papers & projects

Published and forthcoming papers

"Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming

"Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowing How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence"
State of play essay in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford University Press, 2011 (with Marc Moffett)

< pdf > < abstract >

"Non-propositional Intellectualism"
In Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford University Press, 2011 (with Marc Moffett)

< pdf > < abstract >

"A New Framework for Conceptualism"
Noûs 45, 1: 167-189, 2011 (with Enrico Grube and Dan Korman)

< pdf > < abstract >

"The Folk on Knowing How"
Philosophical Studies 142, 3: 387-401, 2009 (with Marc Moffett and Jen Wright)

< pdf > < abstract >

"Asymmetries in Judgments of Responsibility and Intentional Action"
Mind & Language 24, 1: 24-50, 2009 (with Jen Wright)

< pdf > < abstract >

"Know-how and Concept Possession"
Philosophical Studies 136, 1: 31-57, 2007 (with Marc Moffett)

< pdf > < abstract >

In progress (tentative titles)

"The Intellectual Given" < pdf >

A theory of intuition and intuitive justification.

"Grasping the Third Realm" < pdf >

An explanation of intuitive knowledge of abstracta.

"Practical Perception"

A conceptualist account of how perception leads immediately to intelligent action.

Slides from the Barnard-Columbia Perception Workshop and ANU Perceptual Capacities Workshop

"Presentation and Content" < pdf >

On Susanna Siegel's The Contents of Visual Experience.

"Knowledge How and the Possibility of Intelligent Action" (with Marc Moffett)

An intellectualist account of knowledge how and intelligent action that avoids Ryle's regress argument.

Slides from the talk.

"Conceptions in Progress" (with Marc Moffett)

A theory of conceptions and their role in understanding and philosophical progress.

Slides and handout from the Harvard Symposium on Progress in Philosophy (see a review of the event here) and Cologne Conference on the Epistemology of Philosophy

"Conceptions, Understanding, and Wisdom" (with Marc Moffett)

A theory of conceptions and their role in understanding, wisdom, and intelligent action.

Slides from the Bled Conference on Knowledge, Understanding, and Wisdom

"Objectual Semantics for wh-attributions" (with Marc Moffett)

" 'knowing what it is like': Towards an Objectualist Account"

Other projects

Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action
Oxford University Press, 2011 (co-edited with Marc Moffett)

< preface > < table of contents > < OUP site >

Featuring papers by Julia Annas, David Braun, Brit Brogaard, Yuri Cath, Michael Devitt, Jonathan Ginzburg, Katherine Hawley, Jennifer Hornsby, Laura Michaelis, Alva Noë, Ian Rumfitt, Paul Snowdon, Michael Tye, and Marc and I.

"Knowledge How and Knowledge That"
Entry in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, edited by B. Kaldis, Sage Publications Ltd., forthcoming

< pdf >

"Knowledge How"
Entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by J. Fieser and B. Dowden (area edited by T. Poston), forthcoming (with Marc Moffett)

Dissertation

The Intellectual Given, University of Texas at Austin, 2010

I develop and defend the quasi-perceptualist view that intuition is basically just like perceptual experience, just not sensory. Part I is on the nature of intuition. Part II is on intuition's epistemic status. Part III is on how, given a realist metaphysics, intuition manages to "connect" to abstract facts intuited. (Full abstract here.)

A brief description of my research that summarizes and connects the various papers and projects above can be found here.