"Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowing How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence" [pdf]
State of play piece in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford University Press, forthcoming (with Marc Moffett)
This is an essay on the philosophy of intelligence. We articulate and examine general intellectualist and anti-intellectualist theories of intelligence and intelligent action -- as originally discussed by Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind, and subsequently refined by recent work on knowledge how. One of the primary aims is to illuminate some of the main issues and arguments in the contemporary debate over knowledge how. A second aim is to highlight the broader theoretical significance of knowledge how, which we argue may serve as a hinge upon which our general understanding of mind and action turns. The role of knowledge how (and other states of intelligence) in various debates in epistemology, ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science is also discussed.
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