Publications

I. BOOKS 

  Authored

Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground, MIT Press, 1993.

• • • Chapter 5 reprinted in Alvin Goldman, ed., Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, MIT Press, 1993, 69-94.

Knowledge and its Place in Nature, Oxford University Press, 2002. 

• • • Chapter 1 reprinted in E. Sosa, J. Kim, J. Fantl and M. McGrath, eds., Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd edition, Blackwell, 2008, 647-659.  

On Reflection, Oxford University Press, 2012.

• • • Preliminary version of Chapter 3 translated into Chinese in Philosophical Analysis(Shanghai), 2(2011), 3-29.  

A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers, Oxford University Press,                 2014

           Includes articles marked with a single asterisk below.

Second Thoughts and the Epistemological Enterprise, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

      Includes articles marked with a double asterisk below.

Scientific Epistemology: An Introduction, Oxford University Press,  2021.

  Edited

Naturalizing Epistemology, MIT Press, 1985; 2nd edition, 1994. 

Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, Blackwell, 2001.

Goldman and his Critics, [with Brian McLaughlin], Blackwell, 2016.

II. ARTICLES

"Referring to Artifacts," Philosophical Review, LXXXIX (1980), 109-114. 

*"Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory," Journal of  Philosophy, LXXVII (1980), 597-612. 

• • • Reprinted in H. Kornblith, ed., Naturalizing Epistemology, MIT Press, 1985, 115-128; 2nd edition, 1994, 131-146. 

    • Translated into Hungarian as “Túl a Fundácionalizmuson és a Koherencia-Elméleten,” in F. Gabor and S. Péter, eds., Tudományfilozófia: Szöveggyûjtemény, Áron Kiadó(Budapest), 1999, 399-412.

    • Translated into Turkish in Kutadgubilig, November, 2014.

"The Psychological Turn," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60 (1982), 238-253.  

*"Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action," Philosophical Review, XCII (1983), 33-48. 

• • • Reprinted in E. Sosa, ed., Knowledge and Justification, vol. 2, The International Research Library of Philosophy, Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1994, 637-652.

    • Reprinted in R. Neta, ed., Epistemology, Routledge, 2012.

"Ever Since Descartes," Monist, 68 (1985), 264-276.

• • • Reprinted in G. Axtell, ed., Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, 41-52.

"What is Naturalistic Epistemology?," in H. Kornblith, ed., Naturalizing Epistemology, MIT Press, 1985, 1-13; 2nd edition, 1994, 1-14.

"Naturalizing Rationality," in P. Hare and N. Garver, eds., Naturalism and Rationality, Prometheus Books, 1986, 115-133.

"Some Social Features of Cognition," Synthese, 73 (1987), 27-41. 

*"How Internal Can You Get?," Synthese, 74(1988), 313-327. 

• • • Reprinted in H. Kornblith, ed., Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, Blackwell, 2001, 111-125.

*"The Unattainability of Coherence," in J. Bender, ed., The Current State of the Coherence Theory, Kluwer, 1989, 207-214.

**"Introspection and Misdirection," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67(1989), 410-422.  

"The Metaphysics of Irreducibility," [with Derk Pereboom], Philosophical Studies, 63(1991), 131-151.  

• • • Reprinted in J. Heil, ed., Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press, 2004, 709-725.

"The Laws of Thought," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,LII(1992), 895-911.  

*"Epistemic Normativity," Synthese, 94(1993), 357-376.

• • • Translated into Spanish as "Normatividad Epistémica," in M. Valdés and M. Fernández, eds., Normas, Virtudes y Valores Epistémicos, UNAM, 2011, 415-438.

*"A Conservative Approach to Social Epistemology," in F. F. Schmitt, ed., Socializing Epistemology, Rowman and Littlefield, 1994, 93-110.

• • • Translated into Italian as "Un Approccio Conservatore All'epistemologia Sociale," in G. Piazza, ed., Esperienza e Conscenza: Introduzione All'epistemelogia Sociale, LCS(Milan), 1995, 113-126.

"In Defense of Deductive Inference," Philosophical Studies, 76(1994), 247-257.  

*"Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XIX(1994), 39-52.

