Research
PUBLICATIONS
Incentives in Matching Markets: Counting and Comparing Manipulating Agents (with Somouaoga Bonkoungou, Theoretical Economics, 2023): we compare manipulable matching mechanisms using a simple and intuitive criterion -- the number of agents with a profitable manipulation.
How should we score athletes and candidates: geometric scoring rules (with Aleksei Kondratev and Egor Ianovski, Operations Research, 2023): we characterize a family of geometric scoring rules with two desirable axioms and study its relation with optimal scoring rules.
Competition and Moral Behavior (with Xenia Adaeva and DOZENS of coauthors, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2023): we study how competition affects moral behavior and whether the answer depends on how we define competition and how we define moral behavior (it depends a great deal).
Minimal Envy and Popular Matchings (with Aleksei Kondratev, European Journal of Operational Research, 2022): we study refinement of Pareto efficiency in object allocation problem called popularity and discover its relation to envy.
2019 Crab Quota Auction: History, Evaluation, and Alternative Scenarios (with Dmitriy Ivanov, Nikita Kalinin and Ivan Susin, 2021, HSE Economic Journal): we document the largest ever resource auction ($2BLN) and propose alternative designs that minimize strategic complexity for bidders (we do so in Russian).
Comparing School Choice and College Admissions Mechanisms by Their Strategic Accessibility (with Somouaoga Bonkoungou, Theoretical Economics, 2021, working paper version): we compare manipulable matching mechanisms using a pretty universal criterion, which helps rationalizing a bunch of reforms.
Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules (with Aleksei Kondratev, Public Choice, 2019): we provide a taxonomy of voting rules w.r.t. how much they respect majority and protect minority (apparently one can do both).
Efficient Lottery Design (with Onur Kesten and Morimitsu Kurino, Social Choice and Welfare, 2017): we provide new tools for stochastic improvement in allocation lotteries.
Fairness and Efficiency in Strategy-proof Object Allocation Mechanisms (Journal of Economic Theory, 2017): I uncover the frontier of the three desiderata in a classical mechanism design problem
WORKING PAPERS
Reforms Meet Fairness Concerns In School And College Admissions (with Somouaoga Bonkoungou) - we evaluate the recent reforms in school matching systems from the fairness perspective. First, most of the reforms introduced mechanisms that are more fair by stability: when ever the old mechanism does not have a blocking student, the new mechanism does not have a blocking student either. Second, some reforms introduced mechanisms that are more fair by counting: the old mechanism always has at least as many blocking students as the new mechanism.
Identifying Bid Leakage In Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach (with Dmitry Ivanov, presented at ACM EC'19) - here we analyze 600 000 procurement auctions in Russia and for each of them estimate the probability that the bids were leaked to the winner of the auction.
Information Avoidance is not Strategic (with Homayoon Moradi) -- here we find that information avoidance in the classic Dana, Weber, Kuang setting is robust to the (extreme) changes in probabilities but vanishes with the change of the order in which dictators receive the information. The most consistent with the findings is a non-strategic motive like anchoring: subjects follow what they see and ignore what they do not see at the moment.