, 2014.

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach
American Economic Review, 2013.

Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect
with Gabor Virag, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2012.

Asymmetric Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets: An Inversion Result
Journal of Economic Theory, 2012.


Working Papers

Informal Elections with Dispersed Information
2022, with Mehmet Ekmekci; Online Supplement

Auctions with Frictions
2023, with Asher Wolinsky

Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections
2021, with Carl Heese

Fishing for a Veto,
2020, With Kailin Chen and Mehmet Ekmekci


Ongoing Projects, Old Working Papers, and Notes

Stable Assignments and Search Frictions,
with Georg Nöldek

Bidder Solicitation in Common-Value Auctions,
with Asher Wolinsky

Remarks on Optimal Simultaneous Search,
November 2018, with Asher Wolinsky (SSRN)

A Common Value Auction with Bidder Solicitation: The General Analysis
August 2013, with Asher Wolinsky, Supplement 

This working paper is obsolete. It is superseded by "A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation" and "Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition."

Contact

University of Bonn

Institut for Microeconomics

 +49 (0) 228 73 6327

s.lauermann@uni-bonn.de

Raum 3.004 (3. Etage Altbau Juridicum)

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Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn

Secretary

Frau Manuela Hildebrand

manuela.hildebrand@uni-bonn.de

+49 228 73 9198

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Slides