• • • Translated into Portuguese as “Naturalismo: Metafisico e Epistemológico,” Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência, 8(1998), 147-169.

"Naturalistic Epistemology and its Critics," Philosophical Topics, 23(1995), 237-255.

• • • Reprinted in L. Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings, Wadsworth, 2nd edition, 1999, 385-396; 3rd edition, 2003, 322-333.

    • Reprinted in S. Luper, ed., Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Pearson-Longman Publishers, 2004, 383-394.

"Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the A Priori," [with David Christensen], Philosophical Studies, 86(1997), 1-20.  

**"What Is It Like to Be Me?," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76(1998), 48-60.  

"The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry," in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey, eds., Rethinking Intuition, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, 129-141.

**"Distrusting Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIII(1999), 181-196.  

• • •  Reprinted in M. Huemer, ed., Epistemology: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, 2002, 275-291.

*“Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals,” Philosophical Perspectives, 13(1999), 327-346.  

• • • Translated into German as “Wissen beim Menschen und anderen Tieren,” in T. Grundmann, ed., Erkenntnistheorie: Positionen zwischen Tradition und Gegenwart, Mentis, 2001, 303-327.

“The Epistemology of Science and the Epistemology of Everyday Life,” Facta Philosophica, 1(1999), 21-37.

**“The Impurity of Reason,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81(2000), 67-89.  

“The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology,” Philosophical Issues, 10(2000), 24-32.

• • •  Translated into Spanish as “La Evasión Contextualista de la Epistemología,” Teorema, XIX(2000), 33-40.

“Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism,” in A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski, eds., Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2001, 231-248.

“Internalism and Externalism: A Brief Historical Introduction,” in H. Kornblith, ed., Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, Blackwell, 2001, 1-9. 

• • • Translated into Spanish in C. L. Garcia, A. E. Lagos, and P. K. Dávalos, eds., Teorías Contemporáneas de la Justificación Epistémica, UNAM Press, 2012.

"Roderick Chisholm and the Shaping of American Epistemology" and "Can Internalism Be Saved?," Metaphilosophy, 34(2003), 582-602 and 621-629.

*“Does Reliabilism Make Knowledge Merely Conditional?,” Philosophical Issues, 14(2004), 185-200.  

“Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge,” in J. Greco, ed., Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell, 2004, 126-134.

“Conditions on Cognitive Sanity and the Death of Internalism,” in R. Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge: New Studies on Cognition and Intentionality, de Gruyter, 2004, 77-88.

“Social Prerequisites for the Proper Function of Individual Reason,” Episteme, 1(2005), 169-176.

“Précis of Knowledge and its Place in Nature” and “Replies to Alvin Goldman, Martin Kusch and William Talbott,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXI(2005), 399-402 and 427-441.

• • • "Reply to Martin Kusch," translated into German as "Replik auf Martin Kusch," in  G. Vollmer and T. Sukopp, eds., Naturalistische Philosophie: Positionen, Perspektiven, Probleme, Mohr Siebeck(Tübingen), 2007, 108-113.

“Reply to Bermudez and BonJour,” Philosophical Studies, 127(2006), 337-349.  

“Appeals to Intuition and the Ambitions of Epistemology,” in S. Hetherington, ed., Epistemology Futures, Oxford University Press, 2006, 10-25.

“How to Refer to Artifacts,” in E. Margolis and S. Laurence, eds., Creations of the Mind: Essays on Artifacts and their Representation, Oxford University Press, 2007, 138-149.

“Wissen: Ein natürliches Phänomen,” in G. Vollmer and T. Sukopp, eds., Naturalistische Philosophie: Positionen, Perspektiven, Probleme, Mohr Siebeck(Tübingen), 2007, 83-97. 

*“Naturalism and Intuitions,” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 72(2007), 27-49.  

• • • Reprinted in C. Beyer and A. Burri, eds.,  Philosophical Knowledge: Its Possibility and Scope, Rodopi(Amsterdam), 2007, 27-49.    

"Epistemology and Cognitive Ethology,"  in E. Ribes-Iñesta and J. Burgos, eds., Knowledge, Cognition and Behavior, University of Guadalajara Press, 2007, 33-56.

