The Cooperative Pass

by Phillip Martin, Scarsdale, NY

In Problem B of the July, 2007 Master Solvers’ Club, directors David Berkowitz and Larry Cohen suggest that after one diamond—two clubs—pass—pass—? opener might double with a 4=2=5=2 minimum, intending to correct hearts to spades. They go so far as to say, “In the modern era of negative doubles, opener strains to reopen with a double on almost any hand with shortness in overcaller’s suit.

Really? This was an understandable point of view back when negative doubles were new. Players then were reluctant to give up penalty doubles without the assurance that they could still penalize an intervening opponent. But in an era when most players have never used penalty doubles of overcalls, it is surprising to find this view still floating about. Why let a compulsive fear of letting the opponents off the hook in one isolated situation distort your own constructive bidding? Yes, opener should strain to reopen with shortness in the overcaller’s suit, but that doesn’t mean he must double. Unless he has extras, opener should double only with support for the unbid suits

To see why, let’s back up to general strategy in competitive auctions. It is well-known that the burden of entering an auction rests more heavily on the player with shortness in the opponents’ suit. (This, incidentally, is why opener should act with shortness; it has nothing to do with negative doubles. With shortness in overcaller’s suit, opener should reopen even if responder’s double would have been for penalties.) A corollary of this principle is less well-known: When you do not hold shortness in the opponents’ suit, it is often advisable to stay out of the auction even with a moderately strong hand. Many years ago, I was first exposed to this idea in this situation:

Treating the hand as a three-card game-invitational raise, I doubled and then bid three hearts over partner’s two spades. Partner, holding:

♠ K Q 6 2   ♥ A Q 6 5 4   ♦ Q 6 4   ♣ 3,

carried on to four hearts, which went down one on diamond ruffs. I’m sure you and your favorite partner would find your way to three notrump, but Marc Jacobus, holding these cards at the other table, demonstrated an easier way to score a game bonus, or close to it. He passed over two diamonds. His partner passed also, and the defenders collected 300.

This deal was a revelation to me. Pass hadn’t even crossed my mind. As a firm believer in raising partner whenever possible, I wasn’t prepared to concede it was the percentage action, but it certainly had a lot going for it. Why bid if partner can be counted on to reopen with diamond shortness? If opener doubles, responder can still show a three-card invitational raise by jumping to three hearts. But if opener, with diamond length, doesn’t reopen, you have hit the jackpot. At this vulnerability, even if your counterparts bid and make a game at the other table, your loss is small. More often, you will collect 200 or 300 against a partscore or, better yet, go plus at both tables. The problem with passing, of course, is that the auction might reach an uncomfortable level before it gets back to you.

After that deal, I began experimenting with this “cooperative pass” in a variety of situations. Before negative doubles became ubiquitous, some experts, such as Marshall Miles and S. J. Simon, recommended abandoning the strict penalty double and playing a double of an overcall as cooperative, sometimes called a “Simon double,” suggesting not a stack but a moderate holding in overcaller’s suit and a misfit for opener’s. Simon originally called these “proposal-to-partner doubles.” With shortness in the overcaller’s suit, opener would normally pull such a double. Over an overcall, I call a pass with substantial values and some length in the intervenor’s suit “cooperative” because it functions in much the same way as a Simon double. Partner is expected to “pull” the pass with shortness. A cooperative pass differs from a traditional trap pass in that you don’t intend to sit for a reopening double. The reason you are passing is that your offensive prospects depend on finding partner with shortness in the intervenor’s suit.

In time, I came up with three conditions for employing this tactic. When these conditions were satisfied, the pass seemed to work out more often than not:

(1)                         You have game-invitational strength with three cards in the opponent’s suit.(With greater length, you probably have a traditional trap pass.)

(2)                         You have a way to show your values should partner reopen with a double.

(3)                         You have a sensible action should advancer (your LHO) produce a single raise.

Condition (2) necessitated a few systemic adjustments.For example, I arrange to use lebensohl after opener’s reopening double. This agreement proved useful here:

Armed with lebensohl should opener double, I could anticipate being able to bid a constructive three diamonds in that scenario, satisfying condition (2). Thus I was free to pass two hearts. Partner, who held:

♠ Q J 8 7 5  ♥ J 9 6  ♦ A 3   ♣ K J 4,

passed also, and we were the only North-South pair with a plus score. There is nothing unusual about this layout. The frequency with which the cooperative pass leads to good results on innocuous-looking deals is astounding.

One of the most common hand-types for the cooperative pass is an invitational-strength hand with three cards in the overcaller’s suit and five cards in an unbid major. A negative double can be awkward with a five-card major, because it can be difficult thereafter to find a five-three fit. But a five-card major can actually be a plus for the cooperative pass, since provides a suit to jump in if partner doubles.

With spades and diamonds reversed, I would double.I would like to pass, but I can’t do so safely, since there is no adequate follow-up over partner’s reopening double. With the hand shown, however, I would pass, because with five spades I can bid three spades over a reopening double (provided that I needn’t worry about partner’s doubling without spade support). Meanwhile, if partner passes also, our side rates to go plus. By the way, Mike Lawrence faced this situation in the 1989 Bermuda Bowl. He passed over two clubs, and his partner, Kit Woolsey, with:

♠ 6    ♥ K Q J 9 7     ♦ A Q 7 6 3   ♣ 9 8,

reopened with two diamonds (not, I hasten to point out, with a misdescriptive double. Mike was now considerably better placed than if he had started with a negative double. Knowing that partner could not hold 3=5=4=1, he could forget about looking for a spade fit and could show his diamond support. He bid three clubs. (Unfortunately, after that excellent start, the players let the auction go off the rails and finished in four notrump, thoughtlessly spoiling my example.)

Spoiled example notwithstanding, it is clear that responder cannot afford to pass hands like the examples in this article if he must fear an off-shape reopening double. The cooperative pass and the off-shape double are incompatible, and one of them must go. For me, the choice is easy. Not only does the cooperative pass come up more often, the deals that it caters to are more critical. The IMP scale rewards decisions that turn a minus into a plus (which the cooperative pass is designed to do) more generously than those that turn a plus into a moderately larger plus. Ironically, the off-shape double, initially motivated by a fear of letting the opponents off the hook on occasion, indirectly allows the opponents to escape in scenarios that are both more common and more costly.

Reprinted by permission of The Bridge World.

© 2007 by Bridge World Magazine Inc.

Afterthoughts

It's astonishing how many players have a blindspot when the opportunity for a cooperative pass presents itself. The following problem appeared in the January, 2009 Master Solvers' Club:

To my mind, pass is a standout. Being non-vul against vul at IMPs makes it easy. If partner passes, you rate to be in a fine spot. If he bids three clubs, you can bid three notrump. If he bids three diamonds, you can continue with three hearts. And if he doubles, you have a happy choice between passing and bidding four hearts. It's hard even to imagine a likely scenario where pass doesn't work out. Yet only 3 of 27 panelists chose it.

Director Berkowitz, who chose three notrump, calls pass misguided, although he makes the case for it, apparently without even realizing it: "Actually, this is a conundrum. If partner can reopen with a double you want to declare, but if partner has an unsuitable hand to double (not enough hearts, too many spades), you want to defend." Exactly! Once you acknowledge this fact, how hard is it to carry your argument to its logical conclusion?