• • • Translated into German as "Erkenntnistheorie und Kognitive Ethologie," in M. Jungert, E. Romfeld, T. Sukopp, and U. Voigt, eds., Interdisziplinarität: Theorie, Praxis, Probleme, Wissenschaftlische Buchgesellschaft, 2010, 89-108; second edition, 2013, 89-108.

    • Reprinted in S. Tolksdorf, ed., Conceptions of Knowledge, de Gruyter, 2012, 535-555.

"The Metaphysical Status of Knowledge," Philosophical Issues, 17(2007), 145-164.  

• • • Reprinted in Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift, 43(2008), 77-93.

"The Naturalistic Project in Epistemology: Where Do We Go from Here?,"in C. Mi and R.Chen, eds., Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Rodopi(Amsterdam), 2007, 39-59.

"Knowledge Needs No Justification," in Q. Smith, ed., Epistemology: New Essays, Oxford University Press, 2008, 5-23.

*"A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping," Analysis, 69(2009), 263-7.  

"Sosa in Perspective," Philosophical Studies, 144(2009), 127-36.  

**"What Reflective Endorsement Cannot Do," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXX(2010), 1-19.  

**"Belief in the Face of Controversy," in T. Warfield and R. Feldman, eds., Disagreement, Oxford University Press, 2010, 29-52.

• • • Translated into Portuguese as “A Crença Diante da Controvérsia,” in Sképsis, 13(2016), 35-67.

*"Why Should We Care about the Concept of Knowledge?," Episteme, 8(2011), 38-52.

*"Reasons, Naturalism and Transcendental Philosophy," in J. Smith and P. Sullivan, eds., Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism, Oxford University Press, 2011, 96-119.

"Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?," in C. Jäger and W. Löffler, eds., Epistemology: Context, Values, Disagreement, (Proceedings of the 34th International Wittgenstein Symposium), Ontos Verlag, 2012, 285-304.

• • • Revised version in D. Machuca, ed., Disagreement and Skepticism, Routledge, 2012, 260-276.

**"Naturalism vs. the First-Person Perspective," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Romanell Lecture, 87(2013), 107-126.

**"Is There Room for Armchair Theorizing in Epistemology?," in M. Haug, ed., Philosophical Methods: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, Routledge, 2014, 195-216.

"Naturalistic Defenses of Intuition," in E. Fischer and J. Collins, eds., Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Methodology, Routledge, 2015, 151-168.

**"The Role of Reasons in Epistemology," Episteme, 12(2015), 225-239.

"Epistemic Agency," in M. Á. Fernandez Vargas, ed., Performance Epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2016, 167-182.

"Summary [of On Reflection]" and "Replies to Boghossian and Smithies," Analysis, 76(2016), 39-40 and 69-80.

**"Doxastic Justification is Fundamental," Philosophical Topics, 45(2017), 63-80.

"How Central Are Judgment and Agency to Epistemology?," Philosophical Studies, 174(2017), 2585-2597.

"The Naturalistic Origins of Epistemic Consequentialism," in K. Ahlstrom-Vij and J. Dunn, eds., Epistemic Consequentialism, Oxford University Press, 2018, 70-84.

"Philosophy, Science, and Common Sense," in J. de Ridder, R. Peels, and R. van Woudenberg, eds., Scientism: Prospects and Problems, Oxford University Press, 2018, 127-148.

**"Our Sense of Self," in Second Thoughts and the Epistemological Enterprise, Cambridge University Press, 2019, 221-242.

**"Our Rational Nature," in Second Thoughts and the Epistemological Enterprise, Cambridge University Press, 2019, 243-261.

"Don't Think Twice, It's Alright," Philosophic Exchange, 48(2019), 1-26.

"Naturalism, Psychologism, Relativism," in N. Ashton, M. Kusch, R. McKenna, and K. Sodoma, eds., Social Epistemology and Epistemic Relativism, Routledge, 2020, 66-84.

"What Does Logic Have to Do with Justified Belief?: Why Doxastic Justification is Fundamental," in L. Oliveira and P. Silva, eds., Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance, Routledge, 2022, 40-58.

"Against Strawsonian Epistemology: Testimony, Self-Knowledge, Promising, and Resolving," in N. Ballantyne and D. Dunning, eds., Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology, Oxford University Press, 2022, 254-275.

"Naturalism and the Intellectual Legitimacy of Philosophy," Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 16(2024), 99-108.

"A Naturalistic Approach to Moral Epistemology," in A. Hossein-Khani, H. Shykh-Rezasi, H. Amiriara, and G. Kemp, eds., Naturalism and its Challenges, Routledge, 2025, 217-232.

"The Social Practice of Giving and Asking for Reasons," in P. Stovall and L. Koreň, eds., Why and How We Give and Ask for Reasons, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

"Two Kinds of Epistemic Evaluation," in B. Reed and A. K. Floweree, eds., Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere, Routledge, forthcoming.

III. ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES, CONTRIBUTIONS TO HANDBOOKS, ETC.

"Naturalized Epistemology," in J. Dancy and E. Sosa, eds., A Compan­ion to Epistemology, Blackwell, 1992, 297-300; revised and updated, in J. Dancy, E. Sosa, and M. Steup, eds., 2nd edition, 2010, 543-6.

"Introspection," in E. Craig, ed., The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1998, vol. 4, 837-842.

“In Defense of a Naturalized Epistemology,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Blackwell, 1998, 158-169.

• • • Translated into Croatian as “U Obranu Naturalizirane Epistemologiji,” in J. Greco and E. Sosa, eds., Epistemologija: Vodiu Teorije Znanja, Jesenski i Turk(Zagreb), 2004.

    • Translated into Portuguese in J. Greco and E. Sosa, eds., Compêndio de Epistemologia, Ediçōes Loyola(Sao Paulo), 2008.

"Natural Kinds," in R. Wilson and F. Kiel, eds., The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, MIT Press, 1999, 584-585.

“Alvin Goldman,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition, Macmillan, 2006, vol. 4, 147-8.

"Answers to Five Questions," in V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard, eds., Epistemology: 5 Questions, Automatic Press, 2008, 211-16. 

“Self-Profile,” in J. Dancy, E. Sosa, and M. Steup, eds., A Companion to Epistemology, 2nd edition, Blackwell, 2010, 163-8.

"Philosophical Naturalism," in J. Hawthorne, H. Cappelen, and T. Gendler, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Oxford University Press, 2016, 147-158.

"A Naturalistic Methodology," in G. D'Oro and S. Overgaard, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 150-172.

IV. BOOK REVIEWS AND CRITICAL STUDIES

of Joseph Margolis, Persons and Minds, Philosophical Review, LXXXVIII (1979), 109-111.

of Nicholas Rescher, Cognitive Systematization, Philosophical Review, XC (1981), 144-146.

of George Pappas, ed., Justification and Knowledge, Philosophical Review, XC (1981), 627-630.

of Marshall Swain, Reasons and Knowledge, Philosophical Review, XCII (1983), 460-462.

of Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, Ethics, 94 (1984), 711-712.

of D. W. Hamlyn, Perception, Learning and the Self, Philosophical Review, XCIV (1985), 408-411.

of John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 48(1988), 167-171.

of Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Philosophical Review, XCIX(1990), 131-134.

of Alan Millar, Reasons and Experience, Mind, CI(1992), 188-191.

of Jerrold J. Katz, The Metaphysics of Meaning, Minds and Machines, 3(1993), 239-241.

of Edward Stein, Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Philosophical Psychology, 10(1997), 555-557.

of Lynne Rudder Baker, Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind, Philosophy of Science, 65(1998), 377-379.

of Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LX(2000), 197-201.

of Laurence BonJour, Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(2003), 436-437.

of Joseph Rouse, How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism, Isis, 94(2003), 791-792.

of Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Analysis, 69(2009), 109-16. 

of Declan Smithies, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness, "Epistemic Justification and Reflection," Analysis, 81(2021), 793-803.

 of Sarah McGrath, Moral Knowledge, "Where Does Moral Knowledge Come From?," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 107(2023), 556-